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[FBIS Media Note] The following is a listing of economic legislation recently published in the press of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Citations followed by the notation "Translated" have been translated into English and are available in FBIS publications. (Numbers following the notation indicate FBIS serial numbers identifying the translations in electronic format.)

RUSSIA

Federal law No. 38 "On Preventing the Spread of AIDS in the Russian Federation." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 14)

Federal law No. 39 "On the Federal Budget for 1995." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1, 3-5) Translated as MM1104103795.

Federal law No. 40 "On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 pp 9-10) Translated as MM13O414O995.

Presidential edict No. 300 "On the Kabardino-Balkariya Free Economic Zone." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 13) Translated as 954EO796B.

Presidential edict No. 318 "On Salaries in the State Organs of Power." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1) Translated as MM0404110595.

Presidential edict No. 327 "On Immediate Measures to Improve the Activities of Oil Companies." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 11)

Presidential edict No. 334 "On Measures to Ensure Legality in the Development, Production, Sale and Operation of Encoding Equipment As Well As in the Provision of Information-Encoding Services." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 5) Translated as MM12O4134O95.

Government decree No. 190 "On Principles for the Rationalization of the Import Customs Tariff." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 6—BIZNES V ROSSII section) Translated as MM1OO4O84895.

Government decree No. 197 "On the Introduction of Payments for the Issue of Licenses for the Production, Bottling, Storage and Wholesale Sale of Alcoholic Products." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 6—BIZNES V ROSSII section)

Government decree No. 208 "On Government Regulation of Natural Gas Prices." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 13)

Government decree No. 209 "On Regulating Access to the System of Pipelines for Oil, Oil Products and Seaport Terminals for the Export of Oil and Oil Products Beyond the Customs Territory of the Russian Federation." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Rusian 12 Apr 95 p 11)

Government decree No. 295 "On the Introduction of Changes to Specific Decisions of the Russian Federation Government On the Question of Excise Tax Collection On Imported Tobacco Products." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 13) Translated as 954E0796A.

Government decree No. 296 "On the Price of Natural Gas." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 4)

Government decree No. 297 "On the Price of Natural Gas Delivered by Organizations Selling (Re-selling) Gas for the Use of the Population and Home-Building Cooperatives." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 4)

Government decree No. 304 "On Export Customs Duty and Excise Duty on Petroleum Extracted on the Territory of the Russian Federation." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 6) Translated as MM1104103795.

Government decree No. 305 "On Measures to Implement the Strictures of the Russian Federation President to the Federal Assembly 'On the Efficiency of Geverment in Russia' and on the Government Program 'Reform and Development of the Russian Economy 1995-1997." (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Rusian 12 Apr 95 pp 11, 13)

Government directive No. 419-R on efforts to stabilize the socioeconomic situation in Khabarovsk Kray. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 5)

Edict of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan "On Stimulation of the Development of Enterprise in the Republic of Tatarstan." (Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 1) Translated as 954F1933B.

BELARUS

Presidential edict No. 101 "On Measures to Carry Out the Reformation of State Property." (Minsk NARODNAYA HAZETA in Belarusian 21 Mar 95 p 1) Translated as 955C0016A.

GEORGIA

Edict issued by Georgian Head of State on organizational and economic measures to ensure the implementation of mass privatization. (Tbilisi KAVKASIONI in Georgian 22 Mar 95 p 1) Translated as AU0704113495C.

KAZAKHSTAN

Presidential edict "On the Republic Budget for 1995." (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 95 pp 1-2) Translated as 954F1903A.

Presidential edict "On the Introduction of Amendments to the Kazakhstan Republic Law on Destatization and Privatization." (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1) Translated as 954F1971A.

Presidential edict "On Formation of the Customs Committee of the Kazakhstan Republic Cabinet of Ministers." (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1) Translated as 954F2028A.

Presidential edict "On the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan." (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 1-3)

UKRAINE

Crimean Government decree No. 75 "On Increasing the Minimum Taxable Personal Income." (Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Mar 95 p 1) Translated as 954F1823A.

UZBEKISTAN

Presidential decree "On Additional Measures On Regulating Import and Export Operations." (Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 1) Translated as LD1204102995.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 27 Apr

LD2704061695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0542 GMT 27 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 27 (Itar-Tass) - Today's Moscow-based newspapers highlight the decisions announced by Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin to set up their electoral associations with themselves at the head.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA runs a commentary pointing out that "the President, the Prime Minister and the Duma Speaker are fashioning a party of power". In the newspaper's judgement, the Chernomyrdin-led bloc will consist of Party of Russian Unity and Accord, known as PRES, and four State Duma factions—those of PRES, Stability, New Regional Policy, and Russia.

The newspaper's opinion is that the bloc will not experince lack of funds and support from governors and regional chiefs but the paper doubts that the bloc will be supported by Russia's people.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA believes that the Rybkin-led bloc may consist of the Democratic Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the Socialist Party of the Working People, the Russian Social-Democratic People's Party, the Women of Russia, Realists, the moderate Communists, the agrarians, and the Federation of Commodity Producers".

IZVESTIYA carries a commentary pointing out that "the 'party of power' is stating an intention to retain power". The newspaper associates the formation of the two electoral blocs the start of a "backstage" phase of the struggle for power and "rivalry between political figures and groups that pursue narrow personal interests".

This new phase does not envision any "redistribution of political and economic power capable of having strategic consequences for the country," Izvestiya emphasises.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star) runs an interview with Gennadiy Melkov, Consultant at the State Duma Committee on Geopolitics, who declared for a "further concentration of power by the President". Melkov touched upon ways to overcome trends towards political, trade and economic separatism and to preserve Russia's territorial integrity.

TRUD carries an interview with Boris Artyomkin, Head of the Special Accounting Department of the Russian Interior Ministry's Main Directorate for the Execution of Punishments, who said that 7,000 convicts will be freed in an amnesty on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany. He said the amnesty will not apply to persons convicted for grave crimes.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA runs an article by Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Security, who points out that more than 30,000 people in Russia are killed every year in wilful murder cases alone.

According to Ilyukhin, about three million crimes are recorded in Russia annually, on average. However, his estimate is that 10-12 million crimes are committed in Russia every year. The writer of the article singles out the disregard for the law on the part of authorities as one of the causes of rising crime in the country.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov who said 5,300,000 million roubles will be needed for the economic rehabilitation of Chechnya.

"About 4,000,000 million roubles will be allocated from the Federal budget and the rest from the resources of sectoral funds and other sources," Panskov told the newspaper.

Today's newspapers mark the 9th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power station breakdown.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA points out that the Chernobyl clean-up operations involved about 400,000 people, with 7,000 of them dying or committing suicide and 30,000 sustaining disabilities.

Yeltsin on 'Heavy Agenda' for Summit With United States

LD2604150795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1454 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Itar-Tass)—"President Clinton and I have prepared such a heavy agenda (for the forthcoming summit) that we will need several meetings to discuss all the items", Russian President Boris Yeltsin told reporters on Wednesday [26 April].

However, Yeltsin declined to list the issues he is going to discuss with his U.S. counterpart.

According to reliable sources, the U.S.-Russian talks on May 10 are expected to begin with a face-to-face meeting between the two presidents, which is to be followed by two rounds of talks in a wider format. The first round will concentrate on political issues, while the second one will deal with economic problems. In the evening, Yeltsin and Clinton are scheduled to give a joint news conference.

G-7 Reportedly Unwilling To Restructure Russian Debt

LD2604174495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, April 26 (Interfax)—The G7 member nations are not prepared to restructure the debts of the former USSR taken over by Russia, a Russian delegation official told Interfax.

He described the April 25 meeting behind closed doors of the G7 finance ministers and national bank governors with the Russian delegation as difficult.

The official said that the meeting had been attended by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, Economy and Finance Ministers Yevgeniy Yasin and Vladimir Panskov, and acting Central Bank chairperson Tatyana Paramonova.

"My impression is that the restructuring of the Russian debt is deliberately kept off the agenda so as to put off the discussion for another year," the official complained. On the other hand, he said, before the week ends, working contacts to be held between Russian and G7 expert groups in Washington will show whether Russia's partners are prepared for reasonable compromises.

The Russian debt to foreign creditors is estimated as $112.7 billion as of January 1, 1995, of which over $80 billion to the western member nations of the Paris and London Clubs and nearly $20 billion to South Korea, Gulf countries and others. The official said that Russia insists on a long-term, 20 to 25 years, restructuring of the debt.

Chubays Says Russia Close to 'Financial Stabilization'

LD2704101195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0340 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Loshchilin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington, 27 Apr—Over the past few years Russia has never been so close to financial stabilization as it is now. This was said by Anatoliy Chubays, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, who addressed a sitting of the interim committee of the board of managers of the IMF in Washington on 26 April. For the time being, our main task is to reduce monthly inflation to 1 or 2 percent by mid summer. The present rate, standing at approximately 7 percent, is not yet a victory, but it is encouraging to see the first signs of the ruble becoming stronger, he said.

Chubays, who is the IMF Russian manager, said that provided present favorable tendencies hold, our country will—in cooperation with international financial organizations—soon be able to turn the corner and enter the stage of economic recovery. On the other hand, the first deputy prime minister stressed that by the end of 1995 Russia's internal debt will total around $130 billion, which will demand new changes to the schedule for servicing and paying debts. He expressed hope that an appropriate agreement will be concluded with the Paris Club, whose members are the leading international creditors.

The main part of Chubays's speech focused on explaining the Russian Government's views on transnational problems that directly concern the IMF's activity: the financial situation in the developing countries, investment in the infrastructure, and crises in the world capital investment markets. The Russian Federation manager of the IMF also dwelled on issues related to the dollar's instability, as well as on the lessons of the Mexican peso's crash. "The financial market in Russia turned out to be so advanced that it was affected by the crisis in Mexico," Chubays told an ITAR-TASS correspondent. "This is just another example that confirms that we have become an integral part of the world financial system."

'Pause for Thought' Idea on NATO Expansion Welcomed

MM2704080295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev: "A 'Pause for Thought' Would Harm No One"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problems that have arisen in connection with the plans for NATO's eastward expansion are still attracting close attention from politicians and strategists. The actual talk on the subject is poisoning the atmosphere in Europe and blocking the implementation of the "Partnership for Peace" program.

In this connection Italy's initiative, which has been called "Pause for Thought," seems very sensible. The gist of it is that the pause on the question of NATO's expansion will continue as long as is necessary and will be used to strengthen collaboration and cooperation among all the states of Europe.

Obviously the West needs this pause most of all. The well-known U.S. journalist Thomas Friedman, in an article published in THE NEW YORK TIMES, writes that an unreal atmosphere has developed in Washington around the question of NATO's expansion. In particular, Congress and the U.S. foreign policy leadership talk about admitting new countries to NATO as if they were admitting new members to the Young Christians' Association. The House of Representatives has just voted by 214 to 181 to admit Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to NATO, practically without even discussing the question of the consequences the need to defend these countries would have for the United States.

Why so frivolous? One explanation is that the United States actually does not believe that a Russian attack on East Europe is possible. And if there are no enemies, what does it matter who the friends are. Another explanation is that the argument is not actually about NATO at all. It is connected with the domestic political struggle in the United States itself. For the Republicans, who are advocating NATO's rapid expansion while Clinton is not in a hurry, it is a means of demonstrating that Clinton is making concessions to Russia.

Are there any really serious arguments for expanding the alliance? The writer of the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES does not think so. He agrees with those who believe that there are two reasons for expanding NATO: One does not concern Russia at all and the other concerns Russia alone. Both are equally invalid. According to the first, there is no particular reason at all to worry about NATO's expansion since it is simply a club to educate the new democracies and maintain the old ones. So why not admit the most important potential democracy —Russia—to this club. The second approach stems from the belief that Russia is innately expansionist and it should be immediately surrounded by NATO borders. But to be consistent, this border should be moved up to the Ukrainian-Russian border, not the Ukrainian-Polish border.

It seems that the ideas put forward by the writer of the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES, although paradoxical at times, are far more realistic than the pompous arguments of those who advocate NATO's eastward advance. And a "pause for thought" would not harm them at all.

Kozyrev To Discuss NATO Expansion at Moscow Summit

LD2704121195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1026 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 27 (INTERFAX) - Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is convinced that the issue of NATO's expansion to the East will be "seriously and constructively" discussed in the course of the Russian-American summit in Moscow on May 9-10. He declared about this in Washington Wednesday on the conclusion of two-hour talks with U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher.

In a conversation with an Interfax correspondent, Kozyrev said, "We are not ready to solve the issue of NATO's expansion to the East, there should be no hasty decisions in this sphere."

Kozyrev called to work out a new model for European security and made it clear that, in Russia's opinion, NATO should not play a leading role in European security. At the same time, Kozyrev confirmed Russia's readiness to cooperate with NATO. "However, this cooperation should be without any surprises like that which occurred in December 1994 in Brussels when we were forced to postpone the start of the program Russian Federation-NATO due to the alliance's decision to consider the issue on its expansion to the East," Kozyrev said.

In his words, nevertheless, this program will be "launched." "This will take place when we receive answers to the questions in which we are interested, including the question of how NATO suits European security. I am sure that answers will be found but a certain amount of time is needed for this," Kozyrev said.

He emphasized that in its relations with NATO, Russia takes into consideration that it is "a nuclear and the largest European country." "This is the precise classification of the Russian Federation in the documents of the North Atlantic Alliance," Kozyrev concluded.

Duma Delegation Arrives in Japan; To Visit U.S.

LD2704064895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0440 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TOKYO April 27 (Itar-Tass) - A delegation of Russia's State Duma, led by Speaker Ivan Rybkin, arrived in Japan on Thursday. The Russian MPs are to meet with Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, and Speakers of the Houses of Parliament Takako Doi and Bumbei Hara on April 27-28. The delegation is also to be received by Emperor Akihito.

Rybkin is being accompanied by Sergey Burkov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Property, Privatisation and Economic Activities, Mikhail Zadornov, Head of the Budgetary Committee, Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, and Sergey Yushenkov, Head of the Committee on Defence.

At the close of the official part of the visit programme, the delegation is to tour Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, on April 29. Then the Russian parliamentarians will leave by air for the United States for a working trip at the invitation of U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore.

When in the U.S. they will meet with U.S. congressional leaders and businessmen. The Russian MPs will end their tour of the U.S. on May 4.

Lukin Stresses Resolving Territorial Dispute with Japan

LD2604173095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 26 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan must be resolved so that "none of the parties feel like having lost its face," Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Vladimir Lukin told Interfax.

Lukin participates in the delegation headed by the State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin which will visit Japan on April 27-29.

Lukin said Moscow and Tokyo both realized that the two countries must be making "large steps towards compromising on the territorial problem."

Lukin agreed that the search for solutions to the problem was yet hard. He said the problem must finally be resolved, "though it is obvious that neither Japan nor Russia turned out to be in a disaster because of the unsettled territorial issue."

Lukin said that within the context of the present situation when "things are tough," the parties must not be in a rush and "neither Japan nor Russia should be somewhat humiliated."

Grachev Meets Jordan's Chief of Staff, Discusses Ties

LD2604145795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1432 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and head of Jordan's Joint Chief of Staff 'Abd-al-Hafiz al-Ka'abinah met in Moscow today to discuss aspects of bilateral military-technical cooperation.

In response to Interfax questions, Grachev said that the meeting focused on Russian supplies of armaments, materiel and spares to Jordan, in view of the fact that the majority of armaments used by Jordan are Soviet-made.

The sides also considered foreign political issues and "noted that the signing of a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel inspires hope for increased stability in the Middle East," said Grachev.

Speaking on the situation around Iraq, which was also discussed at the meeting, Grachev said that "Russia is ready to participate in efforts aiming at lifting sanctions against Baghdad since the state has actually fulfilled all the requirements of the international community."

Almost all states in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are striving to have "a powerful air Defense system," said Grachev. In his words, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar have requested Russian assistance in this respect.

Shafranik Views 'Fruitful' Visit to Iraq

LD2604194695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1925 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Viktor Lysechko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] AMMAN, April 26 (Itar-Tass)—A visit to Baghdad by the Russian official delegation was fruitful and helped find ways to finish the projects in Iraq that have been suspended by the U.N. sanctions, Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy Yuriy Shafranik said.

In an interview with Itar-Tass on Wednesday, Shafranik said that Russia does not want to loose strong positions in Iraq where dozens of thousands of Soviet specialists worked under various projects in the past.

The minister said that about 70 percent of these projects remained unfinished because of the Gulf war and the international sanctions imposed on Iraq.

"The resumption of work on these projects and the opening of new prospects will create thousands of jobs both in Russia and Iraq," Shafranik said.

Among the new projects the minister named the development of large oil fields in western al-Qurnah and northern Rumaylah with a total capacity of about one million barrels a day.

Shafranik pointed out that Iraq "has moved a good deal forward in the implementation of the U.N. resolutions and the world community should respond respectively."

Shafranik signed in Iraq an intergovernmental agreement and a protocol. From Iraq the delegation left for Jordan from where it will fly home on Thursday.

Iraqi Contract Seen Indicating That Sanctions May Soon Go

MK2704094095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Andrey Smirnov, Yekaterina Akopova: "Russian-Iraqi Oil Agreement. The Main Thing Is To Stake Out Your Plot of Land"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is firmly resolved to regain its positions on the Iraqi market lost after the Gulf war; this resolve was demonstrated during a visit to Iraq by a Russian delegation under Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik, which ended yesterday. Russia (to be more specific, apparently LUKoil) was given the right to develop two large oil fields in southern Iraq, rights that had also been sought by a number of large foreign firms. There is one "but," however: The agreement may go into force only after the anti-Iraqi sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in August 1990 are lifted or eased. This does not deter anybody, however. Both Russian and Western firms are trying to sign as many contracts as possible even before the sanctions are lifted because after that it will be too late.

The USSR's joining the anti-Iraqi sanctions was a justified measure. The issue was not only solidarity with other countries in pursuing a common line of conduct with regard to an aggressor; it was also done with the view to developing partnership relations with the West, which was seen as a compensation of sorts for the loss of traditional markets. These hopes did not come true, however, while illusions (that for the sake of the grand cause of bringing democracy to Russia it will be exempted from the stringent rules of competition on world markets) were dispelled and replaced with Moscow's chagrin and the desire to regain what has been lost.

By the time sanctions were imposed, trade relations between the USSR and Iraq were over 30 years old. The main area of cooperation was Soviet arms exports. The resumption of direct deliveries is currently unlikely—this would be too overt a challenge to the United Nations and the entire world. But the Iraqi market is still fairly promising for Russian manufacturers even in terms of civilian exports and investment. As they departed from Iraq, Soviet specialists left off more than 10 incomplete projects, including, among other things, the oil fields of Northern Rumayla and Western Qurna (an overall capacity of 1 million barrels of oil per day), which feature in the agreement signed by Yuriy Shafranik.

Unlike many other partners of the USSR, Iraq paid for weapons and other deliveries not only with promises of "eternal friendship," but also with oil (over 10 million tonnes a year), which was for the most part reexported. Before sanctions were imposed, oil exports earned Iraq more than $18 billion a year. Now this figure has plunged to $1.6 billion, of which more than half is spent on maintaining the UN sanctions commission and paying damages to Kuwait. The rest can be used to buy food and medicine. Therefore, Baghdad presently has no money to repay its $7-billion debt to Russia, although Moscow has been trying to push through the UN Security Council a decision under which the resolution allowing oil exports to pay for humanitarian deliveries would include a separate provision, adding: "and for servicing its debt to Russia."

Russia is not alone in its desire to have the embargo lifted or eased. Its stance is backed by France, which was the largest importer of Iraqi oil before the Gulf war. French and other West European firms have already visibly stepped up their activity on the Iraqi market—contracts they sign there are also due to go into force as soon as the sanctions are lifted. To all appearances, Iraq itself shares the assurance that the sanctions will soon be scrapped. Concurrently with the signing of the agreement on developing oil fields with Russia, the Iraqi parliament officially rejected UN Security Council Resolution No. 986, which allowed Baghdad to sell $2 billion worth of oil during six months. The resolution, which was passed under U.S. pressure, stipulated that the proceeds must be used exclusively to pay for humanitarian goods, while Iraq itself would not receive a single cent—all payments must be made to a special UN deposit account. The decisions by the Iraqi parliament can be seen as a method of pressuring the United Nations to make more significant concessions. The stepping up of Russian and other companies' efforts to divide the still closed market prove that the United Nations will sooner or later lift the sanctions. Yet another meeting to be devoted to the anti-Iraqi sanctions has been set for mid-June.

Zotov Remarks on Bosnia Impasse

LD2604173795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1622 GMT 26 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—Russia will consider the withdrawal of its UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] battalion if large-scale combat operations resume in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Envoy of the Russian President for Settlement in Former Yugoslavia and Russian representative in the international contact group on Bosnia Aleksandr Zotov told Interfax today.

In his words, other European states that have their units in the UNPROFOR had also said that the escalation of violence in Bosnia "might create unbearable conditions for U.N. peace-keepers' presence."

"It is so far difficult to say whether the four-month agreement on temporary cease-fire in Bosnia which expires on April 30 has been fully abandoned. At the same time, one cannot say it is observed. In fact, the agreement has never been fulfilled completely," noted the high-ranking diplomat.

"We have not faced total violence, military clashes are local but the situation is developing dangerously and alarmingly," he noted.

According to Zotov, Bosnia is between "a large war that has not begun and the end of a relative lull that used to exist. It is hard to predict in which direction the pendulum will swing."

"It is a fact that the spring offensive (of the Muslims - IF) has started in Bosnia. Sarajevo does not try to conceal this fact and explains it by saying that the Bosnian Serbs do not want to accept the plan of the contact group.

"The Muslim leaders have declared that the Serb recognition of the contact group's plan will ensure termination of hostilities and start a political process."

"The Muslims proceed from the fact that the Serb side is occupying Bosnian territories that much exceed the limits ensured by the contact group plan. This circumstance against the background of the Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace plan seems to legalize the military operations, which, strictly speaking, violate the ceasefire agreement," stressed the diplomat.

In its turn, "the Bosnian Serbs note the Muslims started offensive operations before the truce expired and they had to act in response. The events are developing with a military logic and it is hard to divide people into those who are on the offensive or retreating. Who are absolutely right or not."

In the opinion of Zotov, "the Bosnian situation was aggravated by the fact that the current situation does not satisfy Sarajevo. The Muslims were unwilling to have cease-fire, and even if conditions for prolonged truce are created they would like to make the truce short or at least limit it because, in their opinion, it somehow encourages Bosnian Serbs for further occupation of territories seized in combat operations. This status quo is inadmissible for Sarajevo," said the diplomat.

"On the other hand, a more or less active peace process would make the territories kept at a price of human lives a subject of political negotiations which might have reasonable compromises, including those territorial," he added.

In the opinion of the contact group "this process should be based on the adoption of its peace plan as the starting point, including the territorial divisions for the Muslim-Croat (51 percent) and Serb sides (49 percent).

There is so far no clear way to stop the violence in Bosnia and provide for reliable termination of hostilities in the region, said Zotov.

The problem is caused by the Bosnian Serb non-acceptance of the contact group plan. "In this respect the opinion of the contact group is similar to the opinion of the Sarajevo authorities," said the diplomat.

In the words of Zotov, Russia has ideas on the way to overcome the dead end. These proposals do not contradict those of Russian partners in the contact group. The latter "is actively cooperating and has a possibility to elaborate a well-coordinated stand."

Foreign ministers from states-members of the contact group are exchanging opinion on the date, the place, the agenda and the format of its future meeting.

Some think it is necessary to hold a group meeting at the level of foreign ministers. "Measures to organize the meeting may be taken in the near future," said the Russian diplomat.

He does not exclude that the next meeting of the contact group will be held in May.

Contact Group Hopes Bosnia Truce Will Hold

LD2604203295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2023 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov and Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 27 (Itar-Tass)—The Contact Group hopes that truce will hold after ceasefire expires in Bosnia on April 30, the Russian President's envoy in the former Yugoslavia Aleksandr Zotov said.

In an interview with Itar-Tass on Wednesday, Zotov said that although the ceasefire agreement was repeatedly violated over the last four months, the level of violence has decreased.

One of the possible scenarios for Bosnia is a "protracted conflict of low intensity." If the war resumes, the intensity of fighting will be determined by the sides' military preparedness and may vary from region to region, he said.

There is no question about which side is more guilty because "the government troops' actions were retaliated by the Bosnian Serbs," he added.

"I would not like to anticipate events, but if the problem of the presence of peace-keepers becomes topical, our diplomatic and military circles will take the necessary measures," Zotov noted.

Normally, the question of the security of peace-keepers is decided on the national level. However, at present this is an international problem concerning the United Nations. If the vulnerability of the "blue helmets" grows, the question will arise, how to protect them. NATO could help here, but this would not meet Russia's interests, he said.

The Contact Group, which includes Russia, the United States, Germany, France and Britain, continues its efforts to settle the conflict on the basis of the peace plan.

The Group may hold a meeting of special representatives or political directors of the Foreign Ministries before the end of the month. There have also been proposals to convene a ministerial meeting. The last such meeting was held in Brussels in December 1994.

Zotov did not rule out the possibility that these issues may be discussed with the leaders of the former Yugoslav republics during the V-Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8-9.

Kozyrev: Next Contact Group Meeting Likely in May

LD2704120895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1026 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 27 (Interfax)—Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says it is possible that the next meeting of heads of foreign departments of the countries in the Contact Group on Bosnia will take place in May. "The situation in Bosnia could make this meeting necessary," Kozyrev declared in an interview with Interfax in Washington.

In his words, the meeting of foreign ministers has been postponed. "A meeting of the Contact Group on Bosnia, on the level of directors of foreign ministry political departments, of member countries in the Contact Group, is to take place on Friday," Kozyrev reported.

Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany make up the Contact Group on Bosnia.

Report Quotes Russian Intelligence Officer on FSK Actions

AU2704081695 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 20 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Mariya Bazelyuk: "The FSK Is Preparing Acts of Sabotage Against Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the agreement between the leaders of the Ukrainian and Russian counterintelligence services not to engage in "mutually subversive" activities, Moscow has been conducting an anti-Ukrainian policy with amazing consistency; this activity has been particularly vigorous precisely at the level of special services. We have brought back from Chechnya additional evidence that the [Russian] Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK] is preparing acts of sabotage against Ukraine. In Chechnya, we were given a chance to meet a Russian prisoner of war. The Chechen home guards captured an FSK sabotage group. It included Senior Lieutenant Sergey S. He had served in the town of Polyarnyy [Murmansk Oblast] in a brigade that belonged to the Navy. He was later recruited as a free-lance officer of the FSK Second Department in charge of combat operations. He took part in acts of sabotage in Tajikistan. Since 1993, he has been trained as an intelligence officer in regiment 253, where clandestine methods for conducting combat actions on the enemy territory were taught and where "five-person" raiding and reconnaissance and agitation and reconnaissance groups were prepared. On 26 March, his group was brought into Chechnya from Khasavyurt [town in Daghestan on the border with Chechnya]. The group had to reach Novyy [New] Groznyy [in Chechnya] and, through the Chechen opposition, influence the civilian population so that it would demand that the home guards leave the populated areas. The saboteurs had been provided with a triple system of cover story—for different circumstances—but were captured by the Chechens. Here is what Senior Lieutenant Sergey S. said:

"At present, the FSK First Department trains special groups for infiltrating other states. Their bases are camouflaged as though they are training special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and are located in Safronovsk in Moscow Oblast and near Voronezh. Our group of five officers (under the command of Colonel Shapovnikov) was trained by Major Yeshukov and Captain Kedrin. Colonel Sidorov was commander of the regiment. The groups were trained to carry out acts of sabotage and reconnaissance in Nagorno- Karabakh, Ingushetia, Chechnya, the Crimea, Tajikistan, and Armenia. It is true, though, that after signing the agreement on the Russian military bases in Armenia, it is mainly representatives of the military command who are sent there. So far, agitation groups alone have been sent to the Crimea to indoctrinate the Russian-speaking population. The emphasis is on the fact that the Crimea is Russian land that Khrushchev donated to Ukraine in the 1950's. As far as I am concerned, two groups are presently trained in Safronovsk and near Voronezh to be later brought to the Crimean cities of Kerch and Simferopol. I cannot say anything more specific, because it is exclusively the FSK First Department that is in charge of groups for the Crimea."

Russian saboteurs in the Crimea are doing their dirty job, as attested to by the latest events on the peninsula. What is the Ukrainian Security Service doing meanwhile?

Political Issues

Chernoymrdin on Upcoming Election Campaign

LD2604184195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1813 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHELYABINSK, April 26 (Itar-Tass)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said all members of the government agreed to join his election bloc.

"As for other political movements, parties and those who want to join us, we are open to all of them," the premier told Itar-Tass, commenting on his plans for the upcoming elections.

"Our aim should be to attract broad political circles to our election campaign," he added. Chernomyrdin pointed out that an election bloc led by State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin may become his ally on many issues in the upcoming elections.

"We will say the most important things at a constituent congress. We already have a programme, the government is working and work is our credo," the prime minister said.

"The government and I will participate in the election campaign directly, primarily from the organisational point of view. Considering the fact that the future parliament will play an important role in the country's political and economic life in the subsequent four years, we understand that the participation in the election movement is serious work," he noted.

Chernomyrdin, who is in Chelyabinsk on a two-day working visit, said that officially he is not the leader of the election bloc yet. The final decision on this issue will be adopted at its constituent congress in May, he added.

Russian Welfare Minister Lyudmila Bezlepkina pointed out that the participation of the members of the government in the election bloc does not mean their automatic nomination as candidates to the parliament.

Local authorities hope to use the opportunity to discuss with the prime minister the government's debt to the defence enterprises which account for a considerable part of the region's industrial potential. They also want the premier to clarify what kind of state order they should expect for this year. Another point they want to raise with him is the region's critical environmental problems.

More than one half of the products manufactured in the region is linked in one way or another to the needs of the military-industrial complex, but last year the government failed to pay for the fulfilment of its order worth more than 50 billion roubles, according to Vadim Solovev, head of the regional administration.

Solovev said he hoped for a serious discussion of the further development of the Russian nuclear-missile complex during Chernomyrdin's visits to the Makeyev State Missile Centre and the chemical plant Mayak. He said the stable development of the nuclear-missile complex is a must for Russia which is cutting its arms but continues to need a reliable nuclear shield.

The state of the local environment is an extremely important subject the local leaders want to discuss with the Prime Minister because the region alone cannot cope with the problem without help from Federal authorities.

Since the state programme for the rehabilitation of the areas subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of industrial activity began to be implemented in 1993, only ten per cent of its provisions have been fulfilled, Solovev said. Regional authorities will also raise the question about the repayment of the government debt for the work done, and about the financing of the programme from this year's federal budget.

As is known, 25 thousand hectares of land were contaminated in the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions as a result of many years of dumping untreated radioactive wastes by the chemical plant Mayak and the explosion of a tanker with liquid radioactive waste in the Urals in 1957. A total of 437 thousand people suffered from a high dose of radioactive irradiation at the time.

Chernomyrdin Announcement 'Pledge of Stability'

LD2504215195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1954 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's announcement on Tuesday [25 April] about forming an independent political movement is the pledge of stability and predictability of results of the December election, Deputy Premier and Leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) Sergey Shakhray believes.

However, in an interview with Interfax he said this does mean Chernomyrdin will run in elections but will act as a locomotive to try to bring a parliamentary majority capable of working together with a competent government.

Shakhray believes that any strong center alliance will help overcome the chaos of an election campaign, the forerunner of all manner of conflicts.

He said that apart from PRES, the so far unnamed movement would include members of the New Regions of Russia Movement led by Vladimir Medvedyev and the Stable Russia Movement comprising members of the parliamentary Stability group.

Shakhray said the new alliance was being forged not as the result of talks by Moscow-based small parties but a direct address to the rational sections of the population.

On widespread reports about the emergence of another left-of-center alliance to be led presumably by State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, he admitted to the existence of strong electorates in both left-and-right-of center sides of the spectrum. But, he said, the country will stand to benefit if these are led by responsible politicians prepared to put internal stability above their own ambitions.

'Stability' Seen as Unreliable Member of Bloc

MK2604075095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Natalya Arkhangelskaya under the "Russia Prepares for Elections" rubric: "Three Leaders, Two Blocs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday, Viktor Chernomyrdin seized the occasion of turning the All-Russia Book of Memory over to the Great Patriotic War Museum on Poklonnaya Hill to make a sensational statement. "I want to set up a formidable electoral association," he said, "so as to prevent the extremists from winning the elections and getting an opportunity to form a government on the basis of a majority at the State Duma." According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's information (recently it predicted precisely this turn of events), this initiative was put forward back on 24 April, but within a narrow circle of the deputy premiers. [passage omitted]

So, the plans which Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister and leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES], revealed in a recent interview for KOMMERSANT-DAILY are entering the stage of practical implementation. Chernomyrdin's bloc, designed as a right-of-center coalition, may bring together the PRES, the Democratic Choice of Russia, the "Stability" and "Russia" deputy groups, the "Russian Regions" association, and also, possibly, "Women of Russia" and other ideologically related forces. The second bloc could potentially include Zyuganov's Communist Party and Glazyev's Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], although both these scenarios are unlikely. To all appearances, "Yabloko", the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], the Congress of Russian Communities under Skokov, and Rutskoy's "Derzhava" will be left outside. The very idea of setting up two large blocs appears promising, but fairly complex in terms of its implementation.

Still, precisely "Stability" has recently been named as nearly the mainstay of the authorities in the elections—hence the president's choice of an audience to deliver his statements does not seem to be coincidental. Meanwhile, the group's one-month activity in the State Duma raises doubts as to how stable "Stability" is and, most importantly, whether the president will actually be able to rely on it. Typically, back last October, during the most scandalous vote of the fall parliamentary session (on no-confidence in the government), nearly one-third of the deputies who later made up "Stability" voted "Yes." This may be a matter of the past, but a number of "momentous" votes in April also give food for thought. According to their results, the president will be able to draw on an absolutely dependable support from the group if the Belovezhskaya Forest accords are called into question, an agreement members of Zhirinovskiy's factions urge to be denounced at least once a week.

In last week's vote on the bill on State Duma elections the group also voted "No" (the text of the draft law contained the 225:225 proportion between those running on party tickets and in single-seat districts, which does not suit the president), although in this vote the group was no longer so unanimous. Half the group's deputies backed a purely populist proposal by the communist faction on raising the minimum wage, admittedly, being perfectly aware of the fact that by so doing they were undermining the budget and, hence, the executive authority. A considerable part of the group also supported the vote to override the presidential veto regarding individual savings. One-third of "Stability" members did not support the budget. Nearly one-half of the deputies voted for a special procedure for privatizing the first television channel, effectively disrupting the construction of the Public Russian Television (ORT), which had apparently been built with the president's consent. One gets the impression that, like [Pinocchio's] father Carlo, the founders of "Stability" from among presidential administration bureaucrats and representatives of large bank groups did not get quite what they intended.

There are yet more theories, however, one of which says that the creation of new deputy groups was aimed at achieving other objectives (diluting the Duma's radical flanks in favor of the "center" or fully breaking up its "ossified" internal structure). Maybe the authors of the idea simply changed their plans in the process of implementation. This does not mean that as elections draw closer there will be no opportunity to put "Stability" (which, as a matter of fact, has already set up an organization of the same name outside the Duma's walls and registered it with the Justice Ministry) to good use. But it is quite possible that in the end it will not be the president who will be receiving its services.

And yet another curious detail. The other day Duma deputies were given documents on lower chamber members who are effectively engaged in commercial activity under the cover of their deputy status. Moreover, the papers list misuses committed by them, such as failure to repay loans, raising people's money to build housing only to back away from undertaken obligations, and so forth). Characteristically, three out of five names mentioned in the documents (A. Guskov, A. Volkov, and L. Nekrasov) represent "Stability."

'Temperate' Reaction to Chernomyrdin Movement

LD2504201695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1536 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax)—The statement by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on his intention to create a new election movement that some already call "party of power" caused a temperate reaction by Russian political party leaders.

One of the leaders of the Yabloko movement, Vladimir Lukin, said in an exclusive interview with Interfax Tuesday [25 April] that he could not say anything about the possibility to cooperate with the party of power until its election program was published.

However, he doubted that it will have "much in common with Yabloko's program provisions."

Commenting on the proposed bloc's viability, Lukin said "all the power will vote in favor of the party of power" while the rest of the electorate will not vote for it.

The chairman of the party Russia's Democratic Choice, Yegor Gaydar, told Interfax that his party was "unlikely to support" Chernomyrdin's bloc, but will "interact with it on individual issues."

The chairman of the Russian Social Democratic Party, Aleksandr (Nikolayevich) Yakovlev, described Chernomyrdin's decision as "perfectly normal." However, he feared "monopoly on the left flank of reforms" referring to his intention to unite all right-centrist forces. At the same time, he remarked that he "could not figure out which political forces will find their place in this bloc." Yakovlev said he had not received any proposals to cooperate from the election association being created.

The chairman of the Republican Party of Russia, Vladimir Lysenko, said "it is impossible to assemble democratic forces under the official banners." He doubted that the new bloc will enjoy wide popular support.

According to Lysenko, the probability of his party's cooperation with the new bloc was "extremely low."

Chernomyrdin Cites Stalin's Role in WWII Victory

LD2704091595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0853 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By Yevgeniy Tkachenko and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MAGNITOGORSK, April 27 (ITAR-TASS)—Attempts by "political speculators" to revise the Great Patriotic War (and Russia's role in the Second World War in general) were described as 'blasphemous and mean' with respect to the generation of those who won that war and all veterans by Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in his address to the war and labour veterans in the Urals.

"Let the political speculators say right and left that we were all but the initiators of that war, that we made that war while being 'incapable of waging warfare' and won 'incorrectly', none of their allegations is true to reality.

"The enemy failed to crush the courage of the people, to undermine the people's will to win the struggle against fascism. Despite difficulties and privation, all rose to defend the Motherland," Chernomyrdin said.

"It would be wrong not to pay homage to the country's leaders who rallied the people for the struggle with the enemy. The name of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin cannot be deleted from the history of the war," Victor Chernomyrdin said to applause.

Zhirinovskiy: Formation of Election Blocs To Fail

LD2604152295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (ITAR-TASS)—Any attempt at creating pro-governmental electoral alliances ahead of the parliamentary elections will end up in failure, LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy told a press conference in the lower house of the Russian parliament today.

According to Zhirinovskiy, a graphic example of such failure was provided by the activity of one of the pro-government political structures created before the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord.

Zhirinovskiy said the current lull in Russia would end on May 10 after all the foreign guests invited to attend the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory in Europe leave Moscow.

"Politicians will begin to square accounts with each other" directly thereafter, Zhirinovskiy predicted.

Yakovlev Slams Zhirinovskiy Patriotism Claim

MM2604142395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 5

[Article by Academician Aleksandr Yakovlev, in the form of an open letter: "To Zhirinovskiy and the Other 'Patriots' in Emphatic Quotation Marks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The other day I was sent an extract from the verbal extravaganzas blurted out by you, Mr. Zhirinovskiy, as usual, at a press conference. In your characteristically thuggish manner, you tried to insult me, and not only me.

Knowing that you are fond of creating a stir, indeed, that you feed on this political carrion, I am forced to quote the words that fell from your articulatory system.

And so I quote: "That lame devil, our monster, our Goebbels. He will torment us until he dies." That is about me.

Not bad for a presidential contender, is it?

As for Goebbels, God knows, it is simply irresponsible to give up that place to anyone, when it rightly belongs to you yourself and was won by sheer hard labor—through shamelessness and brazenness.

But, after all, back when certain high-level politicians were putting you forward as a party leader (as a counterweight to the Interregional Deputies' Group), it was already being said that the pangs of conscience are unknown to you, and this was taken to be the strong point of Zhirinovskiy's character.

As for the "lameness," you're right about that. Incidentally, you don't know it, but I also still have two fragments from exploding bullets. Do contrive to make use of this fact somehow or other next time. I highly recommend it.

Yes, I am "lame," and a war invalid too. I am receiving a pension to this day. In fact, Zhirinovskiy, you just make me sick. Because you spit on our country's fathers, brothers, and sisters, who kept you safe and sound from fascist bullets, although nobody knew that they were preserving from evil powers the future clown of all Russia, who was living in Kazakhstan at the time under a different name.

But, to you, my blood is not worth a dime. The main thing is to force your way to the presidency, and everything else is dust and ashes, dirt that burns off in the scorching heat of power.

But it is not a sense of grievance that prompts me to respond, though there is that too.

My friends try to persuade me not to tangle with Zhirinovskiy, because it would be making too much of him. That's all very well, but after all, he has set his sights on the presidency, and he has really let himself go too far.

And the authorities, for their part, persist in preferring not to know where this party gets its money—in virtually unlimited quantities. Is this out of fear of the future? Out of cowardice? Out of sympathy?

However, the real reason why I have taken up my pen is this: Zhirinovskiy and his ilk are clambering up to the trough of power under the slogan of "patriotism," or—joking apart—the most arrant form of chauvinism, thereby impugning the honor and dignity of Russia and the Russians.

So, let me address not Volfovich [Zhirinovskiy] himself, but those who raise the desperate cry at rallies: "Forward, Zhirik!"

I will begin by saying that claims by individuals, groups, parties, or movements to possess some kind of mystical right to patriotism are simply fraudulent. Only the people have that right, because they have proved their right with blood and sweat, not bombast and bluster.

And now, like it or not, I must talk about myself, since my honor was impugned.

Many people know well how many lies have been told about me by both Bolsheviks and national chauvinists. The most zealous of them are constantly threatening reprisals, leaving funeral wreaths at the doors of my house, and calling me on the telephone to show off their in-depth knowledge of bad language. And Zhirinovskiy himself gives a kind of signal: "Until he dies."

A real patriot feels somehow uneasy about trying to convince others that he loves his Motherland, his village, his school, his city. This is not the patriotism of the bazaar, but the patriotism of the land, of hearth and home, it is something inside you, what people call a gut feeling.

To me, for instance, the Russian person is considerably more precious than the "Russian idea"—be it autocratic or Bolshevik. The Russian peasant's hut is more precious than the Kremlin, and a village peasants' gathering is dearer to me than any official banquet.

Like millions of young Soviet boys and girls, in my youth I believed in the future of communism and the infallibility of Stalin.

The war came, I went to the front, and believe me, I was not the least among soldiers there. I pulled my weight as one of the platoon commanders whose fate so much has been written about. The lieutenants killed—from junior to senior—numbered 924,000. At the age of 19, I was hit so hard that it still hurts to this day, after 52 years.

Today's scum like Makashov, Bushin, and Prokhanov, not knowing what else to latch on to, have sunk so low as to claim that I was not even at the front, that the documents about this were concocted by the CIA, that it was no accident that General Vlasov and I were at the same front (I was 18 years old), etc. etc.

I consider it beneath my dignity to enter into a debate with these crooks and moral bankrupts, but I refer the reader to wartime articles (the newspaper KRASNYY BALTIYSKIY FLOT [RED BALTIC FLEET] for 24 September 1942—the article entitled "Baltic Machine Gunners in Combat"; the newspaper KRASNYY FLOT [RED FLEET] for 29 September 1942—the article entitled "Bold Attack"), in which front-line journalists wrote about my comrades and me. But this too, presumably, was at the bidding of German, American, Turkish, Nigerian, or other special services.

So, back to patriotism and "lameness."

It was after being at the front that I began to be tormented by doubts. We fought a bloody war. I am sure that more than half the lives were laid down in vain, millions of women and children were widowed and orphaned because of the incompetence of many of Stalin's and Voroshilov's generals, especially at the beginning of the war, and also through acts of reckless daring.

It is distressing to write about it, but that war could hardly help being excessively bloody. More than 70,000 Red Army commanding officers were wiped out by Stalin even before the war. That is seven divisions of officers.

In the thirties, three of the five marshals were wiped out, 15 of the 16 army commanders, 60 of the 67 corps commanders, 136 of the 199 divisional commanders, all four fleet flag officers, all six first-rank flag officers, and nine of the 15 second-rank flag officers. All 17 first-rank army commissars were shot, as well as 25 of the 29 corps commissars.

After the war, I was shaken by the cruelty toward prisoners. What was the point? From Hitler's death camps, straight to Stalin's concentration camps. Only Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov tried to stand up for these thrice-accursed people, but in vain. He himself fell from grace.

Marshal Zhukov said of those repressive years, when the Bolsheviks wanted to turn back, that the Stalinist leaders were "driving people to slaughter like livestock, according to a list: so many steers, so many cows, so many sheep." And he went on: "If only the people had known that innocent blood was dripping from their [the leaders'] fingers, they would greet them not with applause, but with stones."

So much for the repressions.

And can a true patriot forget that in this century we have gone through three revolutions, the Japanese, German, Civil, Finnish, Great Patriotic, Afghan, and other wars, the Bolshevik shootings, and military conflicts in more than 30 of the planet's hot spots?

Wars, shootings, conflicts, more wars....

And in them we lost more than 60 million people—the young, the cleverest, the most talented.

But that does not fit in with the patriotism of "your boys." Violence is the midwife of Bolsheviks, and you—don't dissemble—are from the same brood.

Khrushchev's report on Stalin and his crimes made a tremendous and lifelong impression on me. I am one of the few who heard that report with my own ears: I was present as a guest at the closed session of the 20th Congress.

You can't turn a wolf into a veterinarian, although at that time, during the Khrushchev thaw, people believed in the humanization of socialism.

In 1972 I wrote an article on patriotism and great-power chauvinism. Since that time the national-chauvinists have been cursing me up hill and down dale.

But all the same, it does no harm to look at the question: "freedom or patriotism"?

Since Belinskiy's day this dilemma of the Russian intelligentsia has been seen in rather a topsy-turvy light. Patriotism was placed entirely at the service of the latest regime—"official patriotism"—and honest folk could not get away with being patriots.

The Bolsheviks, having "won" Russia, as Lenin put it, considered patriotism mainly in a contemptuous light. Lenin often said: "We are antipatriots." They, the Bolsheviks, twice came out in favor of the defeat of their own government, their own country—in the Japanese and German wars.

They came to their senses as soon as they felt the need: In 1941, Stalin raised aloft like banners the names of Nevskiy, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Minin, etc.

Today's Bolsheviks, having shrugged off Marxist internationalism as unnecessary, are drawing closer and closer to chauvinism under the name of patriotism.

Apart from "official patriotism," which in Rus [Russia] has always been the preserve of the bureaucrats—whether civilian or in uniform—there is also such a thing as proper, human patriotism.

Pushkin—Russia's soundest, liveliest, most Renaissance mind—loved both the individual and mankind.

Lermontov: "I love the Fatherland, but with a strange love." But that is true love!

Gogol loved only people, because he reasoned: Mankind is made up "of people."

Dostoyevskiy, Chekhov, and Tolstoy loved Russia through people.

The czars, naturally, loved Russia proprietorially.

Lenin saw Russia only as an object to be ruled. Stalin and Khrushchev—autocratically, like the czars; Brezhnev had no ideas on this score, but all the same he had no love for nationalists. He once said: "They should drown the lot of them."

After Chechnya, there will be two variants: the autocratic, which you, Zhirinovskiy, harp on about, and the Russophobe—with the neo-Leninist slogan "Let's turn the Chechen war into an anti- Yeltsin war."

The issue is muddied enough already, and it will get worse.

What can we do?

True patriotism puts people above any idea, above the state, above everything. Sholokhov was sly, but perspicacious—in "Tikhiy Don" ["The Quiet Don"] he perceived one thing that others had not seen: No idea can be above people. Grigoriy Melekhov [protagonist of "Tikhiy Don"], caught up in the maelstrom of extremism.

I see the true patriotic duty first and foremost in helping to ensure the growth of sufficiency for every working family. In the revival of neglected farms and villages forgotten by the authorities, in the provision of amenities in cities and settlements. In people's return to the land: the peasant to the farmland that has run wild, the city dweller to dacha plots and kitchen gardens.

The land is our mother, it gives us food and drink. It is the store of all wealth. The good Lord gave no one as many good things as he gave to us. Yet we, dispirited, are sitting on gold, diamonds, oil; we have more forest and chernozem than anyone, yet we live in poverty. And we see in this absurd situation some kind of "messianic" purpose—a patriotic one, at that.

Real patriotism means treating the sores and ills of society and nature and striving to ensure that the motherland flourishes—materially and spiritually. In short, patriotism is neither official property, on the one hand, nor "disavows its ancestry," on the other. It is deep-rooted. Like with the British, who honor the king, have not forgotten Shakespeare, and revere Newton. For whom "my home is my castle" is paramount.

Whereas official, great-power, "messianic" patriotism has never actually given anything to any actual person: The individual has withered while the state has swollen.

To some extent these are now fateful days for the president. As for Gorbachev in the fall of 1990.

At that time two stools—strong-arm tactics or democracy—beckoned Gorbachev, but he considered the latter too fragile and faltering and decided to play along with the "sworn friends" whose names we learned in August 1991.

Gorbachev became unnecessary in determining the course of a ship on which the pirate flag of mutiny against the captain had already been raised.

But what about Yeltsin? I don't know. But the danger of revenge is becoming increasingly appreciable since the bureaucrats have set about restoring the old order in earnest, sensing the increasingly unbridled support of right-wing forces—those who are lined up with the Bolsheviks and those around your grouping.

Quotas, licenses, bureaucratic price regulation—in general, "all the little irritants of life"—that is the real domain of the immortal Russian bureaucrat.

Two months of total denigration of the president, fragmentation and anarchization of society, and the baneful influence on the mob of the Prokhanovite slogan "Citizens of Russia! Your main enemy is not the Chechen but the democrat."

The democrats have finally been split by pluralism of opinions, but they still castigate the regime in concert. But what comes after that seems to be of no interest to them. Their abruptness is starker than it used to be at anti-Gorbachev rallies.

Blood, filth, stench, abuse, muddleheadedness. "We get the hangover while the others get the party." But all the places at the party are going to be taken by new quasi-fascist wolves. And they will start savaging all dissidents and building a fascist or quasi-fascist society to the refrain "Hey, Slavs" and the cry "Smash the Jews, save Russia!"

In short, the morality of our mother Russia is unpredictable.

This suggests that Russia and its ship of state need to undergo a fundamental, prolonged overhaul. Not to get involved with nationalization again, as you propose. We have been there before.

Russia needs to withdraw into itself like a snail, cool its passion for imperial greatness, and concern itself with the Russian hearth and home.

There has always been plenty of greatness, particularly victories in two patriotic wars, and hearth and home will put up with anything. The house has been—still is—falling down, the roof is bad, the windows have no glass, and need forces you to go out and grow your own produce.

To take care of the hospitals, the schools, the children, the old people, families.

The first thing we must do is to get out of everywhere where our presence is not only dubious, but ruinous. What Russia needs is peace and quiet, work, and prayer. So we must get out of everywhere.

And not wash our boots in the Indian Ocean, as the new "leader in a stylish cap" urges us. Remember the words of Sobakevich [character in Gogol's "Dead Souls"]: "Give him a knife and let him loose on the high road, and he'll stitch you a purse that will make you gasp."

After the Crimean War in the 19th century Russia waged only one war—the Balkan war, a war of liberation. Even a noble war, according to Dostoyevskiy.

Alexander III passed the whole 13 years of his reign in peace with everyone, with the title "The Peacemaker," until he died. He used to drink by the bucketful, he invented baggy pants so that he could hide little bottles of vodka from his wife, he ruined his liver.

But he loved the merchant class, and he brought about an explosion in peace and quiet, a purely beneficial explosion—an industrial explosion. Russia forged ahead, everything was going smoothly, there was an annual industrial growth rate of 20 percent, Russia was rapidly catching up with Europe.

"Russia for the Russians!" But not "Russians for Russia!" That is the essence of patriotism. True patriotism—from the peasant's hut to the Kremlin, and not the other way about. Otherwise the "bronze horseman" of the state will eternally trample poor Yevgeniy and separate him from Parasha [reference to Pushkin's poem on the "Bronze Horseman," Peter the Great as the overbearing state]. The little man, Pushkin's Yevgeniy, is many times more precious, and closer kin, to me than Peter. Even if he is the Great.

Through Ivan's freedom to Russia's freedom. Through Ivan's labor to Russia's greatness. Through Ivan's prosperity to Russia's prosperity. I am all in favor of Russia's greatness, but only through people.

Mr. Zhirinovskiy, you are like a stone weighing down Russia's fate. We had barely begun to get rid of bolshevism, now there is this new misfortune. Leave the political arena, stop deceiving people, and then you will earn the title of "the falcon of patriotism."

Rybkin, Chernmoyrdin Election Blocs Viewed

MM2704141595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by the IZVESTIYA Analysis Center: "Two Wings for the Head of State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The report that V. Chernomyrdin and I. Rybkin, the speaker of the State Duma, are ready to form and head two major electoral blocs in the forthcoming State Duma elections came as no surprise to the experts of the IZVESTIYA Analysis Center. We forecast this development of events back in January-February this year. The associations which the heads of the government and the Duma will lead to victory have also emerged quite clearly in the process of the feverish formation of blocs in recent months. Something has happened which people in the party of power agonized over and wanted to happen: two pro-presidential blocs are emerging under the banners of liberalism and a kind of left centrism.

The components of the Chernomyrdin alliance are of course the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (the party and its faction), the New Regional Policy deputies' group in tandem with Russia's Regions which the party created, and the newly created groups Russia and Stability (the latter in conjunction with the Stable Russia movement), which have already signed an agreement on the elaboration of what is now called a "common position on the questions of fundamental importance." It is virtually inevitable that the Duma- 96 deputies' group, together with the movement of the same name, will join this alliance.

I. Rybkin will try to unite the forces of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia [FITUR] and all kinds of socialists and left centrists. It is not ruled out that the brand- new United Industrial Party will also join in.

The third powerful participant in the contest will undoubtedly be the coalition of quite disparate structures and leaders of a "pro- state" ["derzhavnyy"] orientation formed around Yu. Skokov. Its main participants are the Federation of Commodity Producers, the Congress of Russian Communities, and the Democratic Party and at an individual level such well known politicians as General A. Lebed, ex-minister S. Glazyev, and Orel Governor Ye. Stroyev.

All three alliances—Chernomyrdin's, Rybkin's, and Skokov's—are closely linked with the present "old-new" nomenklatura and express the interests of two of its main tendencies which, irrespective of their personnel and titles, may hypothetically be characterized as "liberal-bureaucratic" and "authoritarian- bureaucratic."

The rivalry between the premier and the former secretary of the Security Council [Skokov] dates back to the times when they were together in the system of executive power.

On the evening of 14 December 1992 at the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies, President Yeltsin submitted to a rating vote five of the 18 contenders for the post of chairman of the government proposed by factions in the Supreme Soviet. The three who polled most votes were Yu. Skokov (673), V. Chernomyrdin (621), and Ye. Gaydar in third place. After long deliberations the president opted for Chernomyrdin whose nomination was approved by an overwhelming majority (721 votes to 172). Thus it was that a strong representative of industry with a "centrist" orientation, as it was thought then, was approved as head of the government to an ovation from the "communo-patriotic" majority and to the obvious dismay of the "democrats."

On the whole, however, the government's course toward the implementation of the reforms remains unchanged.

A most experienced practical worker and, as it now transpires, a cautious and far-sighted politician, Chernomyrdin has also proved to be a supporter of "random market forces" ["stikhiynyy rynochnik"] who has realized (and realized most clearly since the "destatization" of economic sectors) that there is an interest in the economy more powerful than the command.

Slowly but surely, with many reservations, and seeming to do everything to distance himself from politics the premier has moved toward the president. This was shown most clearly in fall 1993 after the publication of edict no. 1400—on the phased constitutional reform.

Throughout this crisis period the Chernomyrdin team displayed a complete loyalty to the president.

During the campaign which then ensued the premier and his immediate associates skillfully demonstrated an absolutely apolitical nature. We will recall, for example, the statement on the refusal to stand as candidates for the Federal Assembly signed by Chernomyrdin, Soskovets, and a number of other leaders of the government.

However, it seems to have escaped the public's attention that V. Kvasov, leader of the government apparatus and the member of the team closest to Chernomyrdin at that time, had nevertheless put forward his candidacy for the State Duma on behalf of Moscow Oblast as an independent and was elected with enormous support from the local authorities who had been given the relevant orders "from above." And he was one of the founding fathers of the pro- government deputies' group New Regional Policy.

By the end of 1994 the prestige of the government and the premier was approaching its peak: Alarmed by some inappropriate actions by the head of state and by his occasional tendency to lapse into a state of political lethargy, the nomenklatura clearly began to pin their hopes for the political future on V. Chernomyrdin.

Meanwhile, major disagreements emerged within the government connected primarily with the activity of O. Soskovets, who was constantly broadening his sphere of influence.

The split within the government and the first vice premier's active "courting" ["igry"] of people from B. Yeltsin's immediate entourage prompted V. Chernomyrdin toward a new rapprochement with the leaders of the liberals inside and outside the corridors of power. Documents couched in pro-reform, pro-market terms began to "leak" from the government apparatus. A. Korzhakov's group responded to this challenge vigorously.

The political crisis of October and November was a most serious test for the government and for V. Chernomyrdin personally.

The restoration of V. Chernomyrdin's position as the no. 2 political leader in Russia today happened relatively quickly—in December 1994-January 1995—and was aided to a considerable extent by the Chechen war as well as by B. Yeltsin's extended absence from the arena of public politics, which prompted many questions about the president's physical condition.

The new and almost charismatic image of the prime minister as a wise and responsible state figure was revealed in a number of television appearances and particularly at the foundation laying ceremony for the Cathedral of Christ the Savior where V. Chernomyrdin played the part of a man who was actually taking the place of the head of state (it is claimed that the prime minister's ceremonial exit from the Kremlin hand in hand with the patriarch made an extremely gloomy impression on certain members of B. Yeltsin's entourage). And it was no coincidence at all that on the eve of the announcement of the new bloc's formation the premier put forward another peace-making initiative on the Chechen war.

V. Chernomyrdin's advance to the role of head of the largest electoral bloc marks the beginning of a new stage in his career. It completes the transformation of the "experienced economic manager without political ambitions" into a political leader covertly claiming the role of "legitimate heir to the throne."

It is typical that the premier's characteristic cautiousness and far-sightedness are also to be seen in the circumstances surrounding this advance. As we have learned from perfectly reliable sources, /in the past few days a decision has been made "at the top" on the submission of B. Yeltsin's nomination for the presidential elections in 1996/. [passage between slantlines printed in boldface] It is hard to say whether the president will actually be re-elected. But the premier's entry into "public politics" in these conditions is more than respectable: It is being done, so to speak, on behalf of and on the instructions of the head of state because it is improper for the latter to participate actively in the parliamentary elections himself.

Kozyrev Not To Join Electoral Blocs

LD2704115695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1122 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 27 (Interfax)—Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev does not plan to join the electoral blocs created by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin.

"If I were to participate in upcoming elections then it would only be as an independent candidate," Andrey Kozyrev told Interfax in Washington Wednesday.

According to Kozyrev, he participates "in the presidential bloc" and is staying in Washington in order to prepare the upcoming Russian-American summit in Moscow on May 9-10.

Emergence of Blocs Shows Moderation an 'Asset'

MM2604124195 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 1

[Commentary by Ivan Vladimirov: "Powerful Electoral Blocs Forming Around Chernomyrdin and Rybkin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the parliamentary elections a fundamental regrouping of political forces is naturally beginning. Old ties are being subjected to a highly critical test of strength and new—sometimes highly unexpected—"dangerous liaisons" are being formed.

Surely the main event in this "refreshed" political landscape is the creation of powerful left-center and right-center blocs interested in stability, the continuity of the political elites, and civilized cooperation at the apex of the pyramid of power.

The issue here concerns those semi-movements, semi-blocs, and semi-party formations which are grouping around the politically favored names of Ivan Rybkin and Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Most likelv the names of these politicians, on whom hopes for stability and the pursuit of a healthy conservatism in political practice are pinned, will be used as classic election "locomotives." And the electoral significance of the "locomotives" can hardly be overestimated.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, that Russian Edouard Balladur, is a focus for right-center forces which to a greater or lesser extent support the government's economic policy, which may conventionally be described as moderately liberal. The forces in question here are the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, New Regional Policy, Stability, Rossiya (bearing in mind the presence in this group of Aleksey Polovkov, this is a kind of second version of Russia's Choice, greatly amended and augmented), and some influential non-factional and nonparty leaders, primarily that section of the regional elites which is economically most sound.

Ivan Rybkin in turn is becoming a center of attraction for all the moderate and constructive left-wing forces who are modeling themselves on their European counterparts. Representatives of those forces are in fact abundantly present in the current right-center government. It is that fact which makes it possible to call the bloc of centrist movements a highly influential "power party" whose representatives will support the incumbent president and government with varying degrees of conviction, at least for the duration of the elections and each in their own way. Even if only for the purpose of preserving a modicum of stability and civilized ground rules.

Probably these major political formations will in reality absorb the other party formations. Those industrialists who call themselves left centrists and who unite in some cases around Skokov and in others around Volskiy, Glazyev, and other political leaders will most probably submerge themselves in the movement headed by Rybkin even in those cases where there is a clearly expressed desire to play an independent role. A Civic Union Mark III is hardly going to have an independent significance and any worthwhile "market value."

The processes taking place could well be assessed as positive because in this instance the "pact" among a number of political forces or, more precisely, the main political forces of a realistically centrist orientation suggests that big-time politics in Russia is becoming more civilized.

The real—highly significant—political weight of the premier and the speaker, who till recently did not venture into "public" politics in the traditional sense, is also understandable. It is becoming clear that concrete actions and moderate views are more of a political asset than the various hues of extremism and populism.

Roundup of Party Leaders' Election Campaigning

MM2604082295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Batygin under the rubric "Such Is Party Life": "Fresh Political Goods"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to tradition, the peak of the political week falls at the weekend. This time, the celebration of holy Easter changed this. It was mainly atheists who were active. On Saturday the Communists held a conference devoted to Lenin's birthday. [passage omitted]

As the parliamentary elections draw nearer, party leaders become more active. Boris Fedorov, leader of the "Forward, Russia!" movement, and Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], clashed during Sunday's television debates on the first television channel. However, there was no hint of polemic here, and the feeling of moderation had evidently abandoned the participants. The two doctors of science—economic and philosophical—had forgotten about basic decorum and their audience of many millions, "feeding" it with "political goods" which were not very fresh.

However, you cannot help agreeing with B. Fedorov that G. Zyuganov's party has little to do with the communist party, which it has compromised by giving up its main postulates—internationalism, class struggle, and the struggle against private ownership. Indeed it appears that the CPRF is simply speculating on the nostalgic feelings of a section of the Russian population.

Our politicians have not yet learned how to conduct a civilized discussion. And what about cooperating? B. Fedorov announced the "rules of the game," instructing his comrades-in-arms Ye. Gaydar, S. Shakhray, and G. Yavlinksiy to conduct a "conciliatory conference," on collaboration at the parliamentary elections. If an alliance is not achieved, this is no misfortune: Then the "Forward, Russia!" supporters and the admirers of "Russia's Choice," PRES, and "Yabloko," so the former minister of finance thinks, will sign something along the lines of a treaty "on non-competition" on the basis of the principle: If you don't touch us, we won't touch you....

Party leaders and chiefs of all hues have to make haste with their tactical maneuvers. Easter dampened political speed today, and May is also generous with holidays. And then there is summer, gardens, vacations. Who can be summoned to rallies and gatherings?

Yeltsin, Lebedev Discuss Judicial Authority

LD2504174295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1417 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Chairman of the Supreme Court Vyacheslav Lebedev in the Kremlin on Tuesday [25 April].

The president's press service announced that the talks were held in a constructive atmosphere and dealt with ways of strengthening the judicial authority, and equipping and guarding courts, especially in the regional and territorial centers, and with the establishment of a research center for training specialists and upgrading their skills.

Both Yeltsin and Lebedev are convinced that the system of federal courts must be uniform. The opinions of the leaders of the Federation's constituent members must be taken into account when members of the supreme courts are appointed.

They also stated that such meetings will become regular so the president might have exhaustive information about the implementation of the judicial reform, and provide backing for it, said the president's press service.

Media Issues

Renewed 'Political Pressure' on Media Discussed

MM2604123095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by Valeriy Rudnev: "Stormclouds Gathering Over 'Court of Appeal' and People Fulminating at Journalists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "Appeal Court" is the familiar short name given to the Russian Federation Presidential Court of Appeal for Information Disputes by this chamber's actual members. As for the stormclouds gathering over the court, which examines journalists' complaints against the authorities and citizens' complaints about journalists, they emanate from the State Duma. A group of deputies intends in the near future to raise the question of the legality of the Appeal Court's activity and the constitutionality of the presidential edict ratifying the statute governing it.

The Appeal Court's activity cannot be said to be in the public eye today, but its rulings have a considerable effect on the political alignment of forces right now. The trail leading from a fairly major furor involving journalists leads to the courts of general jurisdiction rather than to the presidential Court of Appeal. Take for instance the judicial-investigative duel between [Defense] Minister Grachev and journalist Poegil. The Appeal Court is not seen to be involved and is virtually unheard on the matter. So why have Duma members suddenly directed their attention to it? Why have they picked the long-forgotten edict from the pile of complaints about the president? The answer is simple if you remember the Appeal Court's past.

Originally there was the Information Court of Arbitration, whose history began in the torrid fall of 1993 on the eve of the State Duma and Federation Council elections. It was then that new phrases appeared in our vocabulary such as "political advertising," "election campaigning," and "election debate." Then many candidate deputies began to make vigorous use of the mass media in the campaign for votes. And it soon became clear that it is fairly hard to distinguish between a common-or-garden press conference and political advertising, say, or between a "roundtable" and an election debate. And, importantly, that there was no one to do so.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed two edicts 29 October 1993. With the first he formed the Information Court of Arbitration for the duration of the election campaign, and with the second he ratified the Statute on Information Guarantees for Election Campaigning.

Understandably, the nature of the questions that the president handed to the Information Court of Arbitration for consideration was quite important for the election campaign: They ranged from disputes over free and paid appearances on television and radio to the discovery of various illegal inducements and forms of backing for candidate deputies.

The Information Court of Arbitration worked so well and the president was so pleased that on the day that the Information Court of Arbitration's term of authority came to an end, 31 December 1993, Boris Yeltsin immediately turned it into the permanent Russian Federation Presidential Court of Appeal for Information Disputes.

Incidentally, it is on the authority of these edicts alone that Appeal Court decisions rest. As well as on the authority of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff, which provides the chamber with moral and material tutelage: The Appeal Court's premises are a match for the president's—on Staraya Ploshchad, in the luxurious offices of the former CPSU Central Committee—and the special services provided for the chamber's members are up to ministerial standards.

Although the Appeal Court has no actual authority as things stand (it can only seek a court injunction for the publication of a newspaper or the broadcasting of a television program to be suspended), and it has the right to record a reprimand and to raise the question of instituting disciplinary proceedings against an official), in the future it could easily be transformed into a powerful means of regulating election campaigning in the mass media.

The fight for newspaper space and television and radio airtime has already begun. Two warring parties have emerged—the presidential team and the current parliamentarians. The president made the first move with the edict on the formation of the "Russian Public Television" Joint-Stock Company and the transfer to that company of quality time on the First Channel. The State Duma's response—the law banning the flotation of state television and on the new procedure for issuing licenses for airtime—was patently belated and, what is more, according to specialists, the lawmaking process is too complex and sluggish for political maneuvering.

In preparing to attack the Appeal Court, Duma members are evidently counting on seizing the initiative from the presidential team in the battle for the mass media. At least this action is being prepared in an atmosphere of strict confidentiality: The names of the people behind the appeal to the Russian Federation Constitutional Court are not being made public and the identity of the Duma experts is being kept secret right now. Even the actual timing of the appeal to the Constitutional Court is a secret.

Nonetheless IZVESTIYA has succeeded in obtaining a document which explains the crux of the deputies' plot against the Appeal Court. Its legal reasoning is subtle and casuistic and can be boiled down to three main points. First, doubt is cast on the Appeal Court's authority to examine disputes which "arise from the requirements of the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the Russian Federation's international treaties." In the opinion of the as yet anonymous authors, who cite the Russian Federation Constitution, the norms of international law and Russia's international treaties form part of the country's legal system. Therefore such legal disputes can only be resolved by means of constitutional, civil, administrative, and criminal judicial proceedings. The chamber does not form part of Russia's judicial system. In other words, its authorities in this context contravene the fundamental law.

The second point in the deputies' complaint is directed at the provision whereby Appeal Court decisions are final. The Russian Federation Constitution is cited in rebuttal of this idea: "The decisions and actions (or inaction) of organs of state power, organs of local self-government, public associations, and officials can be appealed against in court."

And now to the third point. According to the current statute, the Appeal Court can resolve disputes regarding the allocation of radio and television airtime for factions in the Federal Assembly. Under the country's Constitution the allocation of radio and television broadcasting time comes solely within the jurisdiction of executive organs of state power.

How convincing will the arguments presented by the State Duma deputies prove for the Russian Constitutional Court? What will Duma deputies suggest in the Appeal Court's place? And who will replace Professor A. Vengerov's team? Right now there is no precise answer to these questions.

But one thing is clear: If stormclouds are indeed gathering over the Appeal Court, bolts of lightning will most likely be cast at journalists and the mass media will soon come under renewed political pressure. Right now this is just the limbering-up period.

Military, Nuclear & Space Issues

North Caucasus Military Grouping To Be Reinforced

LD2604140195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1049 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 25 (Interfax)—Leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry passed a decision to reinforce the military grouping in the North Caucasus.

"The 58th Army should be created in this region by June 1," Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, commander-in-chief of Russia's Land Forces reported in an interview with Interfax Wednesday [26 April].

According to Semenov, creation of this army is explained "by a difficult situation in the North Caucasus, primarily by the unstable situation in Chechnya." He also reported that after constitutional order is established in this republic,one motor rifle brigade assigned to the land forces will be permanently stationed in one of Grozny's regions.

Semenov said that the 58th army is being created on the basis of the Vladikavkaz corps and will unite newly created formations. In his words, detachments of this Army will be fully manned and will be more combat efficient.

Semenov recognized that creation of the 58th Army contradicts to the Agreement on Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe, "However, interests of Russia's security and integrity should prevail over terms of this document," Semenov underlined.

He believes that the Treaty on Conventional Arms Reduction in Euroep does not meet current situation in the North Caucasus. He also said that this document was signed in the period of existence of military blocks (the Warsaw Pact and NATO - Interfax).

"Today when the Warsaw Pact ceased its existence and the USSR has collapsed, I believe that the terms of the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Arms should be revised," Semenov said.

In accordance with flank restrictions stipulated by the Treaty Russia's land forces in the North Caucasus can have only 165 tanks, 12 armored vehicles, and 414 artillery guns.

Caucasus Army Said To Violate CFE

MK2704093095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer in the "Armed Forces" column: "The New Army in the Caucasus 'Does Not Fit' Into the CFE Treaty. So Much the Worse for the Treaty, Thinks Commander in Chief Vladimir Semenov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In seven months, in November, the CFE Treaty, signed in Paris in fall 1990, is fully to enter into force. The CFE Treaty is the first attempt in history at a comprehensive continental limitation of "conventional" heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, and combat aviation) in Europe.

Effectively all really serious and large-scale wars in the world in the past 300 year either began in Europe or proceeded with the participation of European troops. Even when there was no war, peace in Europe in the last few centuries was always a balance of fear (mutual deterrence), while the balance of forces was traditionally maintained by an endless arms race. The CFE Treaty does not break this tradition completely, but nonetheless limits the arms race by reasonable national quotas.

The day the treaty is to enter into force, however, may become the last day of its existence. A series of military-diplomatic mistakes have placed Russia in a situation in which the CFE Treaty will almost inevitably have to be renounced. Today it is clear to everybody that in the foreseeable future the Caucasus will be the main theater of military actions for the Russian Army. The CFE Treaty flank limits, however, do not allow Russia to deploy the requisite forces and assets in the southern sector. The Russian leadership understood this in late 1992, but two years of backstage negotiations and consultations at all conceivable levels have brought no result: Any changes in the CFE Treaty are possible only by the consensus of all co-signing nations, which at the present time appears impossible in principle.

In a bid to revise the flank quotas, Russia even sought support in Ukraine because the Odessa Military District also comes under those limitations. But this failed again: Last week a highly placed Ukraine diplomat assured SEGODNYA's correspondent that "by November Kiev will pull out its troops and will fully meet the treaty provisions." Moscow has been left alone.

Now the Russian military states openly that it will act regardless of the CFE Treaty. Yesterday General Vladimir Semenov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, officially announced that by 1 June a new, 58th, army will be deployed in the North Caucasus in view of the "instability in Chechnya." Gen. Semenov admitted that the formation of the 58th Army "does not fit" into the CFE Treaty, but, in his opinion, "the interests of Russia's security and integrity must come above the provisions set in this document."

Two weeks ago in Groznyy, SEGODNYA's correspondent asked Gen. Anatoliy Kvashnin, current commander of the North Caucasus Military District (he led the storming of Groznyy in January), how he was preparing his troops for the time when the CFE Treaty enters fully into force. Gen. Kvashnin said with a soldier's bluntness: "Only a complete idiot would comply with the CFE Treaty's flank limitations."

It needs to be said that many high level Western diplomats, who watch the situation in "Eurasia" (a euphemism meaning the new states originating from the former USSR), relate to Russia's "flank" problems with a measure of "understanding and sympathy"—at any rate, in private conversations. Optimists in Western capitals still hope that before November a compromise formula will be found which will salvage the CFE, while pragmatists are looking for a way to cushion the negative fallout from the collapse of the treaty.

Lebed Questions Duma Decision on 14th Army

LD2704120795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1127 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, April 27 (Interfax)—Commander of the 14th Russian Army, Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, has announced that no one has formally offered him any new appointment. In an interview with Interfax, he denounced as "a lie" all rumors on this score, including the assertion that he has been offered the post of deputy commander of the Baikal Military District.

Asked who has lied, Lebed curtly replied, "defence minister."

He also declared that he learned about Defense Minister Grachev's order to reform the 14th Army only from the press and was never informed about such orders through official channels. Lebed also declared that so far there have been no moves to put this order into effect.

Describing the situation in the 14th Army as unchanged, Lebed reported that the personnel has been engaged in military training as scheduled. "Everything is all right with us. In general, I am the most satisfied commander in our entire assemblage of independent states," Lebed stressed.

He refrained from comment on the 14th Army decision adopted by the State Duma on Wednesday.

"Everything is put very vaguely in this document. I, for one, do not understand the meaning of the phrase 'recommend that the government adopt necessary measures on the effective functioning of the 14th Army and also adopt additional measures to normalize the political and economic situation over the Dniester Moldova republic.' To my mind, these words do not commit anyone to anything," Lebed said.

Grachev on 14th Army, Chechnya, Jordan Talks

MM2704095295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Mikhail Zheglov: "Meeting in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Relations between our countries can be described as friendly, and we are prepared for further cooperation. With these words, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, summed up the results of his meeting with Colonel General 'Abd-al-Hafiz Maryam, chairman of Jordan's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Questions of Russian-Jordanian military-technical cooperation were discussed first and foremost during the talks. It is no secret that at one time Jordan received a large quantity of combat hardware and weapons from the Soviet Union. That is why the question has now been raised of supplying it with spare parts and ammunition, forming an infrastructure for repairs, and training Jordanian technical specialists in our military training institutions. Judging by the fact that the talks did not last long, all problems in this sphere were settled successfully.

According to a now established tradition, following the talks Pavel Grachev answered journalists' questions. He emphasized in particular that in the next few days the Russian Federation president will sign an edict on implementing a moratorium on combat actions in Chechnya. But the troops have already received the order to cease fire as of 0000 1 May. However, the defense minister stated, this does not mean that the federal forces grouping will tolerate bombardment and attacks by Chechen gunmen. If this happens, combat actions will continue.

It is possible that Pavel Grachev will meet with Chechen field commanders in the near future. Colonel General Anatoliy Kvashnin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District Troops, is in fact involved in working on this issue. However, the minister stated firmly, there can be no question of any meeting with Dudayev, since he has been declared a state criminal.

Dwelling on the problem of the 14th Army, Pavel Grachev noted that there is no question of its disbandment, as certain mass media have hastened to report. Only a decision to bring the numerical strength of its command into line with the real numerical strength of the large formation has been adopted. You can scarcely find another example where an army staff numbers 300 men, with just over 3,000 officers and men subordinate to them. That is why the decision was adopted to create an operational group of 80-90 men on the basis of the 14th Army command. Army Commander Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed has been offered several posts for subsequent service in this connection. In any case, we would like General Lebed to remain in the Armed Forces, Pavel Grachev said.

Yeltsin Message Commemorates Chernobyl Accident

LD2504092995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0913 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 25 (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian president's press service circulated the full text of Boris Yeltsin's message to Russian citizens on the occasion of commemoration day of radiation victims.

The message says as follows: "Nine years have passed since the day of the greatest calamity of mankind: the radiation disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. This tragedy affected and crushed fates of many Russians.

"The scale of the tragedy could have been immeasurably greater if not for bravery and staunchness of direct participants in overcoming consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. However, they fell its victims. Out of every ten participants, one is an invalid. Thousands of them have already passed away.

"We are very grateful to these people, although we have to admit that we have done clearly not enough for them. I hold that the most important task of the state is to fulfill its obligations to all the Chernobyl victims as soon as possible.

"I support socially important initiatives by the All-Russian as well as other non-government associations of citizens who suffered from radiation. Government bodies should involve more actively these organisations in joint work to carry out social programmes.

"Addressing all Russian people who suffered from radiation breakdowns and disasters, I ask them to accept my sincere wishes of good health and human happiness."

Edict Tightens Rules on Spent Nuclear Fuel

MM2704110595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Apr 95 First Edition p 3

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 389 "On Additional Measures To Step Up Monitoring of Environmental Safety Requirements During the Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel"; signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, the Kremlin 20 April 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to ensuring environmental safety and protecting citizens' health against the harmful effect of ionizing radiation during the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and in accordance with Article 80 of the Russian Federation Constitution, I decree:

1. Ensuring the protection of citizens and the environment against the harmful effect of ionizing radiation is to be considered a priority area in the work of federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation to regulate and monitor enterprises' economic activity in the field of handling spent nuclear fuel received for reprocessing purposes from foreign and domestic nuclear electric power stations.

2. The Russian Federation Government is to formulate and approve within a three-month period a procedure for accepting spent nuclear fuel from foreign nuclear electric power stations for subsequent reprocessing at

Russian enterprises and returning the radioactive waste and materials formed as a result of reprocessing.

The Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Russian Federation State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Health and Medical Industry are to ensure supervision and monitoring of the observance of nuclear and radiation safety requirements at all stages of the handling of spent nuclear fuel and the radioactive waste and materials formed as a result of reprocessing.

3. The following amendments are to be made to Russian Federation presidential edicts:

a) the word "preferential" [preimushchestvennom] is to be deleted from Point 4 of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 472 of 21 April 1993 "On the Fulfillment by the Russian Federation of Intergovernmental Agreements on Cooperation in Installing Nuclear Electric Power Stations Abroad" (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1993, No. 17, p1449);

b) in Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 72 of 25 January 1995 "On State Support for the Structural Reorganization and Conversion of the Nuclear Industry in the City of Zheleznogorsk, Krasnodar Kray" (SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1995, No. 5, p399):

the words "for temporary storage" [dlya vremennogo khraneniya] are to be deleted from paragraph four of Point 1 and paragraph one of Point 2;

in paragraph two of Point 2 the words "temporary storage" [vremennoye khraneniye] are to be replaced by the words "temporary holding" [vremennuyu vyderzhku], and the words "foreign currency resources received for the said storage and reprocessing" [poluchayemykh za ukazannoye khraneniye i pererabotku valyutnykh sredstv] are to be replaced by the words "foreign currency resources receives for the said services"[valyutnykh sredstv poluchayemykh za ukazannyye uslugi];

in Point 3 the words "temporary storage" [vremennoye khraneniye] are to be replaced by the words "temporary holding" [vremennoy vyderzhke].

4. This edict comes into force from the moment it is signed.

Federal Assembly

Tikhonov on Election Act Alternatives

954F2143A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 19 Apr 95 p 10

[Article by Aleksandr Tikhonov, chairman of the Consolidation Party, under the rubric "Viewpoint": "A Plant for the Production of Pure Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the tumultuous debate on the election act, I had the impression that neither the Duma nor the Federation Council were interested in adopting any of the options discussed. However paradoxical, lengthy debate, rows, and disagreements are more to the benefit of our inmates, as they can in this way extend their term. The deputies clearly like their life: They have come to feel at home and have settled in at both the political and everyday levels, and they have no desire to run the risk of new elections. This is my first impression.

As far as the options that were discussed are concerned, it is perfectly clear to me which of them the governors like most. They would like the majority of deputies to be elected to the Duma by head-to-head district and that there be twice as many of them as those nominated by part list. This is why the Federation Council agrees with the opinion of the president, who has proposed that 300 seats be allocated the regions. The governors are people who on the one hand are knowledgeable about the situation locally and, on the other, can exert an influence on the electorate that lives outside of Moscow's Garden Ring or the capital's beltway. The regional authorities could then exert greater influence on power in the center.

Of course, it is primarily important for me, as the leader of a political party, to know how these organizations will be represented in the legislative authorities. There are politicians who are insisting on the equality of the composition of the Duma, that is, half the deputies from parties, half, from the regions. And there are also those who believe that the "party-ites" should be preponderant. The objection of the "regionals" is heard immediately here—the Duma must not be turned into a Moscow hangout. Compelling also!

I personally might offer the following solution. Make amendments to the law providing for the separation of the party list into main and regional. That is, if a party has overcome the 5 percent mark, the condition that I proposed takes effect: 40 percent on the list should be given to the Moscow elite, the rest, to the party's regional representatives.

The percentage correlation could be different, but it is very important that people from the regions also are able to participate in the country's legislative and political process. I understand that there is a certain violation of democratic principles here and that the most competent and professional and best-trained politicians are concentrated in Moscow. It would be offensive, of course, were an important figure of this party or the other residing in Moscow to be left out, but I am sure that the regions also are capable of providing the future legislative authorities with gifted members of parliament. I am sure if only because I know many members of my own party, which is essentially regional, its principal forces being in the Urals and Siberia. If we surmount the 5 percent barrier, therefore, we will be represented in parliament by provincials in the good sense.

I believe that if public opinion is convinced that the elections should not be postponed, sabotaging the adoption of the act is impermissible, this is anticonstitutional! Is it difficult for representatives of the Duma, the Federation Council, and the president to get together, sit down at a roundtable, form conciliation commissions, and agree on acceptable forms of the election act.

It is popularly held that with the start of the new election campaign the present deputies, instead of tackling their direct duties, that is, formulating and adopting laws, will rush to propagandize themselves as candidates for the new parliament. I believe that the people will easily determine the difference between the workhorses of our parliament and those who would like to ensconce themselves in the Duma for another term.

However we may criticize members of parliament—both past and future—they have done their job. I would compare such work with the production of copper. First you take the copper concentrate, which contains a great deal of barren rock. Then you make from it black copper, it passes through several more stages, and from the black copper the purest copper is obtained. All the phases are different, but not one can be bypassed. So with the "production" of real democracy also.

And, further, there has been much talk about the fact that the future Duma will consist just of entrepreneurs, to whom the interests of the ordinary people are alien. In other words, whoever has the money will win the elections. I would say that the times now are different, the people have learned to differentiate. I could cite many examples of people who have a substantial amount of money not getting elected even at the last elections. The people elected persons who have no money at all, doctors, teachers, scientists were elected....

Whereas previously people voted indiscriminately for those who were opposed to the communists, today the people are beginning to see clearly and will go for persons who have achieved something in this life, not those who run their mouths. We have already passed the barren rock period, it seems.

Duma Turns Down Proposal From Crimean Parliament

LD2604151695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1049 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—The Russian State Duma turned down Wednesday the proposal by Konstantin Zatulin (Democrat) that it accept the request of the Crimean Supreme Soviet to act as guarantor of the Crimean referendum on June 25.

Under a decision of the Crimean Supreme Soviet the referendum will be held on three matters: the abolition of the Crimean Constitution by the Ukrainian parliament, the autonomous status of the republic and the economic union of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Crimean Supreme Soviet urged the parliaments and presidents of Ukraine and Russia to act as guarantors of the popular poll.

During the first voting Zatulin's proposal was supported by 192 deputies, during the second—by 182 (the necessary number was 226).

Only 157 deputies supported Sergey Baburin (Russia's Way) who wanted to discuss the status of Crimea, he reminded his colleagues of Russia's historical responsibility before Crimea.

The proposal of Aleksey Zvyagin (Liberal-Democrat) to consider the lawfulness of the surrender of Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine in 1954, did not receive necessary support—only 159 votes.

Duma Debate on Election Laws Viewed

MM2604143395 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 2

[Commentary by Pavel Anokhin: "Duma Multiparty System Will Not Make for Greater Democracy.... But It Will Make the Contest for Seats in Parliament Easier"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week ended with definite progress in the formulation of federal laws on the elections of the president of the Russian Federation and of State Duma deputies and on the procedure for forming the Federation Council. The laws have not been finalized yet but they have clearly gained in substance since the legislators' discussion at the Duma plenary session 21 April.

As is well known, the draft laws adopted by the State Duma were rejected by the Federation Council and sent back to the lower house for reworking in the light of the "senators'" amendments. They recommended first and foremost a change to the ratios for the formation of the State Duma, reducing the "party" component from 225 seats to 150 and increasing the number of deputies elected in single-seat constituencies to 300. In the opinion of Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov, a legislator elected from the party lists is detached from his voters and not accountable to them. There is also concern over the provision which allows a "party" candidate to stand in a single-seat constituency in addition to the party list, thus doubling the chances of success.

However, in order to establish a multiparty system in Russia the Duma members rejected the proposal of their upper house colleagues and left the present ratios at 225 to 225. Whether this decision will make for greater democracy in the country is hard to say. But as life has shown, the "single-seat" deputies are no less detached from their voters than their party comrades. Is it worth a confrontation?

After taking a principled stand the Duma legislators managed to reach a compromise. For example, the Federation Council's recommendation "to establish a mechanism for setting the date of elections automatically if for any reason the president of the Russian Federation does not exercise his power in this regard" has been politely adopted and "automated." Now if the Russian president does not set a date for elections to the State Duma when its powers expire, the draft law envisages that elections will be organized by the Central Electoral Commission "on the first Sunday after the month in which" the Duma's "powers expire." If the Russian president dissolves the State Duma without setting a date for elections they will be held by the Central Electoral Commission "on the first Sunday three months from the day of dissolution of the State Duma."

The Duma members took account of the "senators'" opinion in the law on presidential elections, too, by reducing the number of voters' signatures needed to nominate a candidate for the Russian presidency from 1.5 million to 1 million. This provision, it is believed, will facilitate greater competition among contenders.

The principle on which the Federation Council is formed proved to be a stumbling-block to deputies in both houses. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has already expressed its position on this question: The law must not contravene the constitution, which clearly states that "two representatives per component of the Russian Federation are to enter" the Federation Council: "One each in the representative and executive organs of state power." However, the State Duma adopted the draft coordinated with "Federation Council deputies" whereby members of the Federation Council are to be elected by the population. The draft law accords the right to nominate a candidate not only to the legislative and executive organs of power of the components of the Federation but also to citizens, which will surely arouse the opposition of the upper chamber and of the president (whose draft law on the formation of the Federation Council has been rejected by the Duma).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the criticisms leveled at the State Duma (namely, that it is aggravating the political situation and inflaming social tension) which have been voiced in connection with its recent commotion over the vote of confidence in the government are superficial, to put it mildly. Undoubtedly there are quite a few immoderate individuals among the Duma legislators, but the sensible ones are clearly in the majority and they will always prevail. To pacify the extremists the sensible deputies are even prepared to temporarily limit their own rights by, for instance, removing from the standing orders the ability of factions to table a motion of no-confidence in the government.

This is not the only piece of evidence that the Duma members, despite their obstinacy, are clearly becoming wiser as the end of their period of office approaches. Additional confirmation of this is provided by the constructive discussion held at the end of the parliamentary week on the laws on elections, which have been returned to the Federation Council for approval in the light of a number of amendments.

Duma Seeks Nazarbayev Support on Language Issue

LD2604152195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1323 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—The Russian State Duma has requested Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to "support the Russian-speaking community and Russian-language organizations in their efforts to make Russian an official language in Kazakhstan."

The request was made on the eve of a nationwide vote of confidence in President Nazarbayev scheduled for April 29. The State Duma points out that "Russian is spoken by a vast majority of the Kazakhs."

As many as 243 members of the State Duma voted in favor of addressing Nazarbayev, with one vote against and three abstentions.

The Duma told Nazarbayev that "there is no constructive dialog between the Kazakh leaders and public organizations that represent the interests of the Russian and Slavic communities of Kazakhstan, including the Cossacks."

It hopes that new parliamentary elections will be scheduled soon in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh legislature was dissolved by President Nazarbayev earlier this spring.

Duma Passes Amended Securities Bill

MK2704101095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Boris Boyko under the "Securities Market Regulation" rubric: "Bill Passed With Government's Suspicious Consent"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For more than six months passions have been running high at the State Duma budget and finance committee's working group over the bill "On the Securities Market." It could have hardly been otherwise because its drafters include proponents of diametrically opposed concepts of the development of a Russian securities market. At yesterday's State Duma meeting the long-suffering draft law (about 600 amendments were made to it while it was being readied for second reading) was passed in second reading effectively without discussion. As for the irreconcilable viewpoints, the drafters managed to reach a compromise on a number of key contentious matters. At the same time, the stance adopted by the Federal Securities Commission on bearer shares and self-regulating organizations underwent the most significant revision. [passage omitted]

Some drafters, including representatives of the State Property Committee and the Federal Securities Commission, unequivocally demanded that bearer shares be banned completely. Others, represented by an unlikely alliance of the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and players on the securities market, insisted that they need to be retained, arguing that banning them would simply leave a part of an already established market outside any supervision framework and, therefore, will not insure it against various kinds of junk bonds. Those opposing the ban on bearer shares asserted that "even Metro travel cards can be quoted." It would be more advisable, however, to recognize them as securities, for from that moment on the holders and issuers of such securities will be able to straighten out their differences in court. Otherwise, such securities holders will not be protected in any way.

Although the viewpoint of the Federal Securities Commission gained the upper hand when the draft law was considered in first reading, the adopted version seemed at first sight to pursue the liberal concept of stock market regulation: Alongside the term "share" it introduces the term "issued securities" that can also be applied to bearer securities. Nonetheless, deputy Mark Goryachev's modest amendment to the text of the draft law could reduce the permission to issue bearer shares to a token paper inscription. The amendment says that bearer shares may be issued in a certain proportion to the size of the issuer's paid authorized capitalization and in accordance with standards set by the Federal Commission on the Securities Market (the new name of the Federal Securities Commission provided for in the new law). In his comments on this provision of the bill, Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the budget committee, said simply that a transition period is needed for all shares to bear their holders' names. Therefore, it would be logical to conclude that the drafters decided not to formalize the securities market as it currently exists, caving in to the Federal Commission's cherished wish to leave only named shares in the long run. [passage omitted]

Another noteworthy development in that regard is an amendment proposed by the communist faction at the eleventh hour, right during the meeting, which renders the Federal Commission accountable not only to the government, but also to the Federal Assembly, a move signaling that the parliament is laying claim to supervisory functions not provided for in the Constitution. Since the Federal Commission makes no bones about its negative attitude to the draft passed by the Duma, it did not come as a surprise that the amendment did not draw any objections from government members present in the audience. On account of precisely this amendment the bill may be rejected by the president. Presumably, the Federal Commission may well be pleased with a scenario whereby an absence of the law (whereas a law according to its concept is clearly unfeasible) will be offset by presidential edicts regulating the securities market. In fact the experience of the post-check privatization program may be considered a success—the edict has been in effect for nearly a year now, while the State Duma continues drawing up a draft program that is effectively already in force.

Agrarian Party Issues Statement Against Reforms

MM2704095395 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Agrarians' Determination"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy G.T. Dyudyayev (Kemerovo Oblast) issued the following statement at the 26 April morning session of the State Duma on the instructions of the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] deputies' faction:

The All-Russia Peasant Assembly took place 5 April this year in Moscow, in whose work over 2,000 representatives of the Russian peasantry took part.

The assembly discussed the critical situation in the agro-industrial complex and the problems of agricultural production and Russians' food supply.

The All-Russia Peasant Assembly defined the agrarian reform being implemented as destructive, antipeasant, and antipeople, and made a number of demands on the government urging that they be implemented by 10 May. Regrettably, the time that has elapsed since the assembly does not convince us of the government's readiness to respond to the demands of Russia's peasants.

Most of the laws and decrees that have been adopted with regard to the countryside are not working, the situation in the agro-industrial complex is not improving, the price disparity is increasing, and purchase prices of agricultural produce are not being indexed. Mindful of this state of affairs in the agro-industrial complex and implementing the instructions of the All- Russia Peasant Assembly the agrarian faction warns the government of their intention—in the event of the peasants' demands not being met by the aforesaid date—on their return from their electoral districts to organize and collect signatures for the question of no-confidence in the government to be considered and urges deputies from other factions and groups to view this statement with understanding and support. [statement ends]

On the same day State Duma Chairman I.P. Rybkin notified V.S. Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Government, of the APR faction's statement and asked him to examine this statement and inform the Duma about the steps that have been taken.

We will report in SELSKAYA ZHIZN on the reaction provoked by this determined move by agrarian deputies.

Federation Council Urges Lifting of FRY Sanctions

MM2604132995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Apr 95 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report on Russian Federation Council undated appeal to President Yeltsin, followed by text of "Russian Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council Appeal to the Parliaments of the World 'On the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,'" signed by the Russian

Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council and dated 12 April 1995, under the general heading: "At the Federation Council"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation Council has adopted an appeal to Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin "On Russia's Attitude to the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia" which notes that the continuation of the Yugoslav crisis is rendering the danger of other countries' becoming embroiled in the armed conflict a reality and that the current system of sanctions is proving ineffective when it comes to resolving the problem of ending the bloodshed.

The appeal stresses that Russia is playing and should continue to play an active role in settling the Yugoslav crisis peacefully and fairly and in maintaining stability in that part of the world. At the same time, in the view of the Federation Council, Russian diplomacy should promote not only the easing but also, where possible, the total lifting of the sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the restoration of its membership of the United Nations and other international organizations.

The Federation Council voiced the hope that the problem of a political settlement to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia will continue to be one of the top-priority avenues of Russian foreign policy, which are constantly monitored by the president, and that the opinion of Federation Council deputies will be taken into account during the formulation and implementation of a system of practical measures to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.

Russian Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council Appeal to the Parliaments of the World "On the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia"

The Federation Council, having examined at its 19th session the question of the situation which has taken shape in the former Yugoslavia, notes that the world community's efforts have not hitherto brought the establishment of lasting peace in that region. The agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not being observed, all manner of obstacles are being put in the way of UN peacemaking activity, and the sufferings of the civilian population are continuing.

The Federation Council, firmly supporting the peace plan of the International Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina, notes that Russia, bound as it is by traditional ties of friendship with all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, is playing an active role in the process of settling the Bosnian conflict.

The Federation Council believes that the only way of reaching a political settlement to the Yugoslav crisis is by political means and methods, via an objective and equitable attitude to all the states that have formed in the former Yugoslavia, via rigorous observance of the UN Charter and the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, and through respect for human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.

The Federation Council believes that the stance espoused by the FRY, which is not directly involved in the Bosnian conflict, which accepted the peace plan of the International Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which backed the political efforts and opposed the supporters of the military option, is a key factor in settling the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. This constructive policy on the part of the FRY leadership merits due attention from the world community. The peoples of the FRY must at the same time see for themselves that their choice in favor of peace has met with the appropriate assessment.

In this connection the Federation Council urges the parliaments of the world to voice a positive assessment of Belgrade's constructive steps and to back the suspension followed by the total abrogration of the UN Security Council sanctions against the FRY.

[Signed] The Russian Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council
[Dated] Moscow, 12 April 1995
No. 431-1 SF

Deputies Cited on Chechnya Amnesty Issues

MM2604135895 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Article by Tatyana Shutova: "Selective Charity. State Duma 'Democrats' in No Hurry To Amnesty Participants in Events in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his appeal to the Chechen people, read out at the conference on national accord in Groznyy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Federation Government, said that "there will be no persecution, much less repression of those who were deceived and joined the armed volunteer militia." The federal authorities are guaranteeing them an amnesty.

An amnesty is a legislative act and thus now a matter for the State Duma. In April it adopted a law on measures for a political settlement in the Chechen Republic and Article 13 of this document envisages that people involved in the Chechen conflict will be amnestied. Vladimir Lysenko, a deputy from the "Yabloko" faction, was instructed to draft the relevant legal act. He organized the conference on Chechnya and proposed a plan for a stage-by-stage settlement. He is an expert. Vladimir Lysenko says that it is necessary to wait until the end of hostilities.

The Duma has instructed the Committee for Legislation to draft the Chechen act of amnesty. And work is proceeding at full speed on a "broad amnesty"—to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the Victory. The "narrow" amnesty did not work: The working group was set up and set aside until "after the holiday."

The Committee for Legislation explained that the "Chechen" amnesty is trickier than usual. It contains new concepts, which are not legally complete. It was only recently that the conflict itself was defined as "armed and non-international." The committee says that declaring an amnesty is a simple matter. Formulating the mechanism for its application is trickier. What is more, the amnesty should also include servicemen who did not obey orders, went AWOL, and fled Chechnya. That is, those who would be considered deserters and waiverers if the conflict were called a war. In short, it is an exacting business and there are many problems.

Why did deputies from "Yabloko" and "Russia's Choice" sympathize with those servicemen who were reluctant to fight and do not want to help the Chechens say "farewell to arms"? The soldiers' mothers took the military under their wing. Who will put in a word for the Chechens? Why are Shabad, Ponomarev, Sheynis, and Kovalev not hurrying their colleagues along?

Deputies from the "Women of Russia" faction and Stanislav Govorukhin, chairman of the commission on Chechnya, visited Chechnya. They believe that the question of an amnesty must be speeded up. At their suggestion the Committee for Security has taken on the responsibility of drafting the act of amnesty. During last Friday's Duma session [21 April] a draft decree was taken as a base

On Wednesday the revised draft decree will be submitted to the Duma for a ballot. Even if it helps preserve just one life it is worth hurrying deputies along, Galina Parshenteva, one of the people behind the decree from the "Women of Russia" faction, said. Well, charity and peacemaking were always a women's vocation. It is just a shame that other Duma deputies are selective with their charity and compassion.

Deputies Favor Creating Commission on Chechnya

LD2604142195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0834 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Apr—A group of deputies of both houses of the Federal Assembly has declared the establishment of a public commission aimed at assisting the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Chechnya. A statement, which has been circulated by them, says they support an appeal by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on intentions of the Russian Government to enter into talks with the command of the armed formations, which are clashing with the federal troops.

The deputies have declared they are ready to be mediators between the sides, if it is necessary. Among the tasks of the public commission, they mention the intention to promote the creation of a mechanism for the implementation of the appeal by Viktor Chernomyrdin, to assist the consolidation of society around the idea of the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to carry out a public supervision over the process of the peaceful settlement of the situation.

Army Paper on Vote Against 14th Army Pullout

MM2704095795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Petr Karapetyan: "Deputies Opposed to Withdrawal of 14th Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 April the State Duma adopted the Decree "On the Situation Concerning the 14th Combined Army" by an overwhelming majority of votes. The withdrawal of the Army from the territory of the Transdniester region was deemed inexpedient.

During the discussion of the question, many deputies said that the withdrawal of the Army would destabilize the situation in the Transdniester region. It was noted in particular that the decree does not contradict the plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense as regards the structural reorganization of the large formation.

Regional Affairs

Further Reportage, Commentary on Chechnya

Yeltsin Declares Moratorium 1-9 May

LD2704061295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0537 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 27 (OANA-Tass)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin decreed late Wednesday [26 April] to introduce a moratorium on the fighting in Chechnya for the period of May holidays which begin on May 1 and last until May 9 when the victory in WW2 is to be celebrated, according to Defence minister Pavel Grachev.

He told reporters that Chechen field commanders had already been acquainted with the document by commander of the North Caucasian military dictrict Anatoliy Kvashnin.

Grachev did not specify the exact period of the truce, but warned that in case Chechen militants open fire on Russian troops they are sure to face a mighty retaliation.

"We shall respond to each shot by a mass of shots", the Defence minister said, but expressed hope that the moratorium would be observed by Chechen fighters.

Foreign leaders who are to attend the celebrations in Moscow devoted to the 50th anniversary of the victory in WW2. However, they will miss the military parade, but will attend a parade of veterans of the Great Patriotic War as WW2 is called in Russia.

"I am positive about the fact that western leaders will not attend the military parade on Poklonnaya hill on May 9", Grachev said.

"They have their own programme and will attend a parade of Great Patriotic War veterans in Red square", he added.

Foreign leaders will come to the Poklonnaya hill after the military parade is over and will participate in the opening ceremony of a memorial complex devoted the victory.

Grachev on May Day Cease-Fire

LD2704091495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0800 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin has signed an edict suspending military actions in Chechnya for the period of the May celebrations.

[Begin Grachev recording] The field commanders, that is the so-called field commanders of the illegal formations, have already been briefed on this edict. General Colonel Kvashnin is now in Groznyy for a second day. However, the moratorium does not mean that if shots are fired at federal troops, the troops will passively observe the moratorium. That is out of the question. If anyone is shot, we will retaliate with machine-gun fire. But I still think that the moratorium will hold sway and will be observed. [end recording]

This was the opinion of the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Meanwhile, a 500-strong naval infantry battalion of the Pacific Fleet is now being moved to Chechnya. Heavy weaponry is also being transported to the area.

Chechen Forces To Ignore Cease-Fire

AU2604142995 Paris AFP in English 1344 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bamut, Russia, April 26 (AFP)—Chechen forces will ignore a Russian cease-fire offer and keep fighting, top separatist commanders said on Wednesday [26 April].

"There won't be a cease-fire on this front. It is our right to keep fighting and we have no order to stop," said Shervani Albakov, commander of rebel forces in western Chechnya.

In Moscow, Russian authorities announced two cease-fire offers, one starting Thursday and the other May 1, lasting more than two weeks and 10 days respectively. It was not clear which plan would take effect.

But Chechen military commanders said they would not stop fighting until Russian troops left Chechnya.

Albakov said Russian cease-fire offers had no validity unless there were negotiations between the two sides' commanders.

"In a war there are two sides and there are military commanders on both sides. They have to meet and our presidents have to meet," Albakov said in the besieged Chechen village of Bamut.

The Russians can only negotiate through separatist President Dzhokhar Dudayev because he heads the Chechen armed forces, Albakov said.

Russian authorities have already said they refuse to meet Dudayev, calling him a "criminal of the state."

The rebel commander in Bamut, which has been under siege for four months and is totally destroyed, said the Russian cease-fire offers were a trick timed for the May 9 World War II commemorations in Moscow to be attended by more than 50 world leaders.

"They want to show the whole world that everything is okay in Chechnya. ... They just need to buy time for this celebration," said Ramzan Ferzayli.

"Not a single field commander, or regional commander, or national commander will stop fighting until the Russian troops leave and talks start with our government," he said.

"Until then, for us absolutely nothing has changed—it's war."

Sides 'Extremely Skeptical'

MM2704133195 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Chernyak under "What People Are Talking and Arguing About" rubric: "'Jubilee' Truce in Chechnya on Verge of Being Torpedoed by Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Apparently Viktor Chernomyrdin's statement about a possible "armistice" with the Chechens for the days on which the 50th anniversary of VE Day is being celebrated and about the appearance of the relevant president's edict took the Russian Federation's power departments unawares. When asked to explain certain details and the mechanism of the upcoming truce the Defense Ministry referred us in fright to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]: They are now in command in Chechnya, let them answer you. MVD spokesman Leonid Golovnev was calmer.

"Viktor Stepanovich did make an announcement about a truce but we do not have the paperwork yet. Let us wait," he joked. But went on quite seriously:

"Our side has expressed goodwill, so far their side has been silent—they are probably thinking it over. For the second day it has been comparatively quiet in Chechnya, there are no large-scale operations. The muftis are doing a lot of work, they are forging contacts with field commanders, many of them are ready for talks. But absolutely nothing has been heard about the Chechen upper echelons for about 20 days now. As regards the mechanism for a possible truce, it is yet to be worked out. If there is a political decision we will withdraw troops. We will not shoot first but will return fire if fired upon."

At the same time, judging from the information coming from Chechnya the warring sides, unlike Kremlin strategists, are extremely skeptical about the likelihood of a cease-fire, the threat of terrorist acts against federal troops still remains, and the Chechens have no intention of leaving their positions in the Bambut area and a number of other populated areas.

Zhirinovskiy, Others Divided on Prospects

MK2704092095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled report]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Political Bookmaker continues to take bets. Today's jackpot is the "celebrations" truce in Chechnya. Thus: "Will the truce be observed; if not, who will be the first to break it?" [signed] Elza the bookmaker.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy:

The truce will not be observed. This is yet another cheap populist move by the government. Violations, I think, will occur on both sides. The people have become absorbed in the war, it is hard to hold them back from killing. It's like stealing: An honest man would not do it, but once he gets carried away.... It is hard to stop.

Anatoliy Shabad:

The moratorium will be observed unilaterally. Bodies should be removed and order imposed. Even if the Chechens sign the moratorium and also observe it, this is no way out. It is necessary to sign a normal peace treaty.

Vladimir Lysenko:

I think the moratorium will be observed precisely until 0000 of 10 May. As soon as Clinton's plane takes off, an announcement will be made about a provocation on the part of Chechen militants and active operations will start over again. It is not ruled out, however, that there will be violations on both sides.

Assembly Leader Welcomes Moratorium

LD2604203095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1914 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Interfax)—Leader of the Assembly of Chechen for Peace, Accord and Rebirth Doku Zavgayev welcomed the Russian leaders' decision to declare a moratorium on military actions in Chechnya during the May holidays. The Assembly was registered by the Russian Ministry for Justice on February 23 as an inter-regional public organization.

Zavgayev said during the Assembly's presentation in Moscow today that all refugees must be returned to Chechnya for restoring political stability and peace in the republic. He said that more than 300,000 refugees were now living in various Russian regions.

Zavgayev said the Assembly was likely to take part in organizing and holding "truly nation-wide elections" in Chechnya in future. He said the Assembly included those "who have the moral right to speak to the people and tell them the truth."

Zavgayev said that the Dudayev criminal regime had placed the Chechen multi-national people in a severe disaster over the last three years.

The Assembly was welcomed by First Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Government Ernest Bakirov. He said Moscow residents would provide to the organization both moral support and material assistance.

Representatives of Bashkortostan, Adygeya, Karachayevo- Cherkessiya and other Russian regions promised the same.

Filatov Said Linked to Order

MM2504095695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Mikhail Gurevich: "Shooting Is Ending Because It Is Ending"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appeal from Viktor Chernomyrdin to the Chechen people published on the first page of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was read out 21 April at a conference on the attainment of national consensus in Chechnya, which was reported at the same time by ITAR-TASS correspondents Sharip Asuyev and Mikhail Shevtsov.

The appeal gave some people grounds for supposing that the story which had appeared a day previously written by another TASS staffer, Tamara Zamyatina, claiming that the Kremlin had given orders for federal troops to end combat operations in Chechnya and that no foreign politician would visit us for Victory Day, accorded with reality.

But Zamyatina's fabrications were refuted the same day by spokesmen for the power departments. On Sunday ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA reported the embarrassment that had occurred with Zamyatina, publishing the article "Service Novel."

It was this article which was read and even shown in an NTV news broadcast on Friday night. They said that ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was opposing the ending of the fighting and wanted the war to continue. And it turns out that Zamyatina (also shown on the night-time

"Today" program and on "Itogi') was right. Chernomyrdin is confirming it, they said.

Yes, the TASS item from Groznyy (from Groznyy, you note, not from a Moscow office) said: "The central point on the conference's agenda is the ending of combat operations and the start of preparation for elections to the republican and local organs of power of the Chechen Republic." But compare Zamyatina's lamentations and the government statement, whose main thrust is that the war is ending because it is ending. It is not December now. The bandit formations have suffered defeat. So the remaining field commanders are being asked "without preliminary conditions" to end combat operations.

And claims that ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA journalists want blood to continue to flow should remain on the conscience of the "puppets" from NTV or the "puppeteers" from the "Most" group that finances them.

500 Pacific Fleet Marines Airlifted

LD2704064195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0537 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By Yuriy Grachev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK April 27 (ITAR-TASS)—Some 500 marines from the Russian Pacific fleet are to be airlifted to Chechnya to replace their battle-hardened colleagues and the first three transport planes took off from the military airfield near Vladivostok on Thursday.

Several other planes are waiting for their turn at the airport, Tass learned from the press centre of the Pacific fleet.

"The servicemen had undegone a good training and will polish it on combat positions", battalion commander Aleksey Zhilinskiy told Tass before departure.

The marines are armed with small arms and heavy weapons. "They are equipped according to the requirements of war time, they have been provided with everything necessary and there are no deserters among the marines", Zhilinskiy said.

26 Apr Report on Situation

LD2604171295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1654 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Itar-Tass)—The Russian government's press service issued on Wednesday [26 April] a report on the latest developments in Chechnya. The report reads as follows:

"According to the Mobile information centre, the Chechen Committee for National Accord gathered in a regular meeting yesterday. Put on the agenda were eight items, two of which provoked particularly heated debates, namely the military and political situation in Chechnya and the structure and formation of state power bodies for a transition period. A commission was set up to investigate the April 23 events in Gudermes.

"Pensions are already paid regularly in 10 Chechen regions. The requisited funds are allocated from Russia's pensions fund. The procedure of pension payments is being brought in line with Russian laws. All records for those who have recently received their pensions outside Chechnya are to be returned to the republic this coming May and June.

"By present, Ministry for Emergencies personnel have destroyed nearly 200,000 highly explosive items, repaired 1,530 metres of gas pipe-lines, removed over 50,000 tons of debris and consumer waste from the city."

27 Apr Report on Situation

LD2704114095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1026 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, April 27 (INTERFAX)—Russian police officers and representatives of Chechnya's National Accord Committee have been explaining to the population the meaning of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's message to the people of Chechnya and the Charter of Peace and Accord.

The press center of the combined forces command in Chechnya reported to Interfax on Thursday, "the civilian population of Chechnya has been positive about the Russian government documents."

Meanwhile, according to the press center, the interior troop command offices have been helping the population the best they can. Up to 500 refugees return to Groznyy daily. Last Wednesday, engineering troops defused mines planted under the republic's surgery center, a hospital, two electric sub-stations, and the Krasny Molot plant.

However, despite peace efforts by Russian Interior Ministry troops, the social and political situation in Chechnya remains complex. Militants are being banded together in preparation for raids into southern hill areas. Up to a thousand militants are reported to have been deployed in the Alleroi and Sayasan communities. Dudayev troops have been continuing to shell command offices and administrative buildings.

The situation has been straining in Naur, an area in northern Chechnya where the increasing influx of refugees has been accompanied by an increased concentration of militants, the press center reported.

Groznyy Inhabitants Fear Going Out

MM2504114195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Yakov: "Sun, Spring, and Shooting in Groznyy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our photographer took this photograph [of a woman holding a baby next to a pile of barbed wire] on the past sunny weekend virtually in the center of Groznyy, near the building which now houses Salambek Khadzhiyev's government. Virtually every night assault rifles and machineguns are fired in the vicinity.

According to the federal troops, guerrillas are slipping into the city and bombarding strategic installations as night falls, in particular, the government's temporary premises. In the view of local inhabitants, it is most often drunk internal troop and OMON [Special-Purpose Militia Detachment] soldiers who fire in all directions as soon as they see something suspicious.

This Sunday tracer bullets set fire to two apartments on the top floor of the block where Lena Firova lives with eight-month old Kair (in the photograph). They burned until morning because at night no one will run the risk of going out onto the street and making even one imprudent move. The tenants of the block, afraid of nighttime shooting, still spend the night in the basement.

Lena Firova has spent all the winter months of the war with her son in the basement. Little Kair has spent six out of his eight months under constant fire. His father vanished from the city back in November—during the opposition's first assault on Groznyy. He either fled and is hiding somewhere, or he has been killed. Who can now answer these questions for the two defenseless people who have remained alone amid this chaos of fire and who are glad just to see the sun? And to encounter silence—when the guns stop.

They do not know what will happen next, a few hundred meters from here; they do not see newspapers or the television. They have no idea of Premier Chernomyrdin's latest offer of talks. They do not know about the federal troops' attacks on Bamut. They have not heard that on Easter Day near Gudermes Dudayev's men surrounded an internal troop subunit and after a long battle the troops lost a few men.

People in Groznyy only know about Samashki—the radio, sometimes really exaggerating the already bloody details, reported the dreadful minutiae of the punitive action against virtually every last inhabitant of the ravaged town. Following that the residents view the passing OMON armored personnel carriers with even greater fear. This endless war, which has already been partially forgotten by Russia, is still going on for them.

Armed Groups Lack Single Command

LD2504173995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1417 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOZDOK (North Ossetia), April 25 (Interfax)—A high-ranking Russian military officer has said he doubts that a broad dialog with Chechen field commanders can be established.

"Today the illegal armed formations in Chechnya lack a single command; they have no clear command structure," he told Interfax in Mozdok on Tuesday.

According to the military official, the chief of staff of the Chechen formations Aslan Maskhadov alone "has retained some influence over some formations." "The remaining units of militants act independently, and are subordinate to no one," he noted.

The military official said he believes that the Chechens "can hardly be expected to halt all combat operations."

According to him, "even if the federal troops suspend their advance on the southern and eastern areas of Chechnya, the militants are not likely to stop terrorist acts against Russian servicemen."

"There is no alternative to a political solution to the conflict in Chechnya," the official said. However, in his view, the illegal formations remaining in the republic should be disarmed or eliminated first.

Military Leader Wants Russian Pullout

LD2504202095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1536 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY, April 25 (Interfax)—Aslan Maskhadov, chief of staff of the Chechen units, said that the Russian authorities got stuck up in Chechnya so deep that they do not know how to get out of the mess.

He believed that the only realistic solution would be withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Chechen Republic but this requires the political will on the part of the top people in Russia.

Maskhadov told Interfax that various peace conferences and assemblies lead nowhere. He had the last week's national reconciliation conference in Groznyy. [sentence as received]

Maskhadov called on the Russian authorities to enter talks "on a mutually acceptable basis and in line with international law." He explained that Moscow has to treat the Chechen Republic as an equal rather than part of the Russian Federation.

Maskhadov was surprised that Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had recently described him as a field commander.

"I am the chief of staff, an organizer of the Chechen Republic's military and political system, not an ordinary citizen," he said.

Crimes Committed by Troops Discussed

LD2504215595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 25 (Interfax)—A meeting presided over by the chairman of the Federal

Territorial Executive Department in Chechnya, Nikolay Semyonov, focused on violations of law committed by Russian servicemen in the republic was held in Groznyy, the Russian Government press office reported Tuesday.

The meeting was attended by the chairman of the National Accord Committee, Umar Avturkhanov, leader of the national revival government Salambek Khadzhiyev, representatives of the federal command, Interior Ministry, Prosecutor's and Commandant's Offices.

The meeting considered cases of pillage, robbery and harassment of civilians by federal troops and their impact on the sociopolitical situation in Chechnya.

The meeting decided to develop a plan of action to perfect the coordination between the federal command and the Chechen authorities. A flexible response commission will be set up in case of conflicts between the federal troops and locals. The guard of state property will soon be established following numerous cases of robbery.

The press office said 42 tonnes of humanitarian aid had been delivered to Groznyy over the last 24 hours.

The Federal Migration Service introduced 24 cottages on Prospekt Dyakova in Groznyy for families who homes had been destroyed.

OSCE Delegation Flies to Chechnya

LD2504202695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1555 GMT 25 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 25 (Interfax)—Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for European Cooperation Yuriy Ushakov believes that "it is early yet to speak about with whom and how the OSCE group will establish contacts in Chechnya."

"It's a working issue which will be tackled it its time," he told Interfax on Tuesday commenting on the statement made by the group's leader, Hungarian diplomat Sandor Meszaros, in Moscow. Meszaros said that the group was planning to establish dialog with "Dudayev himself."

Ushakov believes that "at the initial stage, the group will have to solve the most basic practical problems faced when living and working in Chechnya. "Chechnya is not a health resort, as you know," said Ushakov.

"Subsequently, the leader of the group will have to meet with representatives of the federal power ministries and other federal bodies and after consultations with them, broaden their activity," he said.

The embassy of the Hungarian Republic in Moscow told Interfax that on Tuesday morning the OSCE delegation flew out to Chechnya. The group consists of six diplomats from Hungary, the U.S., France, Sweden, Switzerland and Poland.

General on Prisoner Exchanges

MM2404135695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Colonel Nikolay Poroskov: "Fate of Caucasian Prisoners Worries Society and Special Services. Our Special Correspondent Colonel Nikolay Poroskov Reports From Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last week a Russian Federal Security Service [FSB] operations group in Chechnya has brought back 31 people, including six officers, from Dudayev's jails. In all 153 people (25 officers) have been released to date, 91 of them thanks to the FSB's efforts. Around 80 people are still being held hostage, 267 are listed as missing, and 260 corpses are unidentified. These figures were cited by Major General Nikolay Kovalev, deputy director of the FSB.

The main way in which servicemen captured by Dudayev's men are being released is through exchanges. Among others in return for criminals close to the guerrillas who have been arrested in Russia. Sometimes this involves the payment of a ransom.

On the day that we spoke with the general, Captain Sergey Malikov of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, who had spent almost four months in prison, was released. He had broken ribs and there were bruises on his body. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will report later on the ordeal suffered by Senior Lieutenant Igor Solomatin, who escaped from jail.

According to reliable data, several servicemen have been shot. Primarily for not working well enough for their "masters." The same fate may be in store for 20 hostages held by Shamil Basayev's grouping. An accord has not been reached regarding them. An FSB spokesman recently went to see Basayev again. But an accord has been reached with Aslan Maskhadov for 18 servicemen to be handed over in exchange for arrested guerrillas. The overall situation is being complicated by the fact that the scattered groups do not have a single command.

Regrettably, many elements of this tragedy are reminiscent of the days of slavery: There are cases where local Chechen residents are paying the guerrillas a ransom for the captured servicemen, enlisting them for to work on their farms, and then handing them over for money (selling them, in effect) to the Russian side, reaping a double profit from this human trade.

Up to 5,000 Refugees Return Daily

LD2704111595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1100 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By Lilia Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW April 27 (Itar-Tass)—Up to 5,000 refugees return to the Chechen Republic every day, Sergey Solntsev, press secretary of Russia's Federal Migration Service (FMS), told Itar-Tass on Thursday.

According to FMS, the population of Groznyy has already grown up to 200,000. The migration service has begun work to prepare makeshift housing for them. Thus, five centres for the provisional accommodation of city residents, whose houses were destroyed, are to be built in Groznyy soon. Premises for the centres have already been selected and the provision of them with equipment has already been started. The centres are to accommodate up to 5,000 people. Another 5,000 refugees will be given an opportunity to dwell in special houses to be set up on the already prepared three sites.

In the countryside, people will be assisted in rebuilding their houses. Residents of the Republic will participate in the rebuilding of their houses and receive wages for that.

As for families, mainly Russian ones, who do not intend to return to Chechnya, they number approximately 100,000-120,000, or 30,000 families. They dwell so far in Provisional Accommodation Centres, FMS Chief Tatyana Regent has told Itar-Tass.

But provisional accommodation does not settle the problem. The point is that people's further accommodation has not yet been decided upon. Therefore, they should join the housing waiting list which is common to all migrants. This means that their stay at the Provisional Accommodation Centrees will drag out for an indefinite time.

Number of Refugees Hits 480,000

LD2404130095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1250 GMT 24 Apr 95

[By Anna Bakina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 24 (ITAR-TASS)—The number of refugees from the Chechen Republic reached 480,000 from July 1992—the start of registration of displaced persons from Chechnya—till this April. Out of the total, migration services officially recorded 365,509 people. Some 120,000 people turned for aid.

ITAR-TASS received this data from the Moscow office of the International Migration Organisation.

The main quantities of refugees who fled combat operations, settled in the following areas: about 100,000 in the territory of Chechnya, 232,600 in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, over 40,000 in the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories as well as in the Rostov and Astrakhan regions, 7,000 in central regions of Russia and Siberia.

Commenting on this data, ITAR-TASS reported from Nazran that the Ingush migration service registered 159,000 refugees as of today. Head of Ingush migration service Nazir Daskiyev said that only 28 people dared to return home.

18,000 Russian Soldiers Said Killed

NC2404174295 Istanbul YENI GUNAYDIN in Turkish 21 Apr 95 p 7

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku—In a statement in Baku, Ramazan Kaytemirov, adviser to President Dzhokhar Dudayev, has said that 45,000 people have been killed as a result of Russia's military intervention in Chechnya. Kaytemirov stressed that the Chechen forces killed 18,000 Russian soldiers, including 350 officers and a general, destroyed or disabled more than 500 armored vehicles, and shot down nine military aircraft in the fighting.

Kaytemirov outlined the situation in Chechnya. He said that the Russian military forces control the low lands but are unable to take action on the heights. He also said that the Chechen forces continue to wage a guerrilla war against the Russian military units.

FSB on Efforts To Locate Missing

LD2604141395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1339 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Olga Semyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 26 (Itar-Tass)—"The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s task force in Chechnya does not have any information so far about the fate of Fred Cuny, a U.S. humanitarian mission activist, and accompanying Russian citizens", a FSB spokesman told TASS on Wednesday.

The spokesman expressed regret that many newsmen and humanitarian activists were rushing to Chechnya without having the slightest idea of the situation there or of how to behave in a zone of combat operations, thus exposing themselves to excessive danger.

According to the spokesman, the major objective of the FSB task force in Chechnya is to restore constitutional order in the republic. However, alongside this assignment, security officers also take measures to trace and locate all media workers and various mission staffers registered among the missing in the zone of military actions.

Peace Conference Continues in Groznyy

MK2704062795 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Lema Turpalov under the "Chechen Republic" rubric: " 'A Mosquito Was on Me, So My Brother Smashed it With a Shovel.' Questions Raised at a Peace Conference in Groznyy Need To Be Answered"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every speaker at the conference in Groznyy, held on the initiative of the National Conciliation Committee, had his own opinion. Several dozen more opinions could be heard during the breaks between sessions.

Abdulla Bugayev, vice premier in the National Revival Government, was straightforward: "The operation, as drawn up by the generals, was mindless, and therefore it failed." In the last 10 days of December, the generals reported that the first stage of the war had ended successfully. High-ranking government officials advised about rapid restoration work under way in Groznyy. At the same time, cannons continued to fire for five months running.

At the conference, many speakers spoke about an armistice—but with whom? The opposing side was absent, although there were rumors that Dudayev's representatives came incognito. Abdulla Bugayev identified three categories of gunmen: First, there are Dudayev's gangster entourage, who have thrown their people, for mercenary motives, into the abyss of war; they must be tried, without any doubts. Second, there are fanatics, convinced that they are fighting for faith and the national idea. These are the people with whom contacts should be established in order to explain to them the disastrous effect of the war. The third category consists of those who seek revenge for murdered close relatives and ruined homes. Their numbers will continue to increase, unless "spot-targeted" bombardments and artillery shellings of built-up areas stop.

The word "senseless" was the one most frequently used at the conference. Dada Shaliyev, chairman of the Law and Order Commission at the National Conciliation Committee, said: "Yeltsin repeated many times that he will not sit at the negotiating table with Dudayev, who is responsible for the genocide of his own people. What should one call Yeltsin, then, who is responsible for genocide of the Russian and Chechen peoples?" No one can understand: whether the constitutional order is restored on the territory of the Federation component, or is war being waged against a foreign state? Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the fact that the federal troops destroy not so much gunmen as the peaceful population. Soldiers act like occupiers. Contrary to Govorukhin's [chairman of the Duma Commission on Investigation of the Chechen Events] statements, in Samashki peaceful people were killed and nearly one- third of the village was burned down—not as a result of artillery shelling from a great distance, but after troops entered Samashki. One should see these walls for himself, without any signs of shells and even bullets—the houses were set on fire from inside. Gersolt Elmurzayev, deputy chairman of the National Conciliation Committee, during a break between sessions related in this respect: "A man asks another man in a village why there is a scar on his forehead; the other man answers—a mosquito was on me, so my brother smashed it with a shovel."

Zalpa Dzhambulatova, chairman of the Chechen branch of the Peace Fund, said: "A totally corrupt army has been sent to Chechnya. I was in Groznyy during the assault. I saw outrages, cruelty, looting, committed by soldiers...."

Very many residents of Groznyy were killed after military operations had stopped. The majority of them were refugees who came back to the city to rebuild it. This continues even today. A six- year-old boy was killed near the brick factory just one week before the conference. Two buses filled with refugees were damaged near Staryye Atagi. As many speakers said, there is an impression that the troops were given the task to eliminate the whole nation. And Dudayev's ideologists are using this very skillfully.

The question why it is impossible to take Dudayev—who manages to turn up even in some places outside Chechnya—is the talk of the town. Until now, not a single high-ranking official from the Defense Ministry has given an intelligible answer to the question of who and for what purpose left weapons to the general-president in 1992. Although the General Prosecutor's Office initiated a case in connection with this fact, the State Duma has also set up its commission. How could it happen that the so-called "leader of gangster formations" had been given air corridors to fly all over the world?

The conference urged the Russian Federation president and the Federal Assembly to adopt urgently an act on amnesty for all participants in the military conflict, the more so that the crimes were committed not only by Dudayev's supporters, but by the army, too.

Siberians 'Puzzled' by Appeal

MM2504135695 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Vitaliy Pyrkh: "Everyone Has To Chip in Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnoyarsk—The Krasnoyarsk Kray Administration received a telegram from the chairman of the Federation Council, in which Vladimir Shumeyko urgently asks the Siberians to provide assistance in reestablishing the economy and the social sphere in the Chechen Republic. "According to an age-old good custom," the telegram says, "Russians have always come to their relatives, neighbors, or even complete strangers for help in difficult times. The people of Chechnya are experiencing such times now."

Meanwhile the authorities do not tire of publicly trying to persuade us that the expenditure on reestablishing constitutional order in Chechnya will not affect the economic situation in the regions. Unfortunately it is affecting it. Even the flights of the Krasnoyarsk special purpose militia detachment to the North Caucasus are leading to a situation whereby very soon the local law enforcement organs will be short of funds.

And although, when I asked whether the Chechnya war was affecting the region's projects, Kray Governor Valeriy Zubov answered in the negative—making the reservation, admittedly, that it is all still to come—the administration could not help being puzzled about the telegram it had received. Obviously not because of the assistance and support to ordinary people—you can only sympathize with them.

And our people are sympathetic. But, after all, this is essentially a question of a war programmed by the actions of the ruling politicians, and not a natural disaster. The Siberian people did not demand that Dudayev be armed, they did not demand that Chechen cities and villages be destroyed so that they could then get some exercise at construction sites over there.

Anyhow, the Siberians think, since the need has arisen for appealing to the people for support, that it would be a good idea to provide it at the right time. For instance, when the decisions so onerous for the economy were being adopted. Then there would have been no need for everyone to have to chip in again.

Minister on Chechen Economic Revival

MM2704135295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Apr 95 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Russian Federation Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov by Ruslan Ignatyev; place and date not given: "Money for Chechnya Conflict Not Provided in Budget"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to some politicians the conflict in the Chechen Republic has had a significant impact on the economic situation in the country by accelerating inflationary processes, and vast sums have apparently been sent to the region. How correct are these statements? How is the recovery work in Chechnya being paid for? A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA observer talked about this with Russian Federation Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov.

[Panskov] Obviously the 1995 budget did not set aside any money for this, because it had been submitted and examined at a time when the events in Chechnya did not exist, as such. Moreover, even when anticipating major expenditure connected with Chechnya, we deliberately decided not to plan for it. Because, if we had started to increase expenditure during the discussion in the State Duma, it would have led to an increase in the budget deficit.

Therefore the government made a decision: All expenditure, including the conduct of military actions in Chechnya, is to be made within the limits of the funds planned in this year's federal budget.

[Ignatyev] What sum is required to revive the Chechen Republic national economy?

[Panskov] According to preliminary data, this year it will be necessary to spend 5.3 trillion rubles [R]. The bulk of this—around R4 trillion—will come out of the federal budget and the rest will come out of sector funds and from other sources. It must be said that the program to revive the Chechen economy has been approved by a special commission led by Oleg Nikolayevich Soskovets, but it has not yet been approved by the government.

[Ignatyev] One realizes this is a large sum. But how much money has been allocated so far and who specifically is it intended for?

[Panskov] We are talking about major expenditure, of course. The current allocation is R531 billion. These are federal budget funds that the ministries currently possess. Around R100 billion of this has been transferred to the Emergencies Ministry to provide humanitarian aid for the population and to buy transport to deliver freight and carry means of protection and to acquire the requisite equipment, materials, and technology used in restoring vital services. The Transport Ministry has been allocated R30 billion for emergency repair work at Groznyy Airport, and the Agriculture and Food Ministry has been allocated R51 billion. Incidentally, R2 trillion have been transferred to the same department for the first quarter of 1995. You must understand that the R51 billion sum is specifically targeted. We indicate it in the payment documents: Let us say R3 billion to pay for fuel and lubricants for spring field work, R6 billion for potato seeds for the republic, and R37 billion for repair and recovery work.

Of course, you cannot expect the federal budget to provide manna from heaven. Probably there will be extra money. But we do not have the financial potential at the moment. We must keep within the limits set earlier.

[Ignatyev] How do you decide who to give money to first?

[Panskov] In the first place, there is a priority works plan. Second, the government commission regularly visits the locality to keep in touch with the situation. I personally have been to the Chechen Republic twice. And that has been useful not only for me personally, but also for the matter in hand. When I first went to Groznyy after the events I saw literally a dead city. You would meet the occasional solitary old man, sometimes a woman. On the next trip, two weeks later, we found a totally different world. Busy streets, people all around. By that time there were more than 200,000 people living in Groznyy. On that trip I realized where the money must go first and foremost. Whereas, say, the city gas supply system has been practically restored, unfortunately there is no electricity. So the oil refineries, which are one of the main sources of revenue in the republic, cannot function, you cannot have television (the people of Chechnya need to be told the truth, the situation needs to be explained), and apartments will have no lights.

It is one thing when they tell you in a ministerial office that this, that, or the other does not exist, but it is quite another to find out directly on the spot. Then you know exactly what you cannot do without, what needs to be restored first. Indeed, in the present situation you can try to do everything. But what good will it do?

After talking with the leaders of a number of enterprises, on arriving in Moscow Anatoliy Petrovich Ogurtsev, chairman of the Russian Federation Machine Building Committee, and I determined the priorities and sent the government a proposal on a priority allocation of R150 billion for the needs of the enterprises that will supply the products necessary to revive the energy industry in the republic. Some of the required money will be provided by exempting these plants from taxes.

[Ignatyev] When will the oil refineries be able to start up?

[Panskov] The management of the No. 3 heat and electric power station promised us that the electricity problem would be resolved by 9 May 1995. There will be light—oil refineries, as well as other organizations, enterprises, and departments will start working.

[Ignatyev] What form will payments take? After all, there is still no banking system in Chechnya.

[Panskov] Well yes, we do have some financing problems, because the relevant Central Bank of Russia departments have not yet been reestablished in the republic. But we have now established a federal treasury there. And it is functioning. The Finance Ministry has been set up again. an acting minister has been appointed, and the requisite local organs are being set up. We are currently carrying out the funding mainly through commercial banks. For example, "Menatep" has opened a branch in Chechnya.

[Ignatyev] But aren't the commercial banks trying to make capital, including political capital, out of it?

[Panskov] Naturally the banks are interested in work in the Chechen region. There is a certain prestige in being entrusted with a great deal of money. But I think it will be difficult for them to make anything out of it, aside from improving their image. But I will say that most banks are keen to come. I would point out that there are many transactions that we do not perform directly through Chechen branches for the simple reason that the money is being allocated directly to the customer for the particular work....

[Ignatyev] But without an efficient and orderly financial, structure it is difficult handling trillions of rubles.

[Panskov] Yes, we now need to restore not only the national economy, but also a normal financial system. That is, taxes have to be paid (the tax service heads have already been appointed) and the Chechen Republic budget must function, with all the attendant consequences. Chechnya must now establish normal economic relations with Russia as a component of the Federation.

...A number of agricultural enterprises are now operating in the Chechen Republic, income has already been obtained from livestock raising, and stores have opened in Groznyy. The main thing is that the sowing has been done, which means there will be a harvest. Now that is what we call life.

Stable Power Supply to Groznyy Planned

LD2604090195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0722 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Igor Ivantsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 26 (ITAR-TASS)—It is planned to organise stable electricity supplies to vital projects in the Chechen capital Groznyy by mid-May, ITAR-TASS learnt at the Russian United Power Grid joint stock company here on Wednesday.

This operation will complete the first stage of restoration work in the Chechen power industry, provided for by a plan of the state commission for restoration of the republican economy and the social sphere.

Electricity is already supplied to the city heat and power plant no. 3 which will provide the city with heat during wintertime, to the water intake system, a cannery, an airport, medical establishments, bakeries and communications centres.

Supplies are made through a temporary grid which will be turned into permanent after repairs. For this purpose, the republic repaired four major substations and about 150 kilometers of the city power network, through which electricity is supplied to Groznyy from the Russian United Power Grid.

According to Vladimir Gorodnitskiy, head of the power networks department at the joint stock company, the rates of restoration work was partially hindered by a shortage of funds.

The department had to use its own small reserve, amounting to 15 billion roubles. According to Gorodnitskiy, it became possible, evidently, to resolve the question of financing. A decision was taken to allocate a credit of 50 billion roubles at a low bank rate for this purpose.

Apart from this, several amalgamations of the joint stock society were freed from taxes to the federal budget, totalling 100 billion roubles, in order to channel this money for restoration work in Chechnya.

Chechnya Oil Production Resumes

MM2504102795 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Otar Gadaborshev: "First Tonnes of Oil Extracted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The premises where the leadership of the "Grozneft" association is temporarily located has been particularly crowded lately. The oil workers who have left the Chechen Republic over the past three years are returning to their work places.

"The point is," says A. Vanshteyn, chief of the association's oil and gas extraction department, "that since 1991 the drilling rigs have undergone complete dekulakization—everything that could be pilfered has been pilfered."

Despite all these difficulties the oil workers with the aid of their colleagues from other Russian oblasts are doing everything to ensure that the drilling rigs come to life in the very near future and start to produce the output so necessary both to Chechnya and to all Russia. Minesweeping is under way intensively and simultaneously preparations are being made to launch boreholes, damaged equipment and oil and gas pipelines are being repaired and communications are being set up.

And here is joyful news. The collective of the Goragorskiy gas and oil extracting administration was the first to complete restoration work and has pumped the first few hundred tonnes of oil from the boreholes into the reservoirs.

Kovalev Describes 'Punitive Operation' in Samashki

LD2304131395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1153 GMT 23 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 22 (Interfax)—Special forces of Russia's Interior Ministry carried out in the village of Samashki on April 7-8 a punitive operation designed to inspire fear in the Chechens engaged in guerrilla warfare, State Duma member Sergey Kovalev told a news conference in Moscow on Saturday. The prominent human rights activist returned from Chechnya on Friday.

According to him, the list of civilian victims compiled by human rights activists includes 94 names—they are confirmed by the evidence given by the relatives and neighbors, who witnessed the killings, saw dead bodies or watched burials.

The character of fires and evidence of eye-witnesses indicate that napalm or termite grenades were evidently used in Samashki, Kovalev said.

Kovalev also maintained that about 200 civilians detained in Samashki on April 7-8 were subjected to long beatings, humiliations and torture.

According to him, when the special troops entered the town, they separated men from women, children and old people. Then they forced about 200 men to take off their shirts and shoes. Subsequently the men were ordered to run to the so-called shooting range lying 4 or 5 kilometers away from the village.

As Kovalev said, this evidence is reflected on audio and video tapes.

As he said, the men detained in Samashki were taken from the shooting range by helicopter or truck to filtration centers in Mozdok and in the village of Assinovskaya.

According to Kovalev, during questioning the detained were forced to admit that they had put up armed resistance. Their bodies show traces of torture.

The official version of Russian power ministries concerning events in Samashki rejects the accusations of human rights activists.

TV Correspondent on Destruction

LD2304220595 Moscow NTV in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Apr 95

[From the "Itogi" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Yevgeniy Kiselev] Lev Bruni, a deputy editor in chief of SEGODNYA newspaper, comments on this film [reference to video shot in Samashki following alleged atrocities by federal troops] and the chronicle of events for our program today. Lev Bruni was one of the first Russian journalists to make their way into the town at the end of the military operation.

[Begin Bruni recording] Samashki, in my opinion, is perhaps a good place for manipulating public opinion. First of all, the town was not destroyed completely. The main destruction occurred on the three central streets and therefore, anyone entering Samashki after what happened, after it was stormed, is in fact first surprised at the relative small scale of the destruction. Only when they come upon these three individual streets that were hit do they understand that something awful happened there [voice of woman crying can be heard in background]

The refugees who managed to escape from Samashki during the storm say that nearly every second house was on fire. In actual fact, the damage was a lot less. But it will be difficult to convince them of this as naturally the refugees were fleeing the houses and streets hit particularly badly by the attack.

The number of dead has clearly yet to be counted exactly. There are various figures, ranging from 30 to 250. I saw a lot more fresh graves than 30 although, strictly speaking, I also saw five or six horribly burned corpses, but, as we know, a lot of people were buried in cottage gardens and parks, and to establish the complete truth we would have to dig these graves up, because some of them contain more than one body.

The result of this is that anyone who was on the outskirts of the town on the 11th or 12th of April will say that there was no real destruction, while anyone who was in the three streets of Samashki that were burned will say that the destruction was terrible.

There was evidence that—I myself spoke to a woman who told me that grenades were thrown into the cellar in which they staying in spite of the fact that they cried out that the cellar contained women and children.

There is a lot of evidence of houses being burned. They were not set alight by shells or tracer bullets, but were deliberately burned. That also needs to be checked, all the more so since there is indirect proof of this. I was in quite a few Chechen towns more or less destroyed by the war and nowhere did I see so many concentrated fires. The fact is that neighboring houses are untouched. The walls and the roofs are intact, but the houses are completely burned from the inside. It is hard to believe that all of these houses burned down accidentally. In addition, there is quite a lot of evidence from local people that the houses that were burned were the ones containing corpses.

In actual fact, there is the possibility of several truths here because of the nature of the war. The Chechen war as a whole is not quite waged according to the rules, because war is not called war and clearly we can only demand that the rules, the Geneva Convention and other universally accepted rules for conducting war, however awful it is to think that there are rules for conducting war at all, are observed only by calling war war. [end recording]

Journalist Describes Scene

MM2604133195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Yaroslav Shimov: "Samashki: Life in the Ashes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Samashki—The events in the Chechen village of Samashki 7-9 April remain the subject of bitter debate. But what did nevertheless take place in this village—a bloody massacre or the suppression of gunmen supporting Dudayev who put up resistance? Having visited Samashki several days after its capture by federal forces, I will not attempt to pass any judgments on what happened. I will only describe what I saw with my own eyes.

...Before the war about 12,000 people lived in Samashki. It was a large village with more than 10 streets. Several of the central streets were destroyed. These streets make roughly the same kind of impression as the ruined private residential areas in Groznyy: There is practically no buildings left standing, the walls are pitted by bullets, and several houses have lost their roofs. To all appearances artillery fire had been trained on them. There are really very few such buildings, so you can hardly speak of a massive bombardment of Samashki by Russian artillery.

There are far more houses which have retained their roofs and walls but been completely gutted by fire. Their appearance confirms the many testimonies of Samashki residents who say that Russian servicemen entered the houses and set fire to them. But according to the military it was actually in these streets in the center of the village that they met with the most bitter resistance. An Internal Affairs Ministry officer at a guard post near Samashki reported that the Russian forces suffered losses of about 15 men. The village's inhabitants do not, incidentally, deny that men supporting Dudayev had been in Samashki, but on the day the federal forces entered the village, they had allegedly already left Samashki and the spetsnaz troops dealt out punishment only to civilians.

On one of the streets of Samashki stands a knocked out Russian tank. According to the military, this is the main evidence of the resistance against the Russian forces in this village. It is, incidentally, in the region of the knocked out tank that you find the majority of houses on which there are still white flags. The inhabitants flew them in the hope that the Russian troops would spare them. Nevertheless, several of these buildings have also been burned out. A particularly depressing sight is the school building.

By the time I managed to get into Samashki (no journalists have been admitted up till now), the victims of the tragedy had, of course, already been buried. If during the first days following the village's capture at most 30 inhabitants had remained there, now the majority of Samashki's residents—first and foremost those who had lived in those particular streets which had been virtually unscathed 7-9 April—have returned to their houses and are trying to settle down to a normal life.

It is not easy to do this. It is not only that the fresh graves constantly remind Samashki residents of what has happened, but that it is dangerous for local peasants to work at present. The surrounding fields are littered with mines. I was present at a conversation between the director of a local sovkhoz and the commander of the post guarding Samashki. The officer promised to send sappers to clear some of the fields. But during the village's capture agricultural equipment was also damaged. For example I saw several burned out tractors. "A tractor is not a tank—their owners get very distressed. Why did it need to be burned?"

The most terrible place in Samashki is considered to be the nearby wood. According to local inhabitants, it was here in particular that many of their fellow villagers took refuge from the troops. But military helicopters flew in and fired off many rockets into the wood. Samashki residents claim that there are still many corpses which have not been removed from the wood: It is dangerous to go there owing to the mines and unexploded rockets. I should, however, point out that the military deny outright the aerial attack. As far as the unrecovered corpses are concerned, I personally was shown only one corpse discovered on the outskirts of the village behind the sovkhoz's garages. It is not clear who this person was. From his appearance he could never be taken for a local and his clothing is that of a serviceman. Activists from "Memorial" who are working in the village quoted eyewitnesses claiming that he was thrown from a helicopter circling over Samashki. Whether this is true will be shown by the coroner's inquest for which the corpse was sent to Nazran.

Not far from the scene of this terrible find, the corpses of animals which had been shot were piled up. There are no disinfectants in the village and the carcasses are decomposing, so there is still the danger of an epidemic. Samashki residents who are forced to live in these conditions have a very pessimistic outlook. Everybody with whom I spoke in the village is sure that this war will unfortunately last a long time. The saddest thing is that many young Chechens openly admitted that after what happened in their village they are ready to take up arms to avenge themselves.

The editorial office has in its possession a list of casualties from the military operation in Samashki compiled from the testimonies of witnesses by the "Memorial" society and Sergey Kovalev's group of human rights activists.

Council Members Demand Inquiry

LD2504173395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1417 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 25 (Interfax)—Federation Council member Pavel Shteyn, Viktor Kurochkin and Igor Gladkov said at a news conference in Moscow Tuesday that they want acting Prosecutor General Alekseyi Ilyushenko to immediately open a criminal investigation into the massacre in the Chechen village of Samashki on April 8.

The three men had been sent to Samashki by the upper house of the Russian parliament and stayed there on April 19 to 22.

Shteyn described what had happened in Samashki as a flagrant act of destruction and unprecedented cruelty against a civilian population. He said that by some reports people had been burned alive in Samashki.

Shteyn said that the fresh graves of nearly 110 people were found in the Samashki cemetery while the deputies believe that the actual death toll is higher because some people were buried in family graves.

Shteyn said that according to eye witnesses, the massacre was the work of a commando group in camouflage uniform with black arm bands. The men were not servicemen but middle-aged, around 35 to 45 years of age, and appeared to be doped.

Shteyn believed that this was either a secret "clean-up" team or a unit on the rampage for which nobody is now willing to take responsibility.

Komi Pipeline Repair Expected Complete 'Tonight'

LD2704131095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1257 GMT 27 Apr 95

[By Igor Ivantsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 27 (Itar-Tass) - The repair of the section of the Ukhta-Torzhok gas pipeline, where an accident took place today, will be finished tonight, Itar-Tass learned at the Gazprom central dispatch.

According to the Gazprom spokesman, about 30 metres of the gas pipeline will have to be repaired. The scene of the accident is situated 200 metres away from the countryside road, and the repair vehicles can reach it easily, which facilitates the work of repair teams at the scene of the accident.

In the opinion of Gazprom specialists, the flame at the moment of the accident was no more than 20 metres high, and it was quickly reduced, because gas was burning out. Thanks to the automatic devices installed at gas pipelines, in case of accidents between 33 and 50 per cent of the gas, contained in the pipe between side-valves, goes into the atmosphere.

Yeltsin Permits Elections in Nizhniy Novgorod

MK2704074095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Vyacheslav Chebanov under the "Regions" rubric: "Boris Yeltsin Permits Elections for Governor in Nizhniy Novgorod. Corresponding Directive Will Be Brought There by Sergey Filatov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite his own claim that gubernatorial elections would harm presidential power, Boris Yeltsin has made a decision permitting elections for governor in Nizhniy Novgorod. Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov learned this during his visit to Moscow from presidential chief of staff Sergey Filatov. Boris Nemtsov has long stated his wish to proceed with elections. In his view, the president's decision had been influenced by the State Duma's third voting on the election law, which clearly states that each region is free to elect its own governor or else this right can be taken over by local lawmakers. Nizhniy Novgorod lawmakers, for their part, think that elections for governor should be based on a regional law which will appear in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast early this coming fall. The already passed charter of the oblast confirms this. It was signed 24 April by the Nizhniy Novgorod governor and the Legislative Assembly chairman.

The Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma has also recently announced elections for head of administration. Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov's reaction was unequivocal: "This exercise" has no legal force. It only remains to hope that the situation regarding elections for governors in Russia will be clarified by Sergey Filatov during his visit to Nizhniy Novgorod 11 May.

New Novosibirsk Investigations Head Interviewed

954F2152A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 20 Apr 95 p 5

[Interview with Viktor Grinko, chief of the investigative department of the Novosibirsk mayoralty's administration of internal affairs, by Irina Timofeyeva; place and date not given: "Investigation: Law and Practice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some fake businessmen, acting on forged documents of equally fake companies, took 593 million rubles' [R] worth of goods—sugar, bananas, watermelons, and many other things. A total of 11 incidents in Novosibirsk Oblast and Altay Kray. Alas, swindles of this kind no longer surprise anyone.

Freedom of trade has turned into freedom to cheat. Enterprising crooks immediately took advantage of gaps in the law. It looks as if the law enforcement structures are getting over the shock caused by their actions, and cases are being developed—not just materials on facts. Cases are being referred to the courts. One of them is the aforementioned affair. It was related to our correspondent by Viktor Stepanovich Grinko, the newly appointed deputy chief of the Novosibirsk mayoralty's UVD [administration of internal affairs] and chief of its investigative department. Since graduating from law school, his career has taken him from work as a rank-and-file investigator to this current position of great responsibility, so he knows his unit's problems firsthand.

"All investigation in the city police," he says, "is practically half of the oblast's investigative staff. Which means that we determine to a large extent the effectiveness of police actions. I will tell you honestly, this far we cannot count on any praise. Although the situation is changing, albeit slowly. A crime is considered solved when the case is referred to the court. In the current first quarter, 240 more cases were referred to the court than during the same period last year. The number of cases sent back for additional investigation remained on the same level—approximately three per hundred. The investigation time frame has been shortened. This year there was not a single incidence of violation of legality, that is, unfounded filing of criminal charges."

[Timofeyeva] You have been on the job for two months. It is probably easier for you to see problems and mistakes, is it not?

[Grinko] Yes, I notice many mistakes. The most alarming point, the scourge of the current criminal situation, is that criminals are getting away with it. Considerably more than 5,000 crimes already committed this year have not been solved. Mainly because the suspects have not been identified or are on the wanted list. And of this number, more than 4,000 are thieves. Some cases are referred to public organizations to deal with, but less and less often. Where is it now, the public? Among the unsolved crimes, 57 are grave crimes, and 158 are muggings. Of course, some of these crimes will be solved anyway. But later on.

[Timofeyeva] It has been known for some time that the personnel problem in the investigative apparat is alarming. People are leaving, because the pressure—both psychological and physical—is high. While the pay, as the saying goes, could be better.

[Grinko] All true. For about six years now, the professional core of the investigative staff has been shrinking. Our situation here is even worse than on average in the country. Only 32 percent of the investigators have higher education. Sixty-five percent of our staff have been working here for less than three years. Almost half are women.

[Timofeyeva] So what can one do when everything is in such a neglected state? It looks as if the situation cannot be corrected.

[Grinko] I do not have the right to think this way. Last year only four new law-school graduates came to work here. We get new recruits from the police vocational school, but too few. And the solution is this. The state has transferred the responsibility for training investigators to the local level. An order has just been issued in the oblast UVD to organize a continuing education center for the investigative staff. Everybody will gradually go through training there. We need to reorganize the police vocational school into a higher school, and open an investigative department there. We are negotiating with our law school for a quota on enrollment of our candidates, who would then subsequently work on the investigative staff. By the way, we invite those who want to work in investigations to contact us. Preferably men under 35 with higher education.

[Timofeyeva] It is clear that the current criminal procedural law is a special problem. Almost everyone is complaining about it, but alas, nothing changes....

[Grinko] The lawmakers act lopsidedly. The latest changes in the Criminal Code increase legal protection for suspects and the accused, but no mechanism has been worked out to protect victims and witnesses. The institution of evidence is not being expanded. In the United States, for instance, five main tools of investigation are available. A federal prosecutor can, for instance, grant a witness immunity from prosecution. That is, in the event that he provides extremely important information and testimony, he can be exempted from criminal prosecution. This is especially important in exposing criminals in the upper echelons of power. If the prosecutor believes that a witness is in danger, he can bring up the question of protection.

[Timofeyeva] Which most topical cases are currently being investigated in your department?

[Grinko] We are developing practical expertise in crimes in the credit and banking sphere. We are referring to the court a case on an organized group of four members—also involving fraudulent acquisition of R112 million worth of goods—from solid companies through the use of fake documents. A total of eight incidents, from cucumbers to clothing. We are investigating the fact of embezzlement of R40 billion under the cover of a fictitious company. We are looking into the Styling corporation, currently are in a process of auditing its financial-economic activities. There is a case on counterfeit vodka, on instances on nonrepayment of bank credit. We have wrapped up the case on the theft of tin ingots from the tin processing plant.

[Timofeyeva] Do victimized entrepreneurs and bankers come to you?

[Grinko] Yes, they do. But not as often as we would like to. They try to get their money back with the help of their own services, through the courts—in civil proceedings. We know that not everyone trusts the police in this respect. But this is wrong! At least they will always get advice here. A few days ago representatives of a respectable bank visited us. They did not get back a large amount in hard currency, borrowed by a certain company for purchases of foodstuffs in Spain. We are currently checking on whether there is criminal content in the situation.

City police investigators are handling quite a few cases on crimes against individuals. This, I think, is a special topic, however.

Poisoning by 'Unknown Gas' in Blagoveshchensk

LD2704075895 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A mass poisoning by an unknown gas occurred in one of the Blagoveshchensk schools. The press service of the Russian Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters told our correspondent Aleksey Zagvozdkin that 45 people were taken to hospital. Of them, 40 are children. Their health is satisfactory. Health care services, the interior ministry's bodies, the federal security, civil defense, and emergency services of the town of Blagoveshchensk and Amur Region are rendering help and finding out the causes of the poisoning.

Economic Issues

Columnist Views New Bank Reserve Fund Requirements

MM2404153595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Berger: "If the Central Bank Insists on 'Crude' Regulation, the Number of Russian Commercial Banks Could Diminish Dramatically"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The introduction of certain innovations into the procedure for holding commercial bank funds in reserve is timed to coincide with the labor holiday—May Day. If the commercial bankers fail to get the central bankers to change their minds, the number of banks in Russia could be massively reduced—from 2,500 to 250. At least, that is what representatives of the banking community think.

By increasing reserve demands the national banks are pushing down inflation (or they are trying to do so). But this is just one of five classic methods of monetary regulation. There are also transactions on the open market and interest rate policy. Reserve demands are regarded as the toughest means, even as a crude instrument requiring special care when used.

All this tedious theory, incomprehensible to many, could have clear and simple consequences for business and private life if applied in a particular way. If the Central Bank of Russia insists on using "crude" regulation in too vigorous a manner a large number of customers—ordinary citizens, businessmen, and even directors of state enterprises and institutions—could very soon find that their bank is no longer where it used to be. "Bank Closed. Everything Put in Reserve."—customers could one day find a message along these lines on the door.

The Central Bank has used its legal rights to set a reserve demands level before. But there was practically no fuss at all. Formally speaking, practically nothing has happened today. But the point is that until recently the Central Bank has been "crude" in a rather delicate way. That is, the actual level of reserve demands has been and still is pretty high. But the rules whereby reserve sums were confiscated by the Central Bank enabled one to pay much less in practice. There were entirely legal loopholes.

As long as the Central Bank was indulgent of this known fact no one was indignant either about excessively high reserve demands or about the fact that the Central Bank is paying the banks nothing for the confiscated funds.

Then the Central Bank decided to be as strict as possible. This immediately prompted questions: How justified are the excessively high reserve demands, why is the Central Bank not paying the banks anything for the funds confiscated from them, and how is this done in Italy, for example? Finally, the fundamental question: What consequences will the application of the new rules have for the Russian banking system?

According to representatives of 18 major commercial banks, which are currently trying to hold talks with the Central Bank, most medium and small banks will simply not be able to cope with the new demands. As a result you could have a situation where only 200-250 of the 2,500 banks survive.

The big banks will sustain massive losses too. Losses because they will be forced to pay interest on funds they obtained earlier, one-fifth of which will be confiscated by the Central Bank without payment. When concluding contracts for the acquisition of funds the banks had no inkling of the trouble ahead, of the fact that they would have to give one-fifth of it to the Central Bank for free. One well-known bank has estimated that it will make a net loss of around $5 million per month in hard currency equivalent just by paying the interest on the money confiscated from it. The biggest banks will have to pay enormous sums into the reserve fund—1.5-2 trillion rubles each. This is a severe test even for the big boys. And whereas before banks reluctantly invested in industry, now they will simply forget about it for a long time. But they will try to increase the cost of credits and reduce the interests on the funds they acquire. This is unlikely to have a healthy effect on the general economic situation. Although banks could become markedly less active on the currency market as a result of "crude" regulation. But is the game worth the candle?

After a conversation with a Central Bank leader who preferred to remain anonymous, it seemed to me that the Central Bank itself was unsure whether the measures it proposed were rational or not. It is not inconceivable that it will seek a compromise. At any rate, if we are talking about sticking rigidly to the rules (which is good), then it is time to take a close look at the rules themselves (which is essential).

Banks Score 'Resounding Victory' Over Government

MK2504103095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Vladislav Borodulin: "New Reserves Rules for Banks. 'Seven-Day War' Ends in Banks' Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under an agreement reached 22 April in a conference at Anatoliy Chubays' office between the government, the Central Bank, and the Association of Russian Banks [ARB], norms of mandatory reserve payments may once again be reduced in mid-May. The proposition that commercial banks are becoming nearly the strongest corporate lobby (next to the Agrarians, of course) in Russia has thus been confirmed. Many more or less organized "pressure groups" are strong enough to have their demands met by besieging the government for a long time. None, until recently, could pull this off in a matter of days.

The conference attended by Anatoliy Chubays, Tatyana Paramonova, and ARB Chairman Sergey Yegorov was held the afternoon of 22 April. The decision made boils down to the following. The conference minutes will be circulated soon to commercial banks with a notice that the norms of payments toward the mandatory reserve fund approved by an 18 April Central Bank telegram will take effect 1 May. As early as 16 May, however, yet another conference will convene, similar to the one held 22 April, to look at how the application of these rates works. Depending on the results of the "mulling," one of Anatoliy Chubays' aides stated, the norms now in effect will be cut by 15 to 25 percent. Thus the purport of the upcoming conference consists only in finding precisely which rates should be cut and by how much. Besides, in the words of the same source, it will have to "define in more precise terms the method of calculation" because the demand to determine the size of daily reserve payments proceeding from the arithmetic mean of daily balance of the sums on accounts not subject to reserving drew the banks' same negative reaction which was drawn by upping the norms of mandatory reserving.

Thus, there is every ground to claim that Russian banks have never been closer to scoring a second resounding victory over the official authorities. Where it took them nearly 10 months to have the inglorious edict No. 1006 (one enterprise, one account) abolished, now it has been less than two weeks since the reserve demands were toughened (in essence, the banks only launched a public "anti-reserve" campaign just a week ago).

The importance of the 22 April event is set off by the macroeconomic backdrop against which it happened. Unofficial data show that the Finance Ministry has failed to improve in whatever way the performance of the budget situation—a shortfall in revenues and big government outlays have led to a situation that, in the expression of a senior Finance Ministry official "is literally bursting." Having the legal right in exceptional cases to buy state securities when they are first floated, the Central Bank came up against the problem of forming the resources necessary for large- scale operations in this sector of the financial market. The Central Bank's toughening of reserve demands looked logical in these conditions: on one hand, their application stimulated banks' demand for rubles (whereby, according to a Central bank staffer, "they had to partially unfreeze their hard-currency hoards"); on the other, acting so as to send the dollar exchange rate down, they promoted the population's interest in ruble deposits (the population's spare hard currency is assessed at $10 to $20 billion). The more so because there has been a marked increase in savings bank deposits (more than 4 trillion rubles) since the start of the year. The new "tax" levied on this money followed swiftly. In essence, the rate dynamics last week confirm that banks were getting ready for new norms to go into effect—nearly throughout the week the ruble remained stable or gained in value a little. The drop in its rate by 12 points yesterday showed that the information about the authorities' readiness to weaken the reserve demands had been instantly leaked to banking quarters.

Finance Minister on Fixed Ruble Exchange Rate

LD2604151495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1320 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, April 26 (Interfax)—The Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov thinks that the introduction of a fixed ruble exchange rate is a necessary matter but the problem cannot be resolved by simply signing something or making an appropriate decision.

In an interview with Interfax in Washington he said that all his efforts are aimed at fixing the ruble rate. "In other words we try to create conditions for the ruble to assume a fixed rate by itself," Panskov said.

He added that this requires the fall of the monthly inflation rate to 1-1.5 percent, the reduction of the budget deficit to 3 percent of the gross domestic product and the accumulation of currency reserves to the tune of at least $10 billion.

"After that the question of introducing a fixed rate will disappear by itself, i.e. the rate will become stable," Panskov believes.

The minister agreed that the fall of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen and other currencies affects the situation in the Russian currency market. "Not only does the process affect us, it also worries us greatly," he admitted.

Panskov said that his ministry makes its calculations in dollars. If the dollar continues to fall in the world market, this will result in the growth of the Russian foreign debt, he remarked. "Unfortunately, we cannot influence the process but we must speak about it with our partners," the official said.

In his opinion there is a burning need to restructure Russian debts. "It is our task to restructure debts on a long- term basis and the Russian government must know the prospects of repayment. This is necessary for professional budget-making and economic forecasting," Panskov said. He announced that he intends to meet in Washington with his German counterpart separately because Germany's share in Russia's foreign debts is 80 percent.

Panskov stressed that Russia inherited most of its debts from the USSR. The debts have grown also because they still have not been restructured which means that interest is multiplying.

According to Panskov, by the end of the year Russia's foreign debt will amount to about $130 billion. "We want payments to become even and the interest rate to be reduced. I think that is possible," Panskov said.

The minister found it premature to name concrete figures of reduction that would suit Russia. "I can only say that if the agreement on restructuring the debt is going to be signed with the club of Paris in May, the interest will be almost 60 percent smaller than now," Panskov said.

Moscow's 1995 Trade Deficit U.S.$3.8 Billion

LD2604180995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1702 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 26 (ITAR-TASS)—According to preliminary data, in the first quarter of 1995 Russia's exports to the countries of the Far abroad exceeded imports by 3.8 billion U.S. dollars, a report by the Russian government's Center of economic studies says which was received by Business-Tass today.

Russia's exports to these countries reached 11.5 billion U.S. dollars, a 16.3 increase as compared with the same period of 1994. About 45 percent of the export growth accounted for the rise in oil deliveries and nearly 16 percent—at the expense of natural gas sales.

At the same time exports of products of the metallurgical complex continued to grow: the share of non-ferrous metals in exports in the first quarter of this year rose to 12.8 percent compared to 10.1 percent in January-March, ferrous metals—to 10.6 percent as against 6.6 percent respectively.

As for imports from the countries of the Far abroad (excluding unorganized trade), in the first quarter of 1995 it amounted to 7.7 billion U.S. dollars, an 11.9 percent increase as compared with the same period of 1994.

According to preliminary data from the State custom committee of Russia, January and February of 1995 were marked by a considerable rise in imports of machine building products—their share in the total cost of imports exceeded 35 percent against 28 percent in the first months of 1994. In all, Russia bought machinery, equipment and means of transport worth 1.7 billion U.S. dollars.

Simultaneously, dependence of the Russian domestic market on imported food products continues to grow. In the first quarter of 1995 their share rose to 12 percent as compared with 10 percent in the first months of the last year.

Experts from the Russian government's Center of economic studies believe that one of the factors which promoted the growth of imports of foodstuffs in the first months of 1995, was the surpassing reaction of importers who increased purchases before coming into force of the Russian President's decree on the abolition of custom privileges to a wide range of participants in foreign economic activities.

International Affairs

Kuchma Discusses NATO, CR Relations, Reform

AU2604140795 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Apr 95 pp 1,6

[Interview with President Leonid Kuchma by Tomas Zahradnicek; place and date not given: "A Time for Coming Closer Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zahradnicek] What is Ukraine's point of view regarding the planned expansion of NATO all the way to its western borders?

[Kuchma] Ukraine has never said anything in principle against the idea of NATO expansion per se. This is a matter for NATO and the countries that have expressed their desire to become members of this structure. This is a general principle and no exceptions apply here. But at the same time there is another principle on which all European countries have agreed—the principle of indivisible security. In this context it is necessary to approach very circumspectly and equitably the solution to all of the problems that affect the interests of all European countries. And NATO expansion is just such an issue.

[Zahradnicek] In your opinion, what will its consequences be?

[Kuchma] Ukraine does not think that a hasty, immediate solution pushing NATO's eastern borders right up to Ukraine's western borders will bolster stability and security in this region and throughout Europe. In the event of such expansion, Ukraine will find itself in the very awkward position of a kind of "buffer state" between NATO and the states of the Tashkent Treaty on the collective security of the CIS.

We must not allow new dividing lines to be created in Europe. We would not want to see them either on our western or eastern borders. Ukraine's security interests, in the given circumstance, should be respected in a manner that does not provoke a return to a situation of factual inter-bloc confrontation. This is an extraordinarily important issue for us.

Ukraine does not want to be just a passive "recipient" of security guarantees, but a country that is able to contribute positively and effectively to bolstering stability and security both in the given region and throughout Europe. I hope that our partners, the friendly countries of Central and East Europe, will accept our point of view just as we accept, in principle and with understanding, their endeavor to integrate into NATO.

[Zahradnicek] How do you rate the current level of Ukrainian-Czech relations?

[Kuchma] There has been mutual understanding between our nations for a long time. We relate this to the closeness of our languages and cultures. However, since the two new independent states—Ukraine and the Czech Republic—have appeared on the current political map of Europe, it is as if our paths have divided somewhat. The Czech Republic has begun to take active steps to join the community of western European states. In our opinion that has also been manifested to a certain extent in its relations with eastern European countries, including Ukraine.

At the moment, as a consequence of its geopolitical position and strong integrative links with the countries of the former USSR, Ukraine is establishing relations with its eastern and western neighbors predominantly on the principles of parity. Therefore, our mutual relations are not attaining the kind of level we would wish. There are substantial reserves. Now the situation is changing; an auspicious time for coming closer together is on the way.

[Zahradnicek] Where do you see these reserves?

[Kuchma] I think that the state visit by the president of Ukraine to the Czech Republic and signing the interstate treaty on friendship and cooperation should provide a major stimulus toward developing mutual relations in our countries' new era and should contribute to intensifying cooperation advantageous for the two sides.

First and foremost it is necessary to activate trade and scientific-technical cooperation. Therefore, certain ministers who will hold brief but intensive talks with their Czech colleagues are members of our delegation.

[Zahradnicek] What, in your opinion, are the main reasons for the difference between Ukraine's economic potential and the current state of its economy?

[Kuchma] There are many reasons. First, in the 1980's Ukraine was integrated fully within the economic system of the Soviet Union. Its strong industrial potential—and, first and foremost, its fundamental industrial branches—satisfied, to a certain extent, the needs of all the republics in the former USSR. And, as far as these branches are concerned, their activity was to a certain extent guaranteed by supplies of raw materials and semi-finished products from Russia. The artificial collapse of economic relations which came about as a result of the breakup of the USSR meant that virtually all of the Ukrainian enterprises found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. Add to this the transfer to world prices in energy supplies. Earlier, oil and gas had been supplied for virtually nothing. All of this could not change painlessly without major economic losses.

Another reason is the shortcomings in economic policy and the too slow and—mainly—unbalanced dismantling of the bankrupt administrative system of management. In earlier years, we spoke more about reforms than implementing them. The state factually stood aside during the formation of the market infrastructure. The legislative base also lagged behind considerably. The result was that the process of adapting the economic system to the new economic conditions and of creating competitive structures was carried out too slowly.

We also have to add other political reasons to this. At the time of the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the necessary infrastructure for statehood, specially prepared national cadres, was lacking. The only option was to start from scratch. This situation complicated the process for transforming the entire system of economic relations. The end of last year and the beginning of this year have been distinguished by the substantial acceleration of the whole economic transformation complex.

[Zahradnicek] With what specific results?

[Kuchma] The rise in inflation has been reduced significantly and the national currency is becoming stronger. The volume of output has been increasing in recent months. Understandably, the aforementioned processes have not yet achieved sufficient stability. We are trying earnestly to improve this. I am convinced that, in the coming years, the authority of Ukraine as an economically strong industrial state that has the most up-to-date manufacturing potential at its disposal will be restored.

[Zahradnicek] Which domestic and foreign-political factors, in your opinion, pose a risk to Ukraine's economic and political reforms?

[Kuchma] Real risks indeed exist. I have in fact already spoken about some of them. Disputes between legislative and executive power, typical of all of the post-Soviet republics, are an obstacle to economic and political transformation. But, we have already proceeded much further in seeking mutual understanding and common approaches toward resolving the key issues in society.

At the moment, we are working on creating an effective system for both executive and legislative power. I am certain that despite all of the existing difficulties we will resolve these problems within the framework of the constitution without bloodshed and conflicts and that we will preserve harmony and peace in society.

We are relatively optimistic as far as the foreign-political factors that could endanger us are concerned. The dynamism of the development of Ukraine's foreign-political relations is, without doubt, positive. And we are receiving the necessary support from the world community in implementing the reforms.

Kuchma: NATO Should 'Not Forget' Russia's Interests

LD2604150395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1324 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Shamshin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague, 26 Apr—Ukraine does not have any objections to NATO's expansion to the east, but believes it is necessary to respect Russia's interests at the same time, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said today. Kuchma is paying an official visit to Prague. "If we do not want Europe to be split into opposing camps again, we should not forget about Russia's interests," he stressed.

Udovenko Views CIS, Foreign Policy

WS2704080095 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 18 Apr 95 pp 1,3

[Interview with Acting Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko by Larysa Ostrolutska; place and date not given: "In the CIS Acronym, 'Independent' Is the Main Word"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ostrolutska] In his annual report to the Ukrainian Supreme Council and the appeal at the parliament's meeting, the president emphasized once again the active, consistent, and predictable nature of our foreign policy, as well as its openness to everyone. At the same time, as the president noted, CIS countries represent a zone of Ukraine's priority interests. What are the main distinctive features of our policy toward those counties?

[Udovenko] It is true that we have recently described our foreign policy as active, dynamic, and pragmatic. While the first two notions need no explanation—it would be enough to take a look at the president's schedule of international meetings and trips since the beginning of this year—pragmatism perhaps deserves special attention. We proceed from our national interests, considering, of course, the interests of other states. Our relations with Russia have become more active. Intensive talks have been conducted for several months now in three major directions. The first direction concerns a full-scale friendship and cooperation agreement to be signed by our states. As you know, it has already been initialed. The second set of issues is connected with trade and economic relations, as well as Ukraine's debt to Russia and its restructuring. We have reached an agreement regarding procedures for repaying and postponing the debt. Negotiations on devising foreign assets are continuing. A total of about 20 agreements have been reached primarily in the economic sphere. And the third difficult set of problems concerns the Black Sea Fleet.

However, while we already conducted negotiations with Russia in the past, relations with other CIS and Baltic countries were not active. At present, since the beginning of this year alone, we received high-ranking officials from Estonia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Lithuania...

[Ostrolutska] There are apparently certain differences between our diplomatic efforts in the East (meaning the CIS) and the West (meaning West European countries and the United States)? How can our actions be described here?

[Udovenko] Presenting our policy toward Russia and CIS countries, one can add the following: "But not at the expense of Western countries." We are continuing our fruitful cooperation with the United States, Canada, and

European countries, and hope for their assistance in conducting economic transformations in Ukraine.

Two years ago, we applied for admission to the European Council and are currently actively working to implement this idea. The agreement on partnership and cooperation has been signed with the European Union [EU]. We actively participate in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central European Initiative, where Ukraine has the status of associate member. Ukraine primarily seeks to have economic relations with as many states as possible, and not only in Europe, Asia, or North America. It is not normal, for example, that we keep a low profile in Africa. As of now, we have only established our embassies in Guinea and Egypt. Our presence in the Middle East is also limited.

Of course, many things can be explained by the lack of financing. Cadre is another problem.

Friendly relations with our neighbors are extremely important to us, including those with Russia—about which we have already spoken—Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania. We understand that good-neighborly relations are a precondition for peace and tranquility in our state.

[Ostrolutska] Getting back to the CIS, how viable and natural do you think this formation is? What does it exist for? There are two answers to this question: To divorce in a better (calmer) manner, and to unite based on a new (old) foundation. Or, maybe the truth is somewhere in the middle, as they say?

[Udovenko] It probably is. First, we had to bid farewell to the Soviet Union in a civilized way; and the Byelavezha [Agreement, signed by Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian leaders to announce the demise of the Soviet Union] allowed for this.

On the other hand, they cite the EU example, saying that it is something that the CIS might also want to do, [but] these are two different issues. That union is formed by the states, whose political and economic sovereignty is not under question. With the CIS, however, it is a different story. There are forces advocating restoration of the Soviet Union, a new federation, or a confederation of its former republics. In Ukraine, too, signatures are being collected against independence. This is illegal. I would not like to compare the CIS to EU. We have lived for so long together, and have been economically interwoven so tightly that the disruption of those links (and they are disrupted to a great extent already) will produce sad results.

This form, the CIS, is a good selection. However, as an organizational formation, the CIS does not work. Our president has frequently voiced criticism about the fact that 400 documents were signed and none of them produced any results. What concerns me personally is the tenacious bureaucratic traditions. Some newly-created headquarters becomes ridden with numerous apparatus bureaucrats right after it has been established...

[Ostrolutska] But three years and 400 void agreements show that Ukraine, too, contributed to making the CIS dysfunctional. At first, we ourselves preferred to stand aloof, afraid of losing our independence. But today, the policy is different: We should set our own rules of the game, or we will have to play by the ones set by someone else...

[Udovenko] Yes, we have diverged from passive membership; and in his appeal to the Supreme Council, the president underlined that our CIS policy had become more active and flexible. We are participating in the work of various working groups, and trying to influence decisions to be adopted by the CIS. For example, at a meeting of CIS foreign ministers in Almaty, we discussed protection of Ukraine's so-called external borders. Ukraine does not accept this principle, because according to the national law, we do not distinguish between internal and external borders. There is only one state border. We came up with our own draft of the agreement.

We have also signed an agreement on the Interstate Economic Committee [MEK], actively working on the text of the documents to make the MEK a coordinating and auxiliary center rather than a superstructure or supranational structure, although this kind of tendency was really noticeable.

[Ostrolutska] They say that when a location for the MEK was discussed, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that it can only be based in Moscow (and not in Minsk, as was planned before), if we want it to be a serious body. In other words, everything serious can only be in Moscow, the former capital of the Soviet Union?..

[Udovenko] According to the agreement, MEK member countries shall voluntarily disclaim a portion of their functions, delegating them to the MEK. But what are these functions? I was told: There is a single power engineering system, and it will be managed from a single control panel. But will the interests of other sides be considered in this case?

Of course, we should take advantage of the integration capabilities of CIS structures. This, however, should have its reasonable limits. They are telling us: Let us adopt a decision on external borders (why not on the internal ones?); let us restore the borders along the entire perimeter of the former Soviet Union... Will the Soviet Union be next up in line?

[Ostrolutska] The impression is that since it is impossible to create a big Union, various "small" unions began to spring up on the CIS territory: the customs union, payments union... Ukraine, as ever, is wary of them, even though other states accept this...

[Udovenko] We have not singed the customs union, but the basics of the customs legislation only; in other words, we have agreed to a certain unification of tariffs. It is necessary to conduct trade with other countries, which is the MEK's purpose—to coordinate all customs or other barriers on the way to economic integration of CIS countries.

We have not signed the payments union, either. Although later, when we have our full-fledged national currency, we will have to become its full-fledged member. Now, it is hard to imagine how such a union could physically function.

[Ostrolutska] A couple of words about the "zero option" that you signed in Moscow. Opinions regarding this issue are mixed. Some claim that we should not have signed it, because the foreign assets that we lost exceed considerably our present "acquisitions." What do you think about this?

[Udovenko] The "zero option" was a controversial move on our part. Some criticize us now, even though this issue has not yet been resolved: The Supreme Council will still have to have its say. As a matter of fact, however, we, in Ukraine, do not know what kind of assets or liabilities those actually were...

[Ostrolutska] Some time ago, [then] Prime Minister Vitold Fokin said that 16.37 percent of the debt represents $7 billion, and that we could repay it approximately within a year...

[Udovenko] That was the time of euphoria. If our reforms had started three years ago, we could have probably found ourselves by now in a situation comparable to that of the Baltic states.

As for the "zero option," there are different opinions and figures. For example, I know that Yemen asked Russia to forgive its $7 billion debt. How many other proposals of this kind can there still be? On the other hand, just as other former republics (which, by the way, all without exception signed the "zero option"), Ukraine certainly is a successor of the Soviet Union.

On still other hand, we are no longer in a position to pay $800-900 million every year for servicing our debt only. Russia, however, is willing to do this, which suits the creditors...

Let me repeat, however, that the government did not submit this issue for ratification, and the Supreme Council will conclude the entire case.

[Ostrolutska] As is known, after the summit in Almaty, when the "Europeans" [CIS states situated in Europe] had already gone home, members of the Central Asian Union—the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—continued their discussions. The impression is that this organization stands a good chance of being quite influential to its members. On the other hand, appeals are being voiced to unite three Slavic states with Kazakhstan. Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have concluded their tripartite union. Something of this kind is under way on the CIS territory.

[Udovenko] I see nothing wrong in those processes. The countries are searching for more efficient ties, considering those already available within the CIS as insufficient. We should not fear the presence of many options. For example, I would welcome Ukraine establishing contacts on a bilateral basis and, at the same time, integrating with European structures.

[Ostrolutska] It so happens that during discussions on various CIS documents held recently, Ukraine rallied around it some other countries which did not want to put up with Russia's imperial intentions of uniting everybody in some kind of old [Soviet] Union. Perhaps one could even name our, so to say, allies?

[Udovenko] Basically, I would not like to make any division along the following line: Who forms blocs with who and on what issue. We should conduct our line to promote the CIS unification, and not on the contrary. Besides, we will look at things realistically: At one stage, positions of some states concur, but at another, they may be different. One should promote rapprochement of the countries if this does not threaten their independence.

[Ostrolutska] Apart from positions held by states, there are people's positions and interpersonal relations. Contacts between state leaders and people heading various ministries and organizations seem to play a major role?

[Udovenko] This is true. Over the numerous years of my diplomatic career, I have established good relations with many people who are currently occupying high positions in their countries, including both CIS and foreign countries. I worked with many of them at the UN and met with them at various forums. Among the CIS countries, I can name my Belarusian counterpart [Uladzimir Syanko]—we used to be ambassadors to Poland at the same time. I have good contacts with my counterparts from Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan [Aleksandr Chikvaidze, Khalykberdi Atayev, Gasan Gasanov]. I have known my Russian counterpart [Andrey Kozyrev] for a long time, too; we maintain contacts and can call each other.

We have been so open since Ukraine became independent that there is no need to resort to personal contacts, even though they are also important.

[Ostrolutska] Our ambassadors in the CIS countries (and ambassadors of CIS states in Ukraine) are probably subjected to a sort of diplomatic breaking in before they enter deeper waters...

[Udovenko] I believe that we used to underestimate the creation of embassies in CIS countries. At present, however, the situation is being improved. The only constraint is money and cadre. It is hard to find a building for embassies both here in Kiev and in the capitals of other post-Soviet countries. But we already have developed quite a network of our embassies there. Actually, everywhere, except for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Communication with those countries is becoming easier also because [we have] common and familiar problems; and another reason is the language—we can speak Russian to communicate with each other. On the other hand, we would like our ambassadors to speak other foreign languages, too.

[Ostrolutska] [...] Although it is unlikely that you can train someone to be a diplomat—either you have it or not...

[Udovenko] I do not think so. You can train people to be diplomats. In the Soviet Union, and now in Russia, there is a diplomatic academy—MIMO [Moscow Institute of International Relations]. Our Institute of International Relations is not worse—it is well equipped and employs qualified teachers. Even though—and if you could note it somewhere—someone lays claim to the institute's building all the time. There is no understanding that diplomacy is the face of a country.

Of course, a diplomat has to have an outgoing personality. Besides, he should be prepared to learn and enrich his knowledge all his life. However, he should not be an expert in some narrow field or region. He should rather have extensive knowledge in many fields.

[Ostrolutska] How did your diplomatic career develop?

[Udovenko] I was employed by the Foreign Ministry in 1959. Afterwards, I held many different positions. Positions that I remember very well include those at the UN Secretariat, Geneva, and then in New York. I worked primarily in the English-language environment, even though I know Polish, French, and some German.

[Ostrolutska] Getting back to the main topic of our conversation, how long do you think this CIS formation will last? Will it make any sense to preserve this kind of formation in the future?

[Udovenko] The future of the CIS cannot be described in unequivocal terms. There are people for whom the main word [in this acronym] is the "commonwealth." They see something from the past in it. This is an illusory hope. What is important for me is the unity of none other but independent states. If the CIS promotes the consolidation of such states, it should receive every kind of support.

Parliament Appeals to G7 on Chernobyl

LD2604113695 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0710 GMT 26 Apr 95

["Appeal from the Ukrainian Parliament to the G7 countries and the European Union;" read during Supreme Council session by unidentified speaker—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] The mournful date of the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy, which inflicted an unprecedented blow not only on Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia but on the whole planet, is approaching. In terms of its ecological consequences this tragedy has no analogues in modern history. In our country alone, more than 40,000 square kilometers of land now present a danger to those who live there, which includes more than 2,200 settlements. It has been recognized that about 3,760,000 people, including 1.5 million children in Ukraine, suffered from the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Much has been done in recent years to overcome the after-effects of the accident. In 1986, more than 91,000 inhabitants from 76 settlements were urgently evacuated from the contamination zone of the Chernobyl nuclear power station; 123,000 hectares of agricultural land and 136,000 hectares of forests were taken out of use; a cover was built in extreme conditions over the damaged reactor; many settlements have been cleaned up, roads going through them have been covered with asphalt, and water and gas pipelines have been laid down; several dozen settlements have been built in clean areas.

The overall number of those evacuated from contaminated areas is 160,000. Several dozen settlements were built for them in clean areas. At the same time, at the beginning of 1995 and to this day, more than 2.5 million people live in areas that suffer from radiation. Most of them are engaged in agriculture on polluted lands. Moreover, they are not provided with good quality medical services nor with sufficient amounts of ecologically clean food products, and they have not been given proper living or working conditions.

As a consequence, a tendency toward a deterioration of the people's state of health, especially of children, is manifested ever more clearly from year to year. In the most polluted areas of Ukraine—Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovno, and Chernigov regions—the number of children suffering from thyroid cancer has increased 8-10-fold over the past year. The death rate among those who were engaged in eliminating the consequences of the accident is rising, and these are predominantly young people. The number of those unable to work among the people who suffered as a result of the accident is rising. Moreover, according to experts, the peak of illnesses connected to the Chernobyl factor has not yet been reached.

In Ukraine, there is a state policy on overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy. Relevant legislative acts have been adopted. About five percent of the Ukrainian budget is spent on the social protection of the population, on work connected with liquidating the after-effects of the accident, and on localizing areas contaminated with radiation. Unfortunately, however, the real needs are several times higher. These expenditures are a heavy burden on the national economy. Work directed at reducing the effects of the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy and on the environment requires considerable resources, which is preventing the most vulnerable strata of the population from being given proper social protection, and this is a reason for additional social tension in society, which in turn has an extremely negative effect on economic reforms.

In these conditions, the Ukrainian population accepts with feelings of sincere gratitude the scientific, technical, and humanitarian help which the world community is providing. At the same time, I would like to draw attention to the fact that other countries of the world are faced with a real threat of Chernobyl. This is first and foremost connected with the extremely complex scientific and technical problems which Ukraine today is unable to resolve on its own. The temporary burial in more than 80 places of radioactive waste whose total radioactivity is more than 380,000 curies is a threatening reminder. The total radioactivity of plutonium, strontium-90 and cesium-137 in the floodlands of the Pripyat River, are about 10,000 curies. The state of the Chernobyl nuclear power station's cooling pond from which water flows into the Pripyat River gives cause for concern. The problem of transforming the cover into an ecologically safe system remains an enormous scientific and technical problem.

These factors, and in addition the discharge of radioactive waste into the lakes of Belarus and Russia, are a source of permanent concern for the people because they present a risk that a critical level of pollution will appear in Ukraine's main water artery, the Dnepr and consequently the Black Sea. Ukraine sincerely (?fulfills) its obligations to carry out its own nuclear program exclusively for peaceful purposes and to achieve global safety. A unique step has been taken in achieving this. Ukraine was the first to liquidate its own nuclear weapons. Our country has fulfilled the aspiration to build a civilized democratic society and become a worthy member of the world community.

At the same time, we are concerned that the leading countries of the planet are concentrating only on the demand to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power station. But the Chernobyl problem is a complex one and this is the objective reality. This is why we are counting on an increase in international cooperation, on uniting the intellectual and material resources of the world community, international organizations, scientific and business circles, interested private persons with the aim of overcoming the consequences of the effects of the Chernobyl tragedy, minimizing it as well as drawing up scientific techniques directed at the social and economic rehabilitation of contaminated areas, removing the threat of the spread of radionuclides outside the borders of the contaminated zones, resolving the problems of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, restructuring Ukraine's energy sector and joint use of the uniqueness of the world laboratory, which is the 30 km zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Precisely such an approach would bring the maximum benefits both to the world community and the Ukrainian people. We hope that the appeal from the Ukrainian Supreme Council will be heard and understood in the world and will be manifested by the concrete actions of the parliaments and governments of your countries.

[Signed] The Supreme Council of Ukraine

Columnist Views U.S.-Ukrainian 'Scheme'

WS2604141795 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 14-20 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Oles Tyshchuk: "The Ukrainian Delegation Flew To Iran on a CIA Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko's trip to Iran on 8-9 April, the U.S. Government broke a $1 billion oil contract between the U.S. CONOCO firm and the Tehran leadership, and prohibited other U.S. oil companies from participating in the exploitation of Iranian oil deposits. On the one hand, an unexpected void has been created in Iran's fuel industry, and Ukraine may find itself among those aspiring to partially fill it. On the other hand, such impudent meddling by the White House in the affairs of domestic private entrepreneurs testified to the fact that the cold U.S.-Iranian war is nearing its critical point.

Washington is insisting that the Islamic regime in Tehran is a dangerous hotbed of international terrorism. Washington is correct to a certain extent: Iranian special services are still pursuing their hunt for the head of heretic writer Salman Rushdi, who allegedly offended the Koran with his "Satanic Verses." It was also proven that Iranian citizens were involved in such monstrous terroristic actions last year as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the Jewish National Center in Buenos Aires. Even a certain liberalization of the Iranian theocratic system after Ayatollah Khomeini's death has not influenced the U.S. administration's point of view. On the contrary, the CIA has recently accused Iran of building up military forces on the island of Abu Musa (the Persian Gulf), and insinuated that the United States will not allow a military imbalance in the region. To create more fear, a story was aired by the media that chemical weapons are being installed on Abu Musa. At the same time, Clinton and his people are actively pressing Russia to prevent Moscow from selling $800 worth of [nuclear] reactor equipment for a new nuclear power plant being built by Iran in Bushehr. True, Russia has already ensured that such pressure may be ignored. Despite the United States' protests, Russia sold five submarines to Tehran last year; now Russia asserts that it is absurd to assume that Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani will be smart enough to produce an atomic bomb with the help of the Russian reactor.

However, the desire to obtain Persian oil and gas is so great that Ukrainian diplomats deliberately overlook the rather unenviable position of Iran on the international arena. During their April visit to Tehran, representatives of our state signed a trilateral memorandum jointly with the hosts, and with visiting Turkmens, which, in particular, envisions cooperation in the construction of Turkmenistan-Iran-Europe and Qatar-Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipelines, as well as a Kazakhstan-Iran-Turkey oil pipeline, even though the specific details of the projects will be discussed no earlier than two months from now, at a similar trilateral meeting in Ashgabat. As long as the oil pipeline is not built, Iran is ready to supply Ukraine with energy resources in exchange for extremely necessary products—pipes (KRIVORIZHSTAL is the most probable contractor), fertilizers, and polypropylene (ORIANA concern in Kaluga and NPZ [oil processing plant] in Lysychansk).

The price of risk in this operation will to a considerable extent be determined for Ukraine by the policy of the United States. The powerful part of the U.S. establishment is ready to immediately place Iran on equal footing with Iraq, Libya, Serbia, and North Korea—that is, to put this country, with the help of international institutions, on meager rations governed by economic sanctions. To do this, one only needs a pretext, which can be found easily, and favorable political circumstances. As of today, Washington may force tension in relations with Tehran, but it is quite disadvantageous to break them at the moment. In a week, on 17 April, the final round of a global conference on a future agreement on nuclear nonproliferation treaty [NPT] will open in New York. The United States is urging indefinite ratification of this agreement. A strong opposition is headed by Iran, which was joined by numerous third world countries.

Thus, Washington badly needs an accord, not a clash, with Tehran. Therefore, all March attacks on the Rafsanjani government should actually be considered as a smoke screen, under which it is easier to reach a backstage accord. Such tactics were already used by the White House in 1994 with regard to Pyongyang, when the latter tried to slip from under the NPT cover. What is more, there is a very probable scenario for Ukraine's extremely important part in this show. It is Kiev that seems to be the most acceptable candidate for U.S. mediator, which could persuade Iranians to ease off their position at the New York conference on NPT issues.

Why Kiev? Because Kiev has equally friendly relations with both antagonists in this conflict. Because Kiev itself had once experienced discrimination from the United States for its excessive independence in handling nuclear weapons. Finally, because the reception of the Ukrainian delegation in Iran was in essence Iran's last important foreign contact before 17 April. This scenario may also be supported by a two-day visit to Kiev by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, who included a long conversation with [Foreign Minister] Hennadiy Udovenko in the visit program, even though, under the canons of diplomatic protocol, he might have limited himself to the president, the prime minister, the leadership of the parliament and the Defense Ministry. In addition, as soon as Udovenko returned from Iran, U.S. Deputy State Secretary Strobe Talbott was already waiting to meet him in Kiev. Washington's anxious care for Ukraine this spring fits this scheme, too. Kiev was backed in its efforts to reschedule gas debt payments to Russia, and in its actions in Crimea; on 7 April, on the eve of Udovenko's departure, a resolution was approved on the designation of subsequent [credit] tranches to Ukraine from the IMF and the World Bank. Whether the Ukrainian minister has coped with his task will become clear early next week. Ukraine's direct advantage depends on his cleverness. In the event of his success, Ukraine will enjoy prospective Iranian contracts and Clinton's sympathy. In the event of his failure, the introduction of an embargo, initiated by the United States, will be almost unavoidable, and then all hopes for Persian gas will be turned into a gaseous state of matter.

CGS, Military Delegation in Brussels

LD2604222895 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry press service has reported that a Ukrainian military delegation is visiting Brussels at NATO's invitation. It is led by Col-Gen Anatoliy Lopata, chief of general staff of Ukraine's armed forces.

The delegation is taking part in a discussion of cooperation issues within the Partnership for Peace program. The issues under discussion deal with the holding of joint exercises, [word indistinct] in the peace-keeping contingent, and the planning and organization of further coordinated actions.

Crimeans Ask Yeltsin To Be Guarantor of Referendum

LD2604140995 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1205 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—Our correspondent has learned that the Supreme Council of the autonomous Republic of Crimea has sent a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, which states: "On 25 April 1995 the Crimean Supreme Council, while expressing the intention to regulate the contradictions that have arisen between Ukraine and Crimea by peaceful and democratic means on the basis of international legal norms, decided to hold a Crimean-wide referendum in which one of the questions will be the following: 'Do you approve of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea annulled unilaterally by the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 17 March 1995?'

"In connection with the adopted decision, we request that you become one of the guarantors of the Crimean-wide referendum on 25 June 1995 on granting the Crimean people the right of free choice with regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, access to the mass media, and monitoring the preparations, organization and results of the referendum."

National Affairs

Marchuk Talks Focus on Method of Dividing Fleet

AU2604123595 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 22 Apr 95 p 5

[Report by Serhiy Vlad: "What Has Ye. Marchuk Brought Back From Moscow, After All?"—first paragraph published in a box]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk's two-day official visit to Moscow was undoubtedly the highlight of the week. It was made necessary by the exacerbation of the crisis in the Crimea and by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's peremptory statement on ways to resolve it.

Yevhen Marchuk put forward his position in a private talk with the [Russian] president immediately upon arrival. Reporters learned about the subject of their talks from the brief interviews they gave. According to Marchuk, it was the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet that was at the focus at the Moscow talks and in the talks with Boris Yeltsin, in particular. That problem, Marchuk said, could be 95 percent resolved in the course of the visit. If this is the case, it cannot be ruled out that the two sides will sign a corresponding Declaration on the Division of the Black Sea Fleet during Yeltsin's visit to Kiev. One more thing: The accords envisaged that the shares of both the Ukrainian and Russian sides may be subject to considerable changes.

This is, after all, what analysts predicted, pointing out that the Zavidovo agreement, which stipulated the bolshevik-style fifty-fifty division, can hardly be considered equal or mutually advantageous. This is, in fact, a matter of the Russian fleet, which Ukraine pays for, as it subsidizes the housing, electricity, water supply, and so on for sailors from a foreign country. It is a matter of land, water area, and the shore that have lost their biological value as a result of the Black Sea Fleet's activity. Here is an example. As soon as the question of the cost of land in Sevastopol was raised in talks with Russian experts, the Ukrainian side quite amused the Russians by its proposal that market prices be adopted in the deal. A reciprocal proposal was made right away: "In that case, 'open' the city [Sevastopol is on the list of 'closed'—classified—cities] and hold a trial tender." The Ukrainian side had to drop the claim: It is nonsense to "open" the city; besides, nobody would go for that land. The Russians pressed on and insisted that the infrastructure of their part of the Black Sea Fleet occupies only 200 hectares (!) of land.

According to one of the participants in the talks, at that time, calculations proceeded from $26 per hectare. By all accounts, no alcohol was consumed during the negotiations. At any rate, Yevhen Marchuk's experts asserted that at least 3,000 hectares of land is occupied by the infrastructure of the Russian part of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and outside it. However, whereas land can be readily inspected, things are much more complicated with the infrastructure. Until recently, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense made inventories in terms of facilities and not their cost. As could be expected, during the "fifty-fifty" division, the Russian side largely provided ordinal and serial numbers of their submarines, rather than their combat and technical specifications or market price. The Ukrainian side insisted upon more specific information. It has done so until the Yevhen Marchuk's present visit to Moscow.

What has then Marchuk brought back from Moscow?

Undoubtedly, hope for a more constructive dialogue with the Russian Federation. Speaking of a possible Declaration, Ukraine already has something to declare. The last thing that occurred to me after the news conference that Ye. Marchuk gave in Kiev: The outcome of the talks on the division of the Black Sea Fleet might become decisive during the discussion of the candidacy for the post of Ukraine's prime minister.

Kuchma: Crimean Parliament Decision 'Illegal'

LD2604140495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1227 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PRAGUE, April 26 (Interfax - Ukraine)—The decision of the Crimean parliament to hold a referendum on Crimea's Constitution is "out of Ukraine's legal field and is an illegal one," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma declared commenting on the resolution of Crimea's Supreme Soviet adopted Tuesday [25 April] in Simferopol at the request of Interfax-Ukraine agency.

"If the Crimean parliament continues its illegal activity authorities in Kiev will be forced to adopt corresponding measures," Kuchma said.

Kuchma is on a visit in Prague.

Interior Ministry To Confiscate Meshkov's Entrance Pass

LD2604153395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1337 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, April 26 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Commission for the Annulment of Presidency in Crimea has instructed the Ukrainian Interior Ministry to confiscate entrance passes from former Crimean president Yuriy Meshkov's staff and to forbid them from entering the Crimean parliament building.

The directive was signed by head of the annulment commission, Crimean Vice Premier Arkadiy Demidenko.

At the same time, according to Interfax-Ukraine, the Crimean parliament proposed on Wednesday that a moratorium be imposed on doing away with Crimean presidential bodies and invited Demidenko to discuss the entrance pass issue.

Some of the Crimean deputies believe that Demidenko abused his powers because the building of the Crimean parliament is in the sphere of the parliament's responsibilities, which alone can define its security regime.

On March 17, the Ukrainian parliament annulled the presidency in Crimea.

Crimean Deputies Split on Republic's Future

MM2604153795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "Crimea: Simply a Republic or Simply an Autonomous Republic? This

Question Is Being Put on the Agenda by Certain Crimean Parliamentarians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—The split in the Crimean parliament is the result not so much of confrontation between the power structures in Kiev and Simferopol as of the desire of the "city's fathers" to remain in their posts.

Some of the Crimean people's deputies have decided to seek their fortunes in Kiev. There are about 50 of these. They decided to rename the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Another section are counting on Moscow, where Crimean Parliamentary Speaker Sergey Tsekov recently addressed the State Duma, saying: "As we have not definitively determined our stance on the decisions which Ukraine adopted 17 and 31 March of this year, we cannot carry on working." Events of recent days have shown, as Tsekov stated, that a group of deputies from the Crimean Supreme Soviet, under the impression of the latest unlawful measures undertaken by the Ukrainian Supreme Council and president, are acting against the interests of the peninsula. One of the leaders of this group. People's Deputy A. Danilyan, conversely, believes that his supporters are taking all the necessary steps to bring Crimea's legislation into line with the norms of the Ukrainian Constitution. And Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, for whom the overwhelming majority of Crimeans voted in the first place, can be the guarantor of this policy.

No one knows for whom 90 percent of the inhabitants of the peninsula would vote today, but the storm of outbursts and statements on the controversial Crimean question on the eve of the vacation season, which, as we know, sustains the peninsula, can only be intensified in the immediate future.

Moroz Sets Rada Course, Defends Conduct

954K0568A Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 8 Apr 95 pp 1, 3-4

["Speech by Oleksandr Moroz, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine"; place, date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!

As required by the Rules, you have received a written text of the report of the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

It was prepared taking into account the preliminary discussions in the commissions of the Supreme Council, in the course of which many just observations and ideas were expressed with respect to improving legislative activity and organizing the work of the Supreme Council and its personnel. I expect many sound ideas to be put forward during today's discussion as well.

From my point of view, the most important thing we could do is to consider what has been accomplished from a state-building and constructive standpoint, not confining ourselves merely to registering the shortcomings and mistakes in the work we have done collectively, but striving for substantial improvements in this work.

I would also like to express my own views with regard to certain key issues.

I believe that in order to better understand the organization of the work of the Supreme Council and to gain a deeper insight into the problems that exist and how they might be solved, it is necessary, first, to describe the starting conditions in which the newly elected Supreme Council began its activity; second, to ascertain the internal and external objective circumstances in which the steering of the legislative process has to be organized today; and third, to take note of everything new that has already been done or begun in the work of the Supreme Council, its leadership, the Presidium, standing commissions, and people's deputies.

The fact cannot be ignored that having begun the process of laying a legislative foundation for the development of Ukraine as a new, sovereign state, the Supreme Council of the preceding convocation failed, as a result of both objective and subjective reasons, to set up a well-organized lawmaking system.

The Supreme Council of this convocation had to begin its work in the absence of well-ordered materials subject to enactment into laws and of a justified standardization and a rational (let alone scientific) organization of the legislative process in the state and in the Supreme Council. The normative regulation of legislative activity was also imperfect: There were no Rules of the Supreme Council, not to mention the entire package of requisite legislative acts comprising what is known as "parliamentary law."

Despite the thoroughly contradictory and literally rent Constitution of Ukraine, the constitutional process had been halted midway. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine was not formed, which substantially affected the course of democratic transformations in the state and the division of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.

When we add to this the overall extremely difficult social and economic situation in Ukraine, which is on the verge of being uncontrolled, and the lack on the part of the government of a thought-out program for surmounting the crisis, which often objectively compelled the Supreme Council to step in operatively to settle urgent problems, it becomes evident just how intense and important the period of activity covered in the report under discussion today was.

In analyzing the internal and external objective circumstances that currently define the organization of managing the legislative process in the Supreme Council, we should begin by noting that we are encountering many internal organizational problems for the first time.

What do I have in mind? First, the political arrangement of the Supreme Council into factions and groups of deputies and the creation of the appropriate organizational forms and procedures for approving decisions, which was made much more difficult by the imperfect nature of the existing Election Law.

Obviously, there still remains the pressing need to define and specify in greater detail the functions of commissions and the scope of their powers. As things stand right now, the various factions bear virtually no responsibility for what is most important—the timely drafting of bills, as well as for violations of parliamentary discipline and ethics by deputies.

At the same time, certain factions, focusing their activity on settling political scores, have taken control or are attempting to take control of certain commissions and engage in political games to the detriment of the legislative process and the authority of the Supreme Council as a whole. This is something that has to be acknowledged openly and honestly from a state-building standpoint.

I hope that concrete proposals will be made in the course of this discussion as to how this problem may be solved.

Second. The fact that the majority of people's deputies are now working full time in the Supreme Council. These two circumstances alone require fundamental changes in the approach, first and foremost, to making adequate provisions for the organizational, material-technical, informational, and financial needs of each people's deputy individually, the standing commissions, and the Supreme Council as a whole.

The objective external circumstances that substantially affect the organization of the work of the Supreme Council include the worsening economic crisis, the absence in the state of an organized political force responsible for implementing domestic and foreign policy, a deeply disordered mechanism of state and, above all, executive power and the absence of a system of balanced coordination of the various functions of government, and, finally, a thoroughly deformed and disorganized legal basis created over the last few years.

There are also other factors of an objective and subjective nature, particularly factors associated with the organization of the work of the government and the president's administration, with parallelism and duplication resulting in a lack of responsibility on the part of some executive structures, the neutralization of which seldom depends on the Supreme Council, but which cannot help but affect the Council's work.

This list is sufficient to show the degree to which the activity of the highest legislative body, and thereby the work of the Presidium, which is responsible for organizing the activity of the Supreme Council, is complicated by objective circumstances.

Given this situation, the Supreme Council of the new convocation began by taking the following absolutely essential steps: creating its working bodies and adopting the Rules that govern its work, drafting and approving the fundamental principles governing the implementation of economic policy in this period of crisis, and forming a competent government.

Today, every sober-minded politician understands that the cost of an unsystematic transition to a market economy, the lack of a clear conceptual overview of the entire complex of social and economic problems, and the lack of scientific predictions of the possible consequences of certain radical solutions in the economic sphere is too high.

The greatest strategic mistake made during the first stage of market reforms was the sweeping attempt by fiat to replace state planning of the economy with purely monetary regulatory instruments, suitable only to already formed and stable market systems. As a result, 24.5 percent of national income was lost in 1994 alone (18.8 percent in 1993)—an outcome that is viewed as a national catastrophe by world standards.

Many of our problems stem from the fact that one of the principal prerequisites of switching to a market economy was ignored—that is, the requirement that the system of market regulation and state control over the market environment be formed in a way that anticipates the consequences of creating market relations. As a result, our economic space was swept by a brutal elemental eruption of large-scale criminal consequences, which played a substantial role in causing a large portion of the population to lose faith in the need for reforms as such.

Above all, a regulated market economy requires a carefully worked out and perfected legal foundation, which can guarantee the proper interaction, interdependence, and reciprocal responsibility among all market entities.

"Playing the market game" without rules—that is, conducting market reforms without putting in place a complex and balanced legal infrastructure—leads to social and economic anarchy and creates an environment conducive to abuse and crime, such as we see today in practice.

Based on an assessment of the real state of affairs, the Supreme Council worked out and approved the "Fundamental Principles and Goals in the Formation of the Economy of Ukraine During This Period of Crisis." Although the day before yesterday we heard criticism of the Supreme Council in this hall for adopting this document, after reanalyzing it again yesterday, I concluded that those who criticized this document have simply not read it.

Many provisions of this document were reflected and elaborated in the report of the president of Ukraine "On the Fundamental Principles of Economic and Social Policy" published in October of last year.

Quite naturally, the Supreme Council focused its attention on creating a legislative foundation for reforming the economy, the social sphere, and providing the population with a social safety net.

As you know, we encountered difficulties stemming, above all, from the lack of conceptually worked out packages of the most important bills, their untimely submission by executive structures, and the lack of coordination with respect to the actions of the government, the president's administration, and parliament, much of which was not the fault of the Supreme Council and its leadership.

What is more, in initiating a conceptual approach to providing a legislative foundation for reforms, it was the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine that on 14 November 1994 approved the decree "On the Tentative List of Legislative Acts Forming a Legal Foundation for Economic Reforms" based on the president's report.

This document became an important basis for putting the process of economic lawmaking on a comprehensive target-oriented and planned foundation, a basis for organizing this process and improving the quality of the laws passed, thereby providing a legal base for market reforms. The approved agenda of the second session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine was based on this tentative list.

Unfortunately, some important issues that were included in the "List" are still not being resolved.

Above all, these involve the submission of bills in the order of their importance, the drawing up of legislative acts aimed at creating an effective legal basis in the sphere of the functioning and separation of the state and private sectors of the economy, the structural reorganization of the economy, ensuring the principle of social justice in the process of the privatization and destatization of property, the taxation system, the creation of an effective credit, banking, and financial infrastructure, and finally, the most important thing—providing a legislative foundation for the growth of production and the protection and support of domestic producers of goods.

Mindful of the urgency of these tasks, the Presidium of the Supreme Council recently initiated the creation of a joint working group to resolve these matters. Composed of representatives of the Supreme Council, the president's administration, and the government, the group is headed by Oleh Oleksiyovych Dyomin, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council.

Work in this field, the importance of which was stressed by President Leonid Kuchma in his address to the Supreme Council, and the creation of a legal basis for reforms must remain a priority in our activity.

This requires improving the organization of all the activity of the Supreme Council. It is necessary to rethink the goals that economic commissions need to pursue, the makeup of these commissions, the possibility of expanding, merging, or, conversely, creating new commissions and specialized subcommissions. There are many proposals regarding this from deputies' groups and factions. I believe that we must examine all these proposals carefully and submit them for consideration by the Supreme Council so that all these matters can be properly resolved. In my view, there is an obvious need for creating a special interdepartmental commission to oversee the processes of privatization as well as a parliamentary control board to monitor state budget spending.

I would like to focus your attention on the first issue in particular.

The privatization processes under way today constitute a collision that is constantly destabilizing the situation in society, because it is based on injustice and an enormous stratification of the population in terms of property. We have to institute strict controls over this process. Not simply controls, but interdepartmental controls—not only by the Supreme Council, but with the assistance of the executive branch structures, yet under the supervision and leadership of representatives of the Supreme Council, I believe. I think that we can find experts among the deputies, who are well-versed in these matters and will uphold the principles of statehood and social justice.

There have been many good ideas voiced on this subject in the course of the discussions regarding the Presidium's written report in the commissions of the Supreme Council. Let us continue this discussion, and let us take into consideration all the rational arguments that have been made and implement them without delay.

The next group of problems.

As we know, the constitutional process was reactivated at the beginning of the second session, and a new Constitutional Commission was created. However, in order not to have to return to this later, allow me to level criticism at myself, at all of you, and at the executive branch.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council and the chairman of the Supreme Council had to make five requests to the executive branch structures to submit the draft laws ensuing from the president's report for consideration by the Supreme Council. Despite this, frankly, we did not receive a single bill for months. This needs to be made public, because various theories regarding this are currently appearing in the mass media.

Now a portion of the draft laws (some 35) have piled up. It is possible to analyze them in greater detail. In any event, as you know, during the last month the Supreme Council worked very hard to study this mass of legislation and to process it.

However, returning to what I said earlier, what we need to do today is to draw up an appropriate register by priorities, what follows from what, what needs to be dealt with first. But in terms of this sequence, the legislative work on bills being conducted by entities with legislative initiative is not yet up to par. Because it is possible that we may pass a portion of the bills that have already been submitted and subsequently discover that they contradict those submitted later, but which are more important.

A striking example of this is the Concept of Taxation Policy. We deliberated on the draft law on taxing enterprise profits (whether it is perfect or imperfect is another matter), but just from the information received yesterday from Leonid Anisimov, it became obvious how in the case of a specific example, a specific enterprise, a document that appeared progressive is totally destroying production. Obviously, we first need a concept and then a set of documents that elaborate on it and make it possible to work in the national economy in a systematic way.

However, let me return to the constitutional process. It has been reactivated, a Constitutional Commission has been created, and work is now under way to complete drafting a new Constitution of Ukraine, which, I am certain, can be approved this year. We can consider the mechanism of its adoption and its contents separately, especially as many political organizations are now proposing their own versions. All this needs to be studied, and, in my view, the commission, and especially a number of its sections, is working productively, which fills me with hope that we will be able to pass this legal document of vital importance to the Supreme Council and the state.

I regard it as absolutely essential to conduct large-scale state legal reforms, including reforms of our legislative activity. The Presidium considered and approved the proposals of the leadership of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on perfecting the legislative process, improving the level of its organization, and providing it with a scientific-juridical foundation. In particular, there has been a partial reorganization of the structure of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council, and the staffing of its subdivisions has been strengthened. Computerized information technologies are being actively applied in the legislative process.

By its decision of 7 October 1994 to implement the decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 1992, the Presidium finally created the Legislative Institute of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, which completed its organization in a short period of time and began to function in practical terms. It should be pointed out that the Institute is not yet fully staffed; it employs nearly 30 associates (including technical personnel).

Agreements have been concluded with nearly 30 Ukrainian and foreign scientific and educational institutions regarding cooperation in resolving the most urgent scientific-research problems. An agreement has been concluded with the Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine to draw up a concept of the development of the legislative system of Ukraine. The methodology of planning the legislative activity of the Supreme Council of Ukraine has already been developed, and on the basis of this methodology, the Legislative Institute and the Secretariat are working together to draft a plan of legislative activity for 1995; a draft law on laws and legislative activity in Ukraine has been prepared (in my opinion, this draft law is exceptionally comprehensive and has a solid scientific foundation), and other urgent research projects are under way.

In order to bring in additional scientific forces into the legislative process, consultative councils have been created to deal with questions of legal policy and state-building and with socioeconomic issues. Working under the chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, they are composed of leading scientists—jurists, economists, and practicians—from Kiev and other cities in our country.

Work is being done on the question of creating a parliamentary publishing house.

Thus, despite all our objective difficulties, positive changes are gradually mounting and a well-organized and effective foundation for future legislative activity is being laid on a modern informational and scientific-practical basis.

A number of concrete steps have been taken to reflect more widely the work of the Supreme Council in its print organs: the newspaper HOLOS UKRAYINY and the journal VICHE and to report the work of the Supreme Council, its commissions, and deputies' factions and groups on television and radio. You are witnesses to this work and participants in it.

To sum up what I have already said, I think it necessary to stress once again that we have only taken the first steps to establish a professional parliament in sovereign Ukraine.

Obviously, the decisive criteria governing our work will be halting the crisis process, improving the social and economic situation, and creating normal living conditions for every individual.

This is what determines our most important tasks, and I am of the opinion that the ways to accomplish these tasks must be discussed today.

First. The vital need to define (and thus provide with a legislative basis) a conception of the development of the state, its political order, to formulate the unifying national idea adopted by the absolute majority of the population, and to secure these principles in the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of Ukraine.

Second. Rethinking and making the necessary corrections in reforming the economy, taking into account all aspects—ranging from the national security of the state to the interests of each individual.

Third. Clearly, all these problems can be solved only by developing our own production, supporting and protecting our own producers, conducting a structural reorganization of our economy, and breaking through into world markets with the help of new technologies, which can and must be based on our own intellectual and scientific-technical potential. All this requires providing a legislative foundation without delay and focusing the activity of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on creating this foundation.

Fourth. World experience shows that it is necessary to follow the path of creating special state programs to support key (decisive) sectors of production for the state (basic research, the aerospace sector, shipbuilding, electronics, the agrarian complex). We must immediately create special parliamentary working groups, which will draw up and submit for consideration by the Supreme Council packages of legislative documents on these issues (provide a special legislative foundation for projects that are of decisive importance to the state).

I would go even further. Talking with businessmen (for example, a few days ago in Korea), we discussed this problem and concluded that we should create special legislation as a basis for a number of solid projects that are important to the development of the "breakthrough" sectors of our economy. These could include, for example, special economic zones or a separate law governing, for instance, the aerospace industry or the joint use of the possibilities afforded by two (several) states to develop the manufacturing of motor vehicles. The list of things that could be provided with a separate legislative foundation, keeping in mind the temporary nature of the force of these laws, with the prior approval of the entities engaged in this activity, could be extended. I believe that we should consider this matter in the course of our discussions.

Fifth. When working out, discussing, and adopting the legal basis for reforming society, we should never lose sight of the ultimate goal for the sake of which all these transformations were begun and are being continued—democracy. This is the core and the very reason for the existence of the country's highest legislative body. Members of parliament must not forget this, because the loss of our democratic gains will mean the end of our progress towards a civilized society, an end to our becoming an equal and recognized member of European and world political and economic structures.

Several remarks regarding some purely internal problems. There can be no changes for the better if there is no order in our standing commissions, the principal shops of our legislative process, as it were, if they do not comply with the technology of preparing and working out draft laws, unless all our commissions begin to work "at full capacity."

Unfortunately, we have to admit that even today many commissions do not work in the manner they should; the materials for draft laws are not even recorded and are not kept together in separate files as required by the Rules. As a result, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain who submitted what legislative initiative and when to the Supreme Council, what decisions were made regarding these matters, etc. Yet, clearly, the chairmen of commissions and the heads of their secretariats have sufficient organizational powers to put their office work in order.

In the work of the Supreme Council of the preceding convocation, the main accent was shifted towards an unjustified autonomy for commissions and administrative and production independence of their staffs from the general Secretariat of the Supreme Council and its functional services. This split in the Supreme Council's single legislative mechanism must be eliminated as quickly as possible.

I do not want this to be perceived as an encroachment on the autonomy or independence of the work of commissions. We should keep in mind one fact: The Supreme Council is not only the highest legislative body (as composed of its corps of deputies), but also one of the most important state institutions, in which the two components—the organizational structure and representative body—should work in a coordinated manner, in a monolithic manner, as a single organism. Hence, the services of the Secretariat, which are obliged to ensure this link among the structures of the Supreme Council, must function and function well, taking over functionally some powers of the secretariats of the commissions, even though some people want to reject this in the belief that each commission works autonomously.

The Secretariat and the Presidium of the Supreme Council made it possible to form secretariats based on the convictions and preferences of the different leaderships of the commissions, but different political views, for example, do not mean a different legislative policy. There has to be a single policy that serves a single state. This is the decisive factor, and I think that as we reform the Secretariat, we will continue to abide by these principles.

The heads of the secretariats of the commissions must clearly understand that the requirements of the leadership of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council as to the methodology of organizing their work, the execution of general plans of legislative activity, and the submission of all necessary information to the appropriate structural subdivisions of the Secretariat as part of the control process must be unconditionally fulfilled. Especially as our Rules require this.

As far as the responsibility of the chairmen of the commissions for the organization of the work of the commissions they head is concerned, this is part of their civic duty, official status, and simply a matter of honor as it applies to those in charge.

I do not wish to transform the report of the Presidium into an analysis of the performance of individual commissions. Let me put it this way: I have complaints regarding the work of each commission, beginning with, for example, the Defense Commission or the Banking Commission and ending with... I can tell you in what respect the work of each falls short.

But I think that we should have made it part of our practice to hold a monthly (perhaps closed) meeting in the Presidium, or better yet, in the Supreme Council, at which the commissions would report. What each commission is doing, how its work is progressing, what results this work will yield, and how effective this work will be. It is during the consideration of these reports that we could resolve the issue that is being broached today by a portion of the factions and deputies—the issue of strengthening certain commissions organizationally. This would provide us with an objective basis for the fact that this needs to be done, because at present we sometimes resolve this issue subjectively—based on whether we like or dislike a given person.

Actually, there are grounds today on which to criticize virtually all the heads of the commissions, although we also need to help them in their work. This, too, is both a moral obligation and the duty and right of each deputy.

If I were to describe briefly what will be done in the near future to improve the legislative process, I would list the following:

First. An inventory and official reregistration of draft laws and legislative proposals that are being worked on by the Supreme Council is expected to be completed during April. All these draft laws are being entered into a single Supreme Council computer network, and every deputy will be able to access this network, eliminating the need to reproduce various documents. This possibility is already available.

What is more, we have entered the legislative acts of the United States, Russia, and other countries into our computers. That is, we have joined the single world information network—the legislative and legal network. This is a huge accomplishment, which we owe to the recent work of the Secretariat, the Presidium, and the Supreme Council as a whole. This work was begun earlier with contacts on the interstate level, especially with the Research Service of the U.S. Congress. Towards this end, the chairman issued a directive, approving a corresponding instruction, and the filing of draft laws and their registration has begun.

Second. Proposals on the methodology of planning legislative activity have been submitted for consideration to the Supreme Council. Based on these, if they are approved, the Presidium will draft and approve a statute on the procedure for the operational-calendar planning and tracking of draft laws in the Supreme Council of Ukraine. At the same time, the Center for Computerized Information Systems is developing programs to automate the management of these processes.

Third. On the basis of the completed registration of draft laws, and taking into account additional proposals from entities with legislative initiative, a methodologically justified plan of legislative activity for 1995 is to be drafted during April-May with the help of the Legislation Institute and submitted for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Fourth. It is planned that during April-May, the Legislation Institute, assisted by other scientific legal institutions, will complete work on the Concept of the Development of the Legislative System of Ukraine for the next 10 to 20 years that was developed by the Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences, so that it may be submitted to the Supreme Council for consideration no later than September-October.

The adoption of such a concept, if there exists a new Constitution of Ukraine, would allow us to draw up concrete programs of legislative projects for the entire period that the Supreme Council remains in office and to plan our work each year.

There is no doubt that the new conditions and objectives of the activity of the Supreme Council necessitate enhancing the role of its Presidium: On the one hand, expanding its powers and ability to solve current problems, and on the other hand, freeing the Supreme Council (session) from the need to consider unimportant issues that can be settled routinely.

I know that this is a controversial issue. I know that it is perceived in different ways by various deputies. Some maintain that the Presidium is not the Politburo but a body that sees to the organization of meetings. That is precisely how it functions at present. Its powers are extremely limited. On the other hand, the structure responsible for organizing our work could be composed of the heads of factions and deputies' groups. This would comport with international practice. But this will be possible to do only when the Supreme Council is formed on a proportional basis with elections conducted on a party basis. Until this happens, we need to find a transitional form, and enhancing the role of the Presidium is just such a transitional form. Especially with respect to issues that it makes no sense to raise at sessions, because they merely consume an inordinate amount of time.

Let me cite just one example. Even amendments to the charter or personnel questions affecting the parliamentary publications, the newspaper HOLOS UKRAYINY and the magazine VICHE, have to be approved by the Supreme Council.

In my opinion, we should return to the question of expanding the powers and jurisdiction of the Presidium of the Supreme Council (for example, the passage of normative acts, interpretation of laws, etc.). This would advance the general cause of improving the effectiveness of the work of the country's legislative body.

In conclusion. Obviously, I have not been able to cover all the aspects of the work of the Supreme Council and its Presidium, ranging from individual areas of the legislative process, the work of commissions, the Secretariat, and the Administration of Affairs to ensuring the proper conditions for the work of people's deputies.

We should pass a law providing deputies with official housing but containing the provision that once a deputy's term of office is completed, this housing is either returned to the city housing fund or passed on to members of the next Supreme Council.

Naturally, when I speak of the shortcomings, omissions, and errors in the work of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, I understand these to include my own failings as chairman as well as the failings of the deputy chairmen and the members of the Presidium. These, too, need to be acknowledged publicly. Neither I, nor, I am certain, my colleagues are afraid of criticism. The main thing is that this criticism be just and aimed at improving the work that we are all engaged in together.

Nor can I fail to mention the following. Certain deputies are actively involved in a campaign of defamation and slander against not only the leadership of the Supreme Council, but against the highest legislative body as a whole. I am not particularly concerned about the attempts to defame me or some of the other leaders (the deputy chairmen or members of the Presidium), although I could provide a political assessment of this phenomenon. I know that the law enforcement agencies will sort these things out.

I will state here, or anywhere else, that the object of this slander and these lies is to gain political advantage, settle scores, and the like. I have acted and will continue to act in a manner befitting the office of the chairman of the Supreme Council. I am not afraid of this slander, because I am innocent before the people, the state, the Supreme Council, and my own conscience. (Applause)

The Supreme Council reflects our society as it exists today. And we must finally understand that the political forces trying to defame the Supreme Council, consciously or not, are ultimately working against our society and our state!

Another thing we hear these days: We used to have a good and strong Supreme Council, and now "weaklings" have taken over... Let me tell you, this claim is wholly unfounded. The makeup of the present Supreme Council is strong. It is no weaker than the makeup of the preceding Supreme Council—I have the basis on which to compare the two! And many of you present here have the basis on which to compare the two... Let me tell you that this is being done on purpose in order to discredit the Supreme Council as the legislative body, the only body that can safeguard democracy in Ukraine! I have always defended and as the chairman of the Supreme Council will continue to defend the authority of the Supreme Council. And I want this to be your position as well: A deputy's authority is sacred to me. I want all deputies to hold the honor of the Supreme Council in the same high esteem!

Let me say in conclusion: Let us trust one another, let us look for common ground in the interests of the people and in the interests of the state!

Obviously, the Supreme Council reflects the state of our society with all the contradictions and shortcomings typical of a transitional stage. Thus, consolidation, civic accord and harmony, and hence the ability to surmount the crisis, must begin right here, in our hall. I am profoundly certain of this! I believe that this will be the case. Thank you for your attention.

Amendments Passed To Permit Nationwide Broadcasting Firms

WS2704092895 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0337 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 26—Parliament passed on Wednesday [26 April] a tentative set of amendments to the law on television and radio that would give not only citizens, but also the president and Parliament the right to establish their own nationwide broadcasting companies.

The amendments also stipulated that a National Council on Television and Radio broadcasting that was created by Parliament in January should have control over these companies.

Some in Parliament objected to the legislature giving itself the right to establish its own TV network.

"Parliament has its own newspaper, HOLOS UKRAYINY (Voice of Ukraine). Why should it have its own TV channel?" asked Serhiy Ansinenko, a member of the committee on TV and radio.

Chernobyl Aftermath Reviewed on Anniversary

WS2604112195 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0439 GMT 26 Apr 95

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Ihor Zhyhyr and Ed Zwirn]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 25—The Chernobyl nuclear reactor has almost continually made headlines since it exploded on April 26, 1986, sending clouds of radioactive matter over much of northern and eastern Europe.

Consequently, the decision announced less than two weeks ago by Ukrainian authorities to close the plant by the year 2000 made big news not only in Ukraine, but throughout the world. According to the decision, the Ukrainian government will announce by May 15 a concrete plan for making this schedule a reality.

The news is not that new. In 1990, Ukraine's government placed a moratorium on the future building of nuclear reactors, and declared that the remaining three reactors at Chernobyl would be shut down permanently by the end of 1993. Instead, in October of that year, Parliament brought the issue to the forefront once more by lifting the ban on new construction and rescinding the decision to close down the remaining three working Chernobyl reactors.

Now, in the wake of the latest promise to close down the plant, however gradually, there are signs that a powerful pro-nuclear lobby is again at work within the government, hoping to create a set of financial obstacles so onerous that the shutdown may again become another unfulfilled promise.

Earlier this year, fear escalated when a special report by international experts of the Alliance concern was printed in the LONDON OBSERVER that said the concrete enclosure constructed on top of the plant's ill-fated fourth reactor could collapse at any moment and trigger a new explosion. This month, President Leonid Kuchma caved in to increasing worldwide pressure, particularly from the European Union and the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations and promised to close the plant by the year 2000.

Meanwhile, opponents of the shutdown say the plant closure is not motivated by safety concerns and, furthermore, is inexpedient from an economic viewpoint. The active opposition to the immediate plant shutdown of Serhiy Parashyn, Chernobyl plant director, and the cautious statements of Mykhailo Umanets, State Nuclear Committee chair, spawn talk of a possible nuclear lobby against Kuchma's promise.

"The State Nuclear Committee failed to convince the Ukrainian people and international community that the plant was reliable enough," said Umanets, speaking publicly after Kuchma made the promise. "The fear of the plant is based only on emotional and psychological ground. People are afraid of Chernobyl, of a repeat catastrophe. That is the main problem."

At the same time, many foreign nuclear experts are producing evidence for shutting down the plant. Their reasoning is not based on emotion, but technology.

Many Ukrainian nuclear experts and the State Nuclear Committee had the chance to study the special report by the Alliance expert group on technical and economic grounds for construction of a new sarcophagus for the fourth reactor.

Here are the final conclusions of the report:

1. The existing sarcophagus, Shelter-1, is not sound and can collapse due to a seismic vibration (6-7 on a Richter scale) or other calamity.

Any long-term stabilization of Shelter-1 is not possible.

2. Block B and the third reactor, which share a wall with the damaged fourth reactor, are not steady.

3. The construction of a new shelter is to be considered a top-priority measure.

4. Before Shelter-2 is constructed, it is necessary to erect capacities to process and deposit nuclear wastes.

5. The Shelter-2 construction project needs immediate official confirmation.

The Alliance Concern, which got the right to work out a project on the sarcophagus safety in 1992, carried out its first study and issued the report. The concern will carry out two more studies and submit its final project, ensuring the safety of the fourth reactor for 100 more years. The construction of the new shelter is to be finished within five years.

The Alliance report is not the only evidence of danger from the state of the sarcophagus.

Another international expert group, known as 66&6, issued its conclusion saying that the sarcophagus foundation is in poor condition and another explosion within the shelter could happen at any time.

Within the sarcophagus, there continues a self-sustained chain reaction that some scientists from the Russian Nuclear Research Institute say may lead to an explosion. Many Ukrainian and Belarusian scientists share the concern about the sarcophagus's physical stability and its inner processes.

Another problem of Chernobyl is nuclear waste. According to Parashyn, more than 19,000 nuclear fuel rods are stored in special deposits in Chernobyl. The fuel may be deposited for nine years and then must be either buried in special containers or sent for further processing.

Russian nuclear processing plants in Krasnoiarsk and Cheliabinsk are ready to take over waste fuel from Ukrainian nuclear plants, but only for world prices, so Ukraine is considering constructing its own long-term depositories.

Duke Engineering and Services, a United States firm, is about to finish its work at the biggest nuclear plant in Ukraine, the Zaporizhia plant, on construction of a dry deposit for nuclear wastes. The United States uses similar deposits; they are seismic-proof, easy to control and relatively inexpensive.

The State Nuclear Committee set forth the idea of constructing an all-Ukrainian deposit in Chernobyl. This project has as many supporters as opponents.

The already existing nuclear waste deposits (within a 30-kilometer restricted area) raise many questions about their reliability and protection from underground waters.

Taking into account the numerous publications regarding an increase in cancer-related diseases among Ukrainian children, in birth defects, contamination of soil and air, influence on flora and fauna, the demands to close the plant seem to have come late.

According to the State Nuclear Committee, in the first quarter of 1995, the Chernobyl plant produced 6 percent of all the electricity in Ukraine. When on May 15 the State Nuclear Committee submits to the Cabinet of Ministers its schedule for putting the plant out of operation, another problem, the so-called sum of compensation for both the shutdown itself and its resultant economic dislocation, is expected to be debated.

Umanets said several times that the West should pay $4.4 billion for the closure. The sum includes the erection of a new gas-steam plant near Slavutych ($2 billion), expenditures for Russian gas supplies for the new plant, expenditures for the Chernobyl closure and construction of a new sarcophagus.

The cautious position of the West toward compensation is based on several factors. First, many foreign experts doubt the need for $4.4 billion. Second, even less of a sum is not easy to raise. And finally, the West wants Ukraine to give serious guarantees that the money will be 100 percent spent for outlined purposes.

The G-7 representatives talked about credits, while the State Nuclear Committee said "the West should pay for it."

Michel Barnier, European Union delegation chair, after his talks with President Kuchma, said, "Ukraine should use the already reached agreements about credits and financial aid from international organizations."

Peak of Cancer 'Yet To Come'

WS2604123995 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0439 GMT 26 Apr 95

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Ihor Zhyhyr]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 25—The peak of the incidence of thyroid and other cancers caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe has yet to come, officials from the Scientific Center of Radiation Medicine, Health Ministry and foreign experts at the international seminar "Medical Aspects Of The Chernobyl Disaster" announced on Tuesday [25 April].

The Health Ministry registered the upward trend in cases of the diseases amid three highest risk groups: children, those involved in the Chernobyl accident clean-up operations and pregnant women.

The number of patients with thyroid cancer has increased 10 to 12 fold compared to 1986. The general number of deaths among those affected by the Chernobyl accident exceeded 125,000 over the period of 1988-1994.

According to acting Health Minister Andriy Serdiuk the death toll among Chernobyl liquidators over the past five years climbed to 6,000.

The significant growth in thyroid cancer morbidity growth is registered in the northeastern oblasts most seriously affected by the radiation from the accident. This area has a population of over 7 million, including over 1.5 million children.

Experts Disclose Second Explosion

LD2604185895 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Apr 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was a sensation on the Chernobyl anniversary when a report revealed that specialists working on a draft for the opening for the Chernobyl nuclear power station concluded that during the disaster nine years ago there were two explosions separated by a few seconds. The first explosion blew out the roof of the 2,500 tonne reactor to a height of 14 meters, and the second occurred in a pit into which the reactor collapsed.

It is probable that the new discovery will also help in studying the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Today, against the background of the general increase in thyroid glandular diseases, especially among children, and the emergence of animals with congenital anomalies, specialists are predicting that in the near future there will be more terrible mutations of human genes. By 1992 the number of congenital anomalies among children—16 to 24 instances per 1,000 new-born babies—had already increased in the Ukraine.

On the eve of the anniversary of the disaster, the Ukrainian president [Leonid Kuchma], opening a treatment block for the former inhabitants of Chernobyl and the zone, said the Ukrainian Government has this year allocated about 83 trillion karbovantsy to eliminate the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. But this is clearly not enough, because 160 trillion is needed just for the social protection of those who suffered. And this cannot be done by one state trying to eliminate the consequences of a disaster. It is not only Ukraine alone that is suffering from the Chernobyl disaster, although it is its people who have paid dearly for the USSR's desire to live in a world with nuclear weapons.

Belarus

Moscow Demand To Tighten Customs Control Spurned

MK2604123095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 4

[Report from Minsk by Valentin Zhdanko under the "Belarus" rubric: "President Chagrined by Russian Leaders' Mistrust. He Received Categorical Instruction From Moscow To Tighten Customs Control on Ukrainian Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently Belarusian leaders have gradually begun losing their confidence that they could lift their economy by drawing on cheap Russian energy resources and raw materials. Although the thesis on the need to restore the former economic ties is still being widely invoked in Minsk, in effect managers of dozens of local enterprises, which have lost nearly all markets for selling their products in Russia, are perfectly aware of the fact that the issue is not a lack of political will or interstate documents. No treaties on friendship and unity will cancel market laws or force anyone to buy low-quality Belarusian equipment while much more reliable Western products could be bought at virtually the same price.

As illusions vanish, harsh comments and complaints about Russian partners have increasingly frequently been heard from Minsk. At the end of last week, during President Lukashenka's meeting with Nikolay Gonchar, chairman of the Federation Council Budget Committee, who was on a visit to Minsk, the head of Belarus hurled numerous complaints at the Russian guest. For the most part they boiled down to the fact that Moscow is not yet rushing to put Belarusian manufacturers on a par with Russian ones although Belarus is conscientiously complying with all interstate agreements on military cooperation, transit, and the customs union.

A letter signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin also elicited a negative reaction from Mr. Lukashenka. Never before has the Belarusian president ventured to make such statements with regard to Russian politicians as he did in his comments on the letter. According to Mr. Lukashenka, Viktor Chernomyrdin appears to have affixed his signature to a letter drawn up in the form of an ultimatum without reading it. The Belarusian president attributed the authorship of the message to Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov, who, according to Mr. Lukashenka's assessment, "has a similar temper and sometimes loses direction."

The letter lists in a categorical manner a number of requirements Minsk must fulfill in the areas of border protection, military cooperation, transit, and customs policy. President Lukashenka was surprised by his Russian partner's ignorance, for Belarus has already complied with most of these requirements. The sole new demand—that a tighter customs control be set up on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and that the republic receive 100 Russian customs specialists to be sent there for this purpose—was rejected by Alyaksandr Lukashenka as a demonstration of mistrust in Belarus. In his words, the republic does not need extra patronage by Russian specialists. Moreover, this applies not only to the customs service, but also to the border troops and military cooperation. Alyaksandr Lukashenka expects that the misunderstanding could be straightened out after his personal meeting with Boris Yeltsin.

Lukashenka Reportedly Dismisses Bank Chief

LD2604175495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1628 GMT 26 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to available information, in accordance with the presidential decree Tuesday Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka dismissed chairman of the National Bank of Belarus' (NBB) Board Stanislaw Bahdankevich from his post.

Head of the presidential press service Vladimir Zametalin has neither confirmed nor refuted this information received from a reliable source.

In a conversation with our correspondent from Interfax-West news agency on Tuesday evening he made it clear that "there exist problems concerning Bahdankevich's staying on the post of the country's major banker," however he agreed to make his comments only on Wednesday morning.

Head of the presidential analytical center Pyatr Kapitulo reported to Interfax-West that he does not know anything about Bahdankevich's resignation. At the same time he recognized such opportunity explaining this by disagreements between Lukashenka and chairman of the NBB "on several key issues."

Bahdankevich's unwillingness to agree to the president's wish to lower the credit rate from 25 to 15 percent and the rate on deposits from 20 to 12 percent could be an official premise for his resignation, Kapitulo believes. However, as he said, "one could find "many variants for mutual compromises in this case."

Over the last time Lukashenka repeatedly made it clear that he has a negative attitude to the head of the NBB, especially after Bahdankevich's decision to run for a seat in a new composition of Belarus' Supreme Soviet in one of the electoral districts in Minsk.

During the presidential elections last summer Bahdankevich was in the electoral "tandem" with former speaker of the Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich. It was supposed that if Shushkevich came to power Bahdankevich could take the post of prime minister.

Commercial Activity by Military, Police, KGB Banned

WS2704202695 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0701 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Republic of Belarus Alyaksandar Lukashenka has issued a decree for barring the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Committee for State Security, the Central Board of Frontier Troops and the Board of Railway Troops from commercial activity. The President has put a ban on the activity of the above-listed organs' structures dealing with mediatory, trade, purchase and other commercial activities. The president has also prohibited the granting of premises on lease, the transfer of property, buildings, establishments and other material valuables. The machinery of the Security Council and the Control Service of the Presidential Administration are to carry out inspections in the above-listed organs.

Publisher Urged To Stop Printing Opposition Newspaper

WS2704093495 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0701 GMT 27 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As the chief editor of the opposition SVABODA newspaper Ihar Hermyanchuk informed a BELAPAN correspondent, Ryshard Lyasota, the director of the Orsha printing house, where in recent months the newspaper was printed, asserts that his superiors are recommending him the unilateral cancellation of the contract on printing with the SVABODA newspaper. According to Mr Lyasota, pressure from above is making itself felt not only upon him but also his relatives, the staff of the printing house, and the regional organs to which the printing house is subordinate. According to the chief engineer of the printing house Henadz Karpaw, a representative of the district KGB department asked for being acquainted with the contents of edition number 17 of the newspaper before it was printed. This fact was not confirmed by KGB officials in Minsk. But they informed that in the afternoon of April 26 a group of leaders of the Vitsebsk Regional Committee for State Security left for Orsha to clarify the situation.

Mr Lyasota has already had a conversation about the necessity to cancel the contract with the prosecutor of the town. In the opinion of the director of the printing house, one can say with certainty that in case of nonfulfillment of these recommendations from above, he and Mikalay Sychew, Chief the Information Board of the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee, will be dismissed. Ryshard Lyasota himself would like to part friends with the newspaper, but the contract does not envisage its cancellation with the exception of through the economic court. In addition, the cancellation of the contract and the loss of the client is not beneficial for the printing house even from the financial point of view because now only 20 percent of the printing house's production capacities is used, and a third part of all orders is the printing of SVABODA.

"Today we have nowhere to go but to underground", Mr Hermyanchuk said. "In spite of what is going on, we do not intend to take any moves for the cancellation of the contract".

Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates Ends

LD2604204295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1914 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, April 26 (Interfax-West)—A total of 2,348 candidates will race for 260 seats in the Belarusian parliament on May 14, the chairman of the Central Election Commission, Aleksandr Abramovich, told its meeting Wednesday [26 April].

According to Abramovich, his commission denied registration to 176 citizens.

A total of 1,126 candidates were nominated by political parties and election blocs, 603 registered as they produced 500 signatures as required by the republic's election law, 462 by workers' groups and the rest by veterans' organizations and military units.

Abramovich added that the number of deputies still could change, despite the fact that the nomination deadline had expired, as some parties could recall their candidates.

Sources to fund the future elections and a referendum in the republic are about to be found, Abramovich said. He added the Finance Ministry had set aside the required amounts on the commission's account.

1995 Economic Results Detailed to Date

WS2704095695 Minsk BTK Television Network in Belarusian 1800 GMT 22 Apr 95

[Video report by A. Tsimashenka and V. Sorkin—correspondents identified by caption; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first quarter of 1995, GDP in Belarus amounted to 18.207 trillion Belarusian rubles [R]. In comparison with the same period in 1994, it decreased by 12 percent overall, including an over 10-percent drop in industrial production. Uladzimir Nichyparovich, chairman of the State Committee for Statistics, has provided us with the following explanation.

[Nichyparovich, in Russian] "We can only produce as much as is possible to sell. Unfortunately, however, our neighbors do not possess the appropriate resources to buy our products. Therefore, the situation in industry has become complicated, and our products are being sold with great difficulty."

In January and February 1995 alone, the foreign trade turnover of Belarus decreased by over 14 percent. This was primarily caused by a rather significant decrease in imports to Belarus. At the same time, the export of our goods and services increased by 5 percent, amounting to almost R5 trillion. It must be noted, however, that the financial situation of our enterprises has not improved due to this. As of 1 March 1995, the total debt of foreign purchasers to Belarusian exporters exceeded R21 trillion; in February alone, this debt increased by 20 percent.

[Nichyparovich, in Russian] "If such nonpayments continue, they will have a negative influence on the further work of our industry. If our products are not sold, there can be no revenues. If there are no revenues for enterprises, there are also no revenues going to the state budget."

In the first three months of 1995, the state budget deficit already reached a level of R140 billion. Such a situation is due in large part to events not only on the foreign market, but also on the domestic one. Between January and March, the production of consumer goods in Belarus decreased by 17 percent, while retail turnover of these goods decreased by 22 percent.

[Nichyparovich, in Russian] "The enterprises could have produced more goods, but traders are unable to take them and unable to sell them. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the trade sector does not have working capital; the second reason is that, due to freedom in determining trade markups, the goods have become so expensive that people can no longer afford them."

In March 1995 alone, consumer prices in the Republic increased by 20 percent, whereas the real income of the population in the first quarter decreased by 3 percent. Nevertheless, Uladzimir Nichyparovich thinks that the general economic situation is gradually improving.

[Nichyparovich, in Russian] "We have virtually maintained the level of stability that took shape during the fourth quarter of 1994."

Moldova

Lebed 'Skeptical' About 14th Army Restructuring

AU2604123195 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 25/4/1995—The Russian Defence Ministry has decided to re-structure the control of the Dniester-deployed 14th Army. The Ministry's Press Centre chief, Nikolay Malyshev, said to journalists today that a special order for that was issued on April 19, and military experts are currently working out the procedure for its implementation.

In accordance with the document, the 14th Army Headquarters shall be transformed into an Operative Command, and its staff shall be reduced two-fold. The fact is, the Army staff has been shrinking steadily during last several years, and is now equal to that of a reduced division's. Meanwhile, the Headquarters personnel remained as it used to be before: 200 officers.

The Defence Ministry ordered to complete the restructuring by July 1.

The document says nothing about the Army commander, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed. However, in Malyshev's words, there may be several variants. One of them is that Lebed may be left in Tiraspol, because the Army's new structure envisages a General-level post.

Aleksandr Lebed himself is quite skeptical about such a perspective. He said to INFOTAG that "if the Headquarters is liquidated, then the commander will be left without a job, and will have to settle his further employment by himself."

Lebed expressed bewilderment that he was not officially notified on the rearrangement beforehand, and that he learnt about it only from the press. His remarks about the decision were very rough. He called it "ill-considered" and "groundless." He said that "there is absolutely no reason to launch the Army reorganization before the situation in Dniester is clarified, when the Chisinau-Tiraspol negotiations are frozen, and when one cannot speak about the implementation of the Army Withdrawal Agreement."

In Moscow political circles, the Army reorganization decision is regarded as an attempt to remove Aleksandr Lebed. On April 8-9, he participated in the Moscow-held Third Congress of Russian Communities, where he had stated his intention to go into active politics. This statement was perceived by many as an intention to run for presidency of the Russian Federation.

Many prominent figures in Moldova fear the possible departure of General Lebed. They praise his tough attitude to Tiraspol separatist leaders, and view him as a reliable guarantor of the Army's armament safety. After he is gone, the armament may get into the hands of the rebel Dniester Republic.

Russian Official Hopes Withdrawal Accord To Be Ratified

AU2604124895 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 25/4/1995—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergey Krylov, expressed hope that the State Duma of the Russian Federation will ratify the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the 14th Army from the Moldovan territory. Speaking at today's press conference dedicated to the results of his visit to Moldova, Krylov said the military staff are free to choose localities to continue their service, while the Army's armament and machinery are subject to evacuation.

The Russian diplomat confirmed Moscow's stance concerning the inadmissibility of imposing international control over the Army removal. He motivated the attitude by having stated that "such a control is not envisaged by the Agreement whose implementation is based on mutual trust of the sides."

The Deputy Foreign Minister said that Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Council of the Federation, when on visit to Chisinau recently, put emphasis on that procedure not because he did not care of the servicemen, but because the property evacuation is the most complicated problem, technically.

When asked about the Defence Ministry's recent decision to reorganize the 14th Russian Army, Sergey Krylov replied such issues were exceptionally in the competence of the above ministry. As for a possible departure of Aleksandr Lebed from his present post, Krylov remarked that "departure of a commander must not alter things in his military subdivisions for the worse. Aleksandr Lebed is a serviceman, and he cannot be totally free in such rearrangements. There are state interests, and a servicemen either says 'yes' or he must leave. As far as I know, the 14th Army withdrawal problem is being tackled by many officials, and Lieutenant-General Lebed is far from playing the first role in the procedure," the deputy foreign minister emphasized.

Sergey Krylov also stated Russia's readiness to render further assistance in solving the Dniester dispute. "Russia is ready to help as a mediator at the Dniester negotiations, and to give consultations in various fields," he said. "We proceed from the assumption that Moldova is an integral state, and the Dniester crisis is its domestic problem. That is why solution should be found by the Moldovan leadership themselves, and we are ready to only help in this," Sergey Krylov stressed.

Together with officials from the Moldovan Foreign Ministry, the guest visited Tiraspol. He expressed satisfaction about the trip, having pointed out that the situation there is changing for the better. The situation does not only make unnecessary to send other countries' peace keepers to the region, but even allows to reduce the available peacekeeping troops in Dniester.

When requested to comment the recent Russian foreign minister's statement on a possibility to use force to protect Russian-speakers living outside Russia, Krylov said the minister meant "extraordinary situations when real danger to their lives might appear. Moldova should not perceive the statement as a threat into its own address. And though we received a small number of complaints from ethnic Russians living in Moldova, one cannot speak that this state practices discrimination against Russian-speaker population. That is not the case," Krylov stressed.

Leaders Discuss Bilateral Ties With Russia's Krylov

AU2604123795 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 25/4/1995—On Tuesday [25 April], Moldovan President Mircea Snegur, Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi, and Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli received the deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Krylov who was on a working visit in Moldova.

During the meeting, Mircea Snegur said that the adoption of the new Moldovan Constitution opened a possibility to grant special legal status to certain localities in the republic. And the positive experience of solving the Gagauz problem may be utilized in solving the problem of Moldova's eastern areas.

An appropriate draft law has been already elaborated, however the Moldovan leadership is facing lack of understanding from the breakaway region's leaders. The president expressed bewilderment about reservations offered to delay the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation signed between Moldova and Russia as long ago as in 1990. A similar situation is emerging around the Russian 14th Army withdrawal. "And although the official stance of the Russian leadership remains unchanged, there are forces in Russia which are interested in keeping the conflict unsettled," Snegur said.

According to the presidential press service, Sergey Krylov did not deny the existence of such forces in Russia. He only stressed that all their actions are but their personal initiative which does not at all reflect the Russian Federation's policy. Russia is not going to deny its earlier agreements with Moldova, he said. "Dniester leaders' claims on solving the Russian Army's fate are devoid of any grounds—legal or moral," Sergey Krylov emphasized.

Foreign Trade Deficit Stands at $7,000,000 Jan-Feb

AU2604124995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 25/4/1995—In this past January-February, the Moldova's foreign trade deficit was $7,000,000, according to the State Statistics Department. INFOTAG was told in the Economy Ministry that the volume of foreign trade was $171 million. Export amounted to $82 million, which was 33 percent greater than in the same period last year. Import was $89 million, or 17 percent less than in 1994.

Sixty-three percent of all trade was with CIS countries. In January-February, exports to the CIS diminished by 18 percent, and imports by 11 percent. Meanwhile, exports to Western countries increased 3.5-fold, and imports decreased by 29 percent, compared to 1994.

Ruling Party Comes First in Local Authority Elections

LD2704101095 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 27 Apr 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The final results of the elections to local power bodies that were held on 16 April in Moldova have become known in Chisinau.

[Correspondent Mikhayl Sokirke—identified by caption] Although all the mayors of villages and settlements have not been appointed yet due to an insufficient number of votes, and reelections are to be held in Chisinau on 30 April, the balance of political power in the republic today is, according to the data of the Central Electoral Committee, completely clear. The electorate gave 643 mandates for local authority bodies, which is over 60 percent, to the ruling Agrarian-Democratic Party.

Other interesting figures have also become known. For instance, the communists got 199 mandates, while the blocof socialists with the Unity movement, which supports the agrarians in parliament, and which together with it determines Moldova's foreign policy, got only 82 mandates.

The alliance of democratic forces will be represented by 256 local authority councillors, the democrats by 31 and the Association of Women of Moldova by only nine.

It is possible that, taking into account the rather noticeable passivity of the electors, the above figures cannot be regarded as a reflection of the actual state of society. Nevertheless, one thing is indisputable - the electors show a preference for realists and economic reforms.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev on Ineptness of 'Western Schemes'

MM2704092095 Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Apr 95 p 1

[Own information report on Almaty meeting between group of Russian newspaper chief editors and President Nursultan Nazarbayev: "Democracy Is the Goal We Must Attain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, as we have already reported, a group of chief editors of Russian newspapers met with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Almaty.

Very diverse questions concerning the complex situation (where now is the situation not "complex"?) in the republic, Russian-Kazakhstani relations, the difficulties of developing a single economic (and also information) area within the framework of the Commonwealth of states, and the contradictory lessons of the decade since the start of "perestroyka" were touched upon in the course of a lengthy and very frank conversation. The president expressed his view both of the tragedy in Chechnya and of the threats associated with the dramatic events on the Tajik-Afghan border. In some respects he made even an unexpected interpretation of certain seemingly quite well-known events and "turning points" associated with the breakup of the Union, with what happened at the end of 1991 in Belovezhskaya Forest.... All this merits a separate discussion.

But there was one common question to the president—about his stand on Saturday's referendum on extending the president's powers through the year 2000 and about the reasons for dissolving the Kazakhstani parliament. Would it not have been more logical for N. Nazarbayev to nominate his candidacy in the 1996 presidential election? Everyone says that he would be virtually guaranteed victory, and there would be no question of any assault on democracy....

We believe that Nazarbayev's laconically expressed view of the situation (without comments) is of interest to our readers today, on the eve of the referendum.

"I will remind you once again," he remarked, "that I did not dissolve parliament. We formed a good relationship with the Supreme Council over the year, and we signed an agreement on joint work by the legislature and the executive. We resolved all disputes peacefully, and over two-thirds of the deputies—130 out of 177—always supported my initiatives. But, as is known, the Constitutional Court decided that the 1994 parliamentary elections were held in violation of laws and the constitution and that the legislative organ was illegitimate. You can think what you like, but to me this was simply like a bolt from the blue. But the law is the law, and the president is obliged to abide by the constitution, and I obeyed the Constitutional Court's decision. Otherwise how will we build a rule-of-law state?

"The Kazakhstan Peoples' Assembly proposed extending my powers through the year 2000. We had long been planning to convene it, and it was only by chance that the start of its work coincided with the parliamentary crisis. Precisely 305 assembly delegates from all the republic's oblasts voiced the idea of abandoning the wearisome pre-election marathon, which could cause our multinational state to blow up, and calmly tackling reform. Then this call was taken up by five political parties, including two opposition ones. The opposition leaders themselves admitted that they had no alternative economic program, that the first impetuses for stabilization had just manifested themselves in the economy, and that there was no point in changing horses in midstream, so to speak.

"They appealed to me. I gathered together prominent jurists: Does the extension of presidential powers run counter to the constitution? They told me that the president has the right to submit very important questions for the people's verdict, to put them to a referendum. That is what I decided. Let the people have their say. You have already held so many referenda in Russia, but this will be our first in Kazakhstan....

"Does this run counter to the principles of democracy? Am I establishing a 'dictatorship'? But I have now been playing leading roles in the republic for 12 years, and I long ago satisfied my own personal ambitions. We will certainly elect a new parliament—no way can we manage without it.

"For now, we have proclaimed democracy as the goal. We still have to attain it. Civilized countries took centuries to reach this goal, and universal, equal suffrage was established in America just 40 years ago, while their democracy is 200 years old! What can be said of Kazakhstan? Less than a century has passed since we 'skipped' out of feudalism. Only yesterday did we extricate ourselves from totalitarianism. Is it really possible to approach our democracy with the same yardsticks as in the United States or West European countries? Western schemes do not work in our Eurasian expanses. This, incidentally, also concerns Russia...."

...Well, let us postpone comments until the results of this referendum.

Almaty Begins Dismantling ICBM Silos

LD2604150495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1437 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, April 26 (Interfax)—Dismantling is under way of ICBM silos in Kazakhstan under the Start treaty, Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin told a news conference in Almaty on Wednesday [26 April].

The operation starting on April 12 is being carried out by the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces under control by Kazakhstan's defense and environment ministries, a defense ministry source in Almaty told Interfax.

He said that the dismantling operations would continue in the central region of Turgai and elsewhere in Kazakhstan where such silos are located. The source made it clear that the operation was an indication of the country's commitments under the Start agreement.

On Tuesday, Russia completed the withdrawal of nuclear warheads of the SS-18 missiles to its own territory.

The latest operation is part of the 1992 Lisbon protocol to the Start-1 deal binding three other nuclear states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to destroy all ICMBs stationed on their territory in a period of seven years. The break up of the former Soviet Union left Kazakhstan with 104 SS-18 missiles carrying 10 warheads each.

Nazarbayev Approves New Tax Code

LD2704102595 Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 95 p1

[FBIS Translated Text] Nursultan Nazarbayev has approved the text of the corrected tax code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was submitted to him, and signed the corresponding decree. The basic document for economic relations pertaining to the state and economic entities and individuals lessens the tax burdens of the latter two. Eleven kinds of taxes and payments are being introduced instead of 45. A 30 percent single rate of corporation tax has been introduced, which ensures correspondence with international practice and equality before the budget. The ceiling of the personal income tax rate is 40 percent, with a more graded progression on low incomes.

The new code says that only those people whose incomes were not taxed at source, those who have made major purchases within the year of a value exceeding one thousand times the minimum wage, or those who have foreign bank accounts are obliged to submit a tax return.

Each taxpayer must have an individual tax number. Work has been underway on this since last year and is due to be completed in the near future. Every taxpayer, whether a corporation or an individual, is obliged under the code to keep documents regarding incomes and expenditures for five years. The code contains a mechanism for recovering non-payments and debts to the budget, going up to setting up special auctions of debtors' properties to pay off debts.

The easing of the tax burden and the increasing of accountability for evading payments is evidence of the state's concern for the development of the business activities of economic entities and the republic's population, in the interests of accelerating the reforms and moving Kazakhstan out of the economic crisis.

The new tax code is to be published in the forthcoming issues of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

Tajikistan

Ceasefire Extended in Tajikistan; Almaty Talks Resume

LD2604172095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1651 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 26 (ITAR-TASS)—The Tajik Government and the opposition agreed in Moscow on Wednesday [26 April] to extend their ceasefire agreement for another month and to hold the fourth round of talks in Almaty on May 22, according to Otakhon Latifi, board member of the Coordinating Centre of Democratic Forces "Tajikistan".

The agreement followed days of consultations that ended in Moscow today.

The agenda of the fourth round of talks has been agreed and contains "fundamental issues of the constiutional system and consolidation of statehood of the Republic of Tajikistan."

These include proposals on a new constitution and a new law on elections; the participation of all sections of the Tajik population, political parties, movements and public organisation in the constitutional and law-making process; organisation and conduct of free democratic elections in Tajikistan; the transitional period; and the role of the United Nations and other international organisations in solving these tasks.

The opposition delegation insists on setting a deadline for remedying the breaches of the ceasefire agreement and stepping up control over the implementation of agreements by U.N. observers in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan's President Emomali Rakhmanov and Tajik opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri are due to meet in Kabul ahead of the fourth round of talks. Observers believe that the central issue at the talks will be the withdrawal of Tajik troops from the area covered by the ceasefire agreement.

The two delegations which took part in Moscow's talks are expected to sign a joint statement on the results of the consultations on Wednesday evening.

A Russian Foreign Ministry official will make a statement that "Russian border guards and Russian soldiers from the collective peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan, respect and recognise bilateral agreements between the Tajik sides and do not violate these agreements by fulfilling their mission."

Russian Commander's 'Irritation' 'Increasingly Overt'

MM2604144395 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Alisher Niyazov: "Deception on Southern Redoubts. The Commander of the Border Troops in Tajikistan Is Indignant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe—"The inter-Tajik consultations which have commenced in Moscow on the preparation of the fourth round of talks brought about only a temporary lull," Lieutenant General Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of the Russian Border Troops Group in Tajikistan, has declared. "The lull has in no way resulted from the talks but from resolute counteractions. A process of restoring the combat readiness of the groups of gunmen and building up reserves from deep inside Afghan territory is now under way." With metal in his voice the Russian general demanded that people, including the international community, call things by their proper names. In his opinion, the border guards in Tajikistan will not expose their backs in the future just because the Islamists' leaders have mounted a propaganda ballyhoo over Russian "military aggression" in the Pamir.

Observers believe that the tough tone of the statement results from several causes. The border guards have recently been of the opinion that they have been deceived just too often, and not only by the Tajik opposition. Now that it is quite clear that the first and, maybe, the main strike by gunmen from across the Pyandzh has misfired and that the opposition has incurred palpable losses (according to some data, up to 250 men), A. Chechulin's irritation is becoming increasingly overt.

Thus, the commander accuses the Tajik Government of having failed to take active measures to close its own responsible section of the Tajik-Afghan border, including on the Badakhshan salient. In an interview with a local newspaper he bluntly stated: "One thing must be understood very clearly—active forms of defense should be adopted against this form of aggression, and this primarily concerns the Tajik state. The republic has the potential for this." The deliveries of humanitarian aid to the Pamir along government lines, which were widely publicized by the local and Russian mass media in the past, were not forgotten either. It is known that, being transferred there by aircraft of the Collective Peacekeeping Force throughout the winter, it went not to civilian residents but to opposition gunmen. This gave very good support to Badakhshan's armed formations, enabling them to prepare more thoroughly for the events of early April.

Observers do not rule out the possibility that the Collective Peacekeeping Force, which is based on a perfectly battleworthy unit—the 201st Motorized Rifle Division—is also partly to blame for Chechulin's bad mood. On the eve of the April battles Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the peacekeeping force, repeatedly declared that in the event of a direct military danger the forces entrusted to him would give the border guards "in-depth support." He kind of kept his promise. Strangely, however, this support was given to the Moskovskiy and Pyandzh Border Detachments, i.e. to the border sectors where a relative lull was observed during those days. Not one peacekeeper appeared on the Pamir salient, where Russian border guards were engaged in fierce fighting against Badakhshani and Islamic gunmen.

At the same time the summer promises to be hot once again on the border. This is indicated by the river crossings by Tajik mojahedin, which have become more frequent at the end of April, and by the firing on border guards from neighboring territory. The border's defenders hope that they will not have to defend the southern borders, as previously, on their own.

Russian Border Troops Act To Stop Border Illegalities

LD2604175095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1615 GMT 26 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Apr—Russian border troops "will continue to take every possible measure, employing the necessary forces and weaponry, to ensure their own safety and to stop the illegal acts being perpetrated across the Tajik-Afghan border," says a statement by a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, which was received today by ITAR-TASS.

The document notes that because of its present circumstances Afghanistan "is not for its part ensuring the proper conditions of control on its state border," and its territory adjacent to the border is "being actively used to fire on the border troops' installations, attack Russian border guards, and attempt armed incursions across the state border."

At the same time, "the Russian side, while having a sincere wish for an all-round political settlement in Tajikistan as well as wishing to achieve national accord and a guarantee for peace and stability, first of all, on the Tajik-Afghan border, is doing all it can for the promotion and success of the talks between the government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the opposition, and is prepared to help implement the agreements achieved," the document continues.

In connection with this, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to state that the "Russian border troops and the Russian servicemen within the ranks of the joint CIS peace-keeping forces deployed in Tajikistan, while respecting and recognizing the agreements between the Tajik sides, do not violate them when exercising their duties."

The border troops ensure the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border in accordance with the bilateral agreements with Tajikistan and multilateral agreements within the CIS framework and are "guided by the appropriate legislative and normative acts" while carrying out this task, the statement says.

Opposition Expected To Step Up Activities in Pamir

LD2604143195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1317 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KHOROG, April 26 (Interfax)—Tajik opposition militants are expected to step up activities on the Pamir section of the Tajik-Afghan border on Wednesday or Thursday, the chief of the staff of the Russian Border Force Colonel-General Aleksandr Tymko told Interfax Wednesday [26 April].

He said that there is an impressive concentration of opposition groups on the Afghan side. Hostilities are expected to break out in the directions of Vanch, Kalaikhum and Khorog (Gorno Badakhshan, East Tajikistan).

Quoting intelligence sources the general said that the leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Movement ordered their supporters to conduct acts of terrorism against Russian officers.

Tymko said that in Vanch and Yazgulem powerful border forces are formed capable of resisting militant attacks for several days. In the next few days the general will visit several sections of the border in Badakhshan where breakthroughs are most probable.

An intelligence officer of the Khorog border unit told Interfax that militants have at their disposal a Sukhoi-25 combat plane and several MI-8 helicopters but they have not been used against border guards so far. Referring to intercepted radio transmissions he said that the leadership of the intelligence service in Afghanistan has ordered the free distribution of drugs among CIS border guards on the Tajik-Afghan frontier.

Badakhshan Commander Suspends Ceasefire With Russians

LD2604171895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Khorog, April 26 (Interfax)—A field commander in Nagorno-Badakhshan, Salam, suspended the ceasefire agreement earlier concluded with Russian border guards this morning.

An Interfax correspondent reports from Khorog (the administrative center of Badakhshan) that a representative of Salam presented the command of the Khorog border regiment's first post an ultimatum demanding that his people be allowed to move towards Afghanistan. Salam said that otherwise he would attack border guards. According to Russian intelligence officers, Salam has about 300 militants.

An intelligence officer of the Khorog border regiment told Interfax that armed groupings in Badakhshan could be divided into three categories: neutral groupings (for instance, the Rushan grouping led by Kholbash); groupings subordinated to the Afghan headquarters of the Movement for Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan (the Vanch-Yazgulem grouping led by Salam) and more autonomous groupings which are more loyal towards Dushanbe (the Khorog grouping led by Mandzhnun).

Chief of the Russian Border Guard Troops Main Headquarters, Colonel-General Aleksandr Tymko told Interfax today that the Khorog border regiment was ready to resist attacks even if they began this evening. He said the situation was under control. Tymko said border guards could have to resist a wide-scale offensive of the opposition's militants. Tymko said that military actions could be launched both from Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

An Interfax correspondent on the scene reports that the situation in the area controlled by the Khorog border regiment remains calm but border guards are on alert.

Armenia

Russian Envoy Hands Parliament Statement to President

NC2604203395 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, 26 April, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan received Russian Ambassador to Armenia Andrey Urnov, who handed the Russian Federation Council's statement on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the president of Armenia.

The Armenian presidential press service reports that Ambassador Urnov said during the meeting that by formally handing over the statement the Russian side wishes to stress the importance Russia gives to the consolidation of the existing cease-fire and speedy resolution of the conflict.

The current progress in resolving the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict as well as other issues of mutual interest were also discussed.

Border Positions Shelled From Azerbaijan

NC2604184395 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Armenian Defense Ministry reported that the calm on Armenia's northeastern border was again disrupted last night. The defensive positions of Ttujur in Krasnoselsk came under fire from various firearms between 2100 and 2115, and at Chinari in Tavush between 2330 and 2400. There were no casualties in either case. The Army subunits forced the enemy to cease firing.

No incidents have taken place along the rest of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border since last night.

The cease-fire is being observed in Karabakh. This was reported by the press service of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army headquarters.

Turkey Allows Airspace for Armenia-Lebanon Flights

LD2604204795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1914 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, April 26 (Interfax)—Turkey has agreed to let via its air space planes flying from Armenia to Lebanon where many ethnic Armenians are living.

This air corridor will be opened in early June. The corresponding agreement was signed during the visit of the Armenian Civil Aviation Main Department's delegation led by the government's official Shagen Petrosyan to Ankara on April 20-21.

The Armenian vice-president's Advisor on Civil Aviation Issues Karpis Titizyan told Interfax today that Armenian planes going to Beirut now had to fly via Bulgaria which was rather expensive.

Titizyan said that Turkey's decision to give the permission for Armenian planes to fly in its air space would bring serious positive economic results and animate political relations between Yerevan and Ankara. He said that this move, in fact, marked the beginning of Turkey softening its tough policy towards Armenia and development of bilateral relations on the whole.

Turkey closed the air corridor between Armenia and Lebanon in 1993 after Karabakh troops seized the Kelbadzhar Region of Azerbaijan. All land communications between Armenia and Turkey were also suspended. The two countries have not yet established diplomatic relations between them though Turkey was one of the first to recognize Armenia's independence in 1991.

Azerbaijan

High-Ranking OSCE Officials Arrive in Baku

NC2604174295 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] High-ranking OSCE officials arrived in Baku today. Rene Niberg, co-chairman of Minsk Group; Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian Foreign Ministry's ambassador for special missions; [name indistinct], chairman of the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials; and other officials are included in the delegation.

The Foreign Ministry informed KHABAR SERVICE that the aim of the visit is to get acquainted once more with the republic's position on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

They will also visit Armenia.

Doubts Over POW Exchange With Armenia

LD2604161695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1406 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, April 26 (Interfax) —Azerbaijan's National Security Minister Namig Abbasov has expressed doubt that the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties will be able to conclude the exchange of POWs and hostages in accordance with the principle "all for all" by May 12.

In an interview with Interfax Wednesday [26 April] Abbasov declared that Azerbaijan is ready for such an exchange any time. However, Nagorno Karabakh's Armenians, he said, have not given any positive answer to, in particular, appeals of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia's Federation Council, and the German parliament to implement the exchange before May 12.

Abbasov asserts that Nagorno Karabakh's Armenians oppose the "all for all" exchange.

According to official information from Baku, there are no Armenian hostages in Azerbaijan. However, there are 22 Armenian captives and 16 people of Armenian nationality who, according to Azerbaijani sources, have ended up on Azerbaijan's territory due to unclear circumstances.

Baku reports that about 4,700 Azerbaijanis are in Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh at present.

Meanwhile, Stepanakert reported that there are about 150 Azerbaijani POWs in Nagorno Karabakh.

Finance Minister Assesses Reform Program

954F2160A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 22 Apr 95 p 5

[Interview with Minister of Finance Fikret Yusifov, by A. Feyzullaogly; place and date not given: "'It is Easier To Write a Program of Reform Than To Implement It': Azerbaijani Minister of Finance Fikret Yusifov Believes That People's Irresponsibility Is Much More Dangerous Than Transportation Blockades and Disruption of Economic Ties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Feyzullaogly] The economic situation in the country is grave. What currently constitutes the greatest concern for you, the person at the helm of the republic's financial system?

[Yusifov] The budget policy, based on the approach of tight credit and strict savings, which the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank has been conducting for the past five or six months, has stabilized the Azerbaijani manat. We were able to achieve this because the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank have implemented the provisions of the main directions of the economic policy the Azerbaijani Government intends to conduct. We have drafted this program together with the IMF and other international organizations.

True, at the beginning of April the exchange rate of the manat dropped sharply. But its decline was artificially engineered. In order to stop this process, we took measures of an economic nature. In order to influence the "black market," we organized additional sales of U.S. dollars at the Baku Interbank Foreign Currency Exchange, and thus were able to avoid a sharp jump in the national currency's exchange rate in relation to U.S. dollar.

I have to note right away that although we can prop the manat for a while this way, one cannot resort to such measures all the time. It is impossible to constantly conduct foreign currency interventions—to do this, we have to first earn foreign currency. In order to put an end to this problem once and for all, serious transformations in the economy are needed, changes in its structure. I support the viewpoint that economic reforms have to be conducted in a consistent way and in keeping with the requirements of the current situation.

And the situation in the Azerbaijani economy is dismal. This is due first and foremost to the fact that most of our enterprises are idle. I have said many times before, and will repeat again today: If the country does not have a healthy economy, there is no way it can have a normal financial situation.

[Feyzullaogly] What specifically can you offer in the way of getting out of the current situation?

[Yusifov] We need to start with base elements of the present economy and proceed consistently, implementing reform along the way. It is necessary to create a mechanism that would be capable of imposing strict control over all economic activities. Of course, we have a government apparat, but in the current situation the economy cannot be regulated only by current laws and decrees. Today, in order to ensure the revival of the Azerbaijani economy and agriculture, decisions need to be made that will take into account specific peculiarities and psychological factors on the local level. That is, the situation of each enterprise in the country should be studied separately, and individual decisions should be made in each particular case on restarting its operations. The current situation requires precisely this approach.

[Feyzullaogly] Will this not create confusion?

[Yusifov] There are departments for each industry in the government and the structures subordinate to it. The government should direct joint efforts of these structures. The situation in each sphere should be analyzed and concrete measures implemented in order to get out of the crisis situation.

It is easier to write a program of reforms than to implement it. I believe that first of all we should achieve macroeconomic stability. And to do this, we have to first create a strong economic base. Without it, implementation of the economic reform will be seriously hampered.

We have now achieved political stability in the country and, as a result, financial stability; this creates a foundation for economic revival.

Of course, the closing of the North Caucasus Railroad, and disruption of economic ties and old mechanisms are important factors hampering the republic's economic revival. But there are enterprises where stoppages are not related to the aforementioned circumstances. The reason these enterprises are faring poorly is the irresponsibility of their managers, and in many instances it is due to the fact that they put their personal interests above the national ones. This is the greatest tragedy. This is much more dangerous for Azerbaijan than the railroad closing and disruption of economic ties.

I want to return again to the idea that a rapid-response government mechanism should be put in place, where each person will do his job.

Yes, we have lost time. The currency has been changed several times; we have lost a considerable part of the national territory. And with respect to economic reforms, we are behind some republics of the former USSR. But this is even beneficial for us. Representatives of international economic organizations visiting our republic note that our republic has a good potential. We can effectively utilize the experience of others. For instance, the Baltic republics have conducted many experiments in reforming their economies, and we can take advantage of their experience. Azerbaijan developed for many years by the same scenario as these countries. Now we have common difficulties. And we can avoid repeating their mistakes.

Russia has done a lot in the area of economic reforms. We can study its experience. International economic organizations point out the example of Kyrgyzstan to us.

[Feyzullaogly] Does the Ministry of Finance get proposals on economic reforms from our own specialists and scholars?

[Yusifov] Last year we prepared on our own a draft program "Economic Reforms in Azerbaijan" and submitted it for consideration to the IMF and the World Bank. They approved the draft, after which it was sent to the relevant state and government bodies, but we still have not received a concrete reply. In my opinion, if the government develops a flexible-response mechanism, we will be able, having developed correct programs, to implement them and get out of the current situation with dignity. Our republic has a sufficient potential for it.

[Feyzullaogly] What is the current state of the budget?

[Yusifov] Right now the budget situation is grave. If you remember, during the discussion of the 1995 budget in the National Assembly, they said that we include line items in the budget, or finance organizations, at our discretion. This talk is groundless. We act in keeping with the existing law. If someone wants to get budget funding outside the law, this is, of course, impossible; nevertheless, the current state of the budget, as I already said, is dismal. Therefore, there are organizations that we cannot finance despite their numerous petitions: Enterprises are idle, so we get no tax revenue from them, and there is not enough money. As soon as money comes in, the Ministry of Finance will begin financing them without waiting for petitions.

[Feyzullaogly] The first quarter of this year is behind us. What is the situation with respect to tax revenue?

[Yusifov] In the first quarter of this year, especially in March, through intense efforts of the Main State Tax Inspectorate, we were able to collect the planned revenue. Trust me, in the current difficult situation this is an almost impossible task. I would like to use this opportunity to express through the newspaper my gratitude to the tax inspectorate staff, who conscientiously did their job.

Another question related to the budget. As is known, in the beginning of March the presidential edict on liberalization of hard currency regulations went into effect. In connection with the liquidation of the Consolidated Foreign Currency Fund, the revenue earned on compulsory sale of foreign currency will no longer go into the budget. Which means that in the second quarter the strain on the budget will increase. Emergency measures will have to be implemented in the economy.

[Feyzullaogly] Rumors have been circulating in all budget organizations for a long time regarding structural changes.

[Yusifov] Yes, the state structures that currently exist in the republic must be reined in. State structures that duplicate one another and get in the way of the common cause create real chaos. Resolution of any problem encounters a multi-level bureaucratic red tape and gets held up. The Ministry of Finance informed the relevant leadership bodies of its proposals on structural changes in the administrative apparat. This is a very important question. It is impossible to talk about a flexible-response state mechanism when five or six structures are involved in the sale of one and the same commodity. I said at the National Assembly: "By retaining only one such structure, we will be able to pay salaries to the employees of others just to keep them from meddling in the work of the former, and will accrue a great economic effect."

Serious structural changes are expected in the Ministry of Finance as well. First, work is being done on setting up a treasury system. Second, we want to set up a structure to work with securities, the need for which inevitably will arise in the course of privatization. Third, before implementing a tax reform in the country, we need to set up a special structure that will be drafting all normative documents and legislative acts.

One of the important points is creating an accounting system in the republic. To do this, hundreds of normative documents have to be drafted. At this point we still use as a guidance in many cases the accounting documents from USSR times. This is not normal. We have recently created an accounting methodology administration and intend to expand its staff and the sphere of work. The law "On Accounting" already has been passed by the National Assembly. In short, the reform should encompass not only the financial system, but all spheres.

Georgia

Shevardnadze 'Dissatisfied' With Moscow Abkhaz Policy

LD2604151995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1049 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, April 26 (Interfax)—Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze declared that he has certain grounds to be dissatisfied with Moscow's policy with respect to "the Abkhazian separatists."

In an exclusive interview with Interfax he reminded that "in the middle of this March separatists launched another bacchanalia of extremism in Abkhazia's Gali region with respect to the returning refugees and shot up civil population." "Unfortunately, Russia's peacekeeping forces headed by General Vassily Yakushev were passively watching these atrocities explaining their behavior by the fact that their functions do not included crime fighting," Shevardnadze said.

He confirmed the strive of the country's leadership for strategic partnership with Russia, however, he pointed out that relations between two countries would be firmer if "we felt support of Russia's counter efforts confirming reality of Moscow's break with Abkhazia's separatist regime and if we felt support of the peacekeeping forces."

"Preserving the loyalty to the constructive course aimed at further cooperation with Russia we confront reproaches and attacks on the part of our radicals. Frankly speaking, not only they but I, as well as they, feel that there are grounds for dissatisfaction," Shevardnadze underlined.

At the same time he said that Russia's position with respect to regional conflicts in Georgia has become "more definite and reassuring."

He confirmed readiness to grant to the autonomous republic of Abkhazia "the widest rights out of all existing in the international state-legal practice," however, Abkhazia's Constitution should be brought in line with Georgia's Basic Law.

Shevardnadze Talks With Romanian Foreign Minister

LD2604155095 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1200 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Romanian Foreign Minister Mr. Teodor Melescanu arrived in Tbilisi today for an official visit.

Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state, met the Romanian minister today. The minister conveyed greetings from the Romanian leadership. He said that Mr. Iliescu supports the policies of Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze and believes that bilateral relations should develop further. In this respect, the forthcoming reciprocal visits by the Georgian and Romanian leaders are of great importance. A package of agreements is being prepared for signing at the summits. As far as cooperation agreements are concerned, the most important ones deal with maritime and cultural projects.

Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze noted that prospects for building Caucasus transit routes are becoming more real. An important role in this could be played by Georgia and Romania, which occupy key positions in the Black Sea basin. The implementation of these projects would be extremely beneficial for both countries. [passage omitted]

Tomorrow Mr. Melescanu will leave for Baku.

Estonia

Tough Line Called For on Russian Council Membership

LD2504131195 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 25 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe today, Estonian President Lennart Meri expressed the hope that Ukraine and Moldova will soon become full members of the Council of Europe.

Meri said that Estonia calls upon the Council of Europe to pay the same attention to Moldova that it did to Estonia some time ago, and hoped that Moldova will soon become a full member of the Council of Europe. Lennart Meri emphasized that, at the same time, Estonia expects Russia to keep its promise and withdraw its troops from Moldova.

Lennart Meri noted that it was impossible for Russia to become a full member of the Council of Europe unless it guarantees that generally accepted democratic norms were adhered to on its territory. It is not clear why some emphasize the need to accept Russia at a time when more people are being killed in Chechnya then in the war in the former Yugoslavia.

In his speech, Lennart Meri briefly touched upon the current state of the Estonian economy and legislation, and said that there are no particular problems with the rights of ethnic minorities. He referred to U.S. Vice President Al Gore, who, after visiting Estonia, said that Estonia respected the rights of minorities and was an example to other states in this area. The situation of minorities in Estonia was also the main subject of questions following the president's speech, BNS reports.

No CE Membership While Chechnya Goes On

LD2604141295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1049 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, April 26 (Interfax)—Russia cannot become a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe [CE] as long as it fails to observe universally-recognized democratic norms and puts an end to the war in Chechnya, Estonian President Lennart Meri told the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly on Tuesday [25 April] in Strasbourg.

Sources at the Estonian president's press service told Interfax on Wednesday that the president "urged the Council's assistance for Russian democratic reforms."

Meri called for the full-fledged membership of Ukraine and Moldova in the Council of Europe.

Prime Minister Wants 'Friendlier Approach' to Russia

LD2604181095 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Apr 95

[Report by correspondent Ye. Sokolova; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] A certain amount of optimism has emerged in the difficult relations between Russia and Estonia. The new Estonian Government, which was formed last week, intends changing the climate of suspicion and adopting a friendlier approach toward its eastern neighbor. Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi said this in an interview with "Vesti."

[Begin Vahi recording] There are good prospects for us to acquire political relations and all other types of relations, cultural relations, between people. But of course we need more contact for this, including contact at a higher level, in my opinion. [end recording]

[Sokolova] During the past three years the Russian and Estonian presidents have met just once and the prime ministers have not met at all. It is quite interesting that in the days of Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar it was Tiit Vahi, who was then the Estonian prime minister, who signed a treaty on free trade between Russia and Estonia. The treaty is still not ratified and is not operating.

[Begin Vahi recording] We are ready for such contacts, including those which concern interstate relations. [end recording]

[Sokolova] The new prime minister says his cabinet is a government of pragmatists and experts. It is possible that they will succeed in achieving a well-balanced foreign policy with regard to Russia. Mart Laar's government avoided this, preferring nationalist, radical populism.

Russian Envoy on Kozyrev Statement

LD2604204695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1914 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, April 26 (Interfax)—The recent statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on a possible use of force to protect Russian citizens abroad was not intended against Estonia, Russian Ambassador in Tallinn Aleksandr Trofimov told Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi Wednesday [26 April].

According to Trofimov, Russia is ready to normalize relations with Estonia, and "the process has already begun." He hoped that the new Estonian government will pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy towards Russia.

The Estonian government press office told Interfax that Vahi had pointed out his republic's interest in establishing good-neighborly relations with its eastern neighbor. He emphasized that Estonia supported free trade and would like to sell its goods to Russia on the same conditions. However, Russia's high customs duties on Estonian goods hamper the exchange of goods between the two countries.

Vahi also remarked that Estonia could not simplify its border clearance procedure for those coming from Russia, because the strict border control was essential to ensure the republic's security.

Vahi told the Russian ambassador that his government will soon consider submitting the July 26, 1994 bilateral agreements on the troop withdrawal and social guarantees for Russian retired officers for ratification by the republic's parliament.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin had submitted the documents for ratification by the State Duma on January 14, 1995.

Interior Ministry Staff Changes Return Former Officials

LD2604142695 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The new government's broom is sweeping in the administration sphere of the interior minister. New staff—or in some sense, previous staff, depending on one's taste—are taking office. Uku Toom went along to a news conference at the Interior Ministry.

[Toom] The news conference that took place should be called an information hour instead. The new team brought into—or rather, brought back into—the Interior Ministry by Minister Edgar Savisaar was presented. The new minister's staff placements have been swift and resolute. Jaan Toots has been appointed the Police Department director general's first deputy; Andres Kollist the Citizenship and Immigration Department director general; Urmas Soorumaa advisor to the interior minister; and Jaanus Rahumagi director general of the Police Department. This stands for closer cooperation than hitherto with security firms. [passage omitted]

Gero Kartau, chancellor of the ministry, saw it necessary to explain that the recruitment of new men at the ministry does not mean that the place is swept clean.

[Begin Kartau recording] Three staff have now left, and a number of extra staff have been employed. These are not at all new posts but the filling of places created by the previous minister, so I would not say there have been any substantial staff changes. [end recording]

[Toom] Andres Kollist, the new Citizenship and Immigration Department director general, was asked about his attitude to the deadline by which non-citizens must submit applications for residence and work permits.

[Begin Kollist recording] July 12, which is of course a very much politicized and complicated issue ...[pauses]...I have no clear plan at present as to whether to cancel this date, amend it, or postpone it. I would rather like to avoid doing this and view the date in the following manner: the individuals who act within the proclaimed law display their loyalty to the state of Estonia, and those who do not care at all about this date show that they do not wish to respect the laws of the country where they would like to carry on living under residence permits. This is my philosphical approach to the issue. It is too early to say what the practical steps will be. [end recording]

Lithuania

Seimas Ratifies European Convention on Rights, Freedoms

LD2704111095 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 27 Apr 95

[Report by correspondent Guoda Salciute]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Seimas unanimously adopted the bill to ratify the European convention on protection of human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the fourth, seventh, and 11th protocols to this convention.

However, the first protocol of the convention, which protects property rights and which Lithuania has already signed was not ratified today. Agreement was reached instead that the Seimas will adopt a resolution soon by which it will commit itself to ratifying the first protocol of the European convention on protection of human rights and basic freedoms this year. [passage omitted]

The European convention on protecting human rights and basic freedoms says that a country which ratifies the convention may include certain provisos in it if the convention runs counter to that country's legislation. This opportunity was used by Lithuania, as well: Several provisos were included in the ratified convention. [passage omitted]

Leftists, President Gain Support; VE Ceremony Boycott Cited

WS2604141895 Tallinn BNS in English 1212 GMT 26 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Vilnius, Apr 26, BNS—In April the popularity of Lithuania's left-wing political figures increased more rapidly than that of the centrists or rightists. President Algirdas Brazauskas went up by the highest number of points in the ratings. Such results were produced by the public opinion poll conducted each month by the Lithuanian-British Baltic Research group.

In March Brazauskas dropped to the lowest ever in the popularity list. In April, however, he went up by eight points to the second place. This boost in Brazauskas' popularity may be linked with his refusal to go to Moscow for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Allied Victory over the Nazi Germany.

The popularity of Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius rose by six points. [passage omitted]

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